of the King and the House of Lords, were publicly understood to be the only means of attaining Catholic emancipation, and that Canning was prepared to lead the attack, without doubt a large section of those who had hitherto voted in the House of Commons for emancipation would have declined to support any longer a measure which, it would then unexpectedly have appeared, could not be passed without imperilling the whole framework of the Constitution. Peremptorily rejected by a large majority in the House of Commons, the measure would have been despaired of by the Irish people, with what consequences it is not difficult to imagine. Canning then justified his political rectitude in regard to treating Catholic emancipation as a question on which no possible Government could abide to stand or fall; and to limiting his protests in favour of the measure to the persuasive force of a powerful advocacy. These debates mark an important epoch in Canning's last brilliant five years of office; and deserve the attention which the foregoing observations endeavour to draw to them. Many people think of him only as a Foreign Minister. The result of his present effort marks him as a consummate debater; and still more, still higher, still rarer, a persuasive debater; and an orator who, without losing his friends or his principles, could succeed by fair argument in disarming and conciliating opponents. To return to the text-Canning passes from domestic to foreign affairs; and notes as immediate work firstly, 'Stuart's Instructions,' secondly, 'Lamb's.' Sir Charles Stuart was at this time designated for the mission to the Emperor of Brazil (Political Life,' vol. ii. p. 318), with a view to mediate between Portugal and Brazil. It was accordingly arranged that he should call at Lisbon to ascertain the terms of the Portuguese Government, and then pass on to Rio de Janeiro; but all this did not take place till later in the year. Sir Frederick Lamb's mission to Madrid held instructions to settle the mutual recriminations of the British and Spanish Governments; Great Britain complaining of the infraction of treaties with respect to facilities for commerce; Spain complaining of smuggling connived at by British officials, and of the harbouring of refugee conspirators in London. Later on Canning promises to communicate to Lord Granville the answer returned to Count Nesselrode's (Russian) despatch on the recognition of the independence of the Spanish Colonies, and to address to his Lordship a despatch for the French Government relative to the Channel Oyster Fisheries.] 1825 1825 EXTRACT OF OPINION OF THE AUSTRIAN PLENIPOTENTIARY, presented at St. Petersburg on March 4, 1825, on the Greek Question. Si, contre toute vraisemblance, la Porte déclinait l'intervention des Alliés, ou si, cette intervention une fois admise, elle se refusait absolument à des concessions jugées indispensables pour amener le terme de l'insurrection, les ministres des Cours Alliées s'armeraient d'un langage plus sévère; prendraient une attitude plus imposante. Accusant alors avec justice le Divan seul de la prolongation de ces troubles funestes, dont la réaction se fait sentir en Europe et froisse les intérêts les plus chers des souverains et des peuples, ils en concluraient l'impossibilité de laisser subsister davantage un tel état des choses. Ils feraient pressentir la possibilité de se rapprocher des Grecs, de leur envoyer des agents consulaires et de recevoir les leurs; dire même qu'on pourrait reconnaître chez eux l'existence d'un Gouvernement provisoire et menacer peut-être d'admettre un jour l'indépendance de la Morée et des Iles. [This memorandum appears to contradict the account given in the 'Political Life,' pp. 434-435. There it is stated that Austria differed from the Russian Government with regard to the principles which were to govern the conference, and with regard to the end to be aimed at; that Austria only sought to gain time and amuse Russia, until the Porte should have quelled the insurrection; that she desired the rebellion to be put down at any rate, and that she decidedly objected to the proceeding desired by Russia that the Porte should be menaced with the withdrawal of the representatives of the Allies if their intervention was refused. In this memorandum, on the contrary, the Austrian Plenipotentiary submitted as follows: If, contrary to all probability, the Porte should decline the intervention of the allies, or, if that intervention once admitted, she should refuse absolutely the terms pronounced indispensable for putting an end to the insurrection, the Ministers to the Allied Courts should make use of sterner language, should adopt an attitude more overawing, accusing with justice the Divan alone of being responsible for the prolongation of these melancholy troubles, of which the reaction was felt in Europe, and disturbed the dearest interests of sovereigns and peoples. They would argue the impossibility of per mitting the continuance any longer of such a state of things. They would bring before the Porte the possibility of their opening up communications with the Greeks-of sending to Greece Consular Agents, and accepting Greek Consular representatives in return; to remind the Divan that it was possible for the Allies to recognise the establishment amongst the Greeks of a provisional Government, and 'to warn them of the possibility of a recognition some day of the independence of the Morea and the Isles. The copy of this remarkable exposition of Austrian views contains a correction in Canning's own handwriting, and is endorsed with instructions in pencil to furnish copies for Lord Granville (Paris), Sir Henry Wellesley (Vienna), Mr. Stratford Canning (St. Petersburg), and Mr. Temple (Berlin). Its great value lay in its use in the event of a controversy with Austria on liberal principles. Austria had taken upon herself to rebuke the British Government for the recognition of the separated Spanish Colonies; and now, only two months afterwards, she was propounding to her allies at a formal conference the possibility of their finding it expedient to recognise the independence of revolted Greece. It may be observed that Great Britain was not represented at the conference in question; not improbably a reason why Austria permitted herself so outspoken a declaration of policy more consistent with that of Great Britain than with the principles usually professed by Austria.] MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE. F. O.: March 9, 1825. My dear Granville,─My despatch of to-day is made for communication to Villèle. I have no objection to your communicating it hereafter to Metternich himself, if you take to each other. But I will not make up to him nor have him made up to, on my behalf, until I know the rights of J'en suis indigné.' As to Damas, you may communicate the enclosures or not, as you like best, but I see no reason for his seeing the despatch. I have just finished Stuart's instructions-oh! what a labour they have been-60 folios-mi-marge to be sure, and not very closely written-but portentous in bulk after all allowance and deduction. 1825 1825 I have taken leave of him to-day, and he will probably sail on Saturday. Express my acknowledgments to Villèle for his promise about Hyde de Neuville, and assure him that what we are about to do, (or to try to do,) between Portugal and Brazil will be as advantageous for France as for ourselves, if we are not thwarted. There is a M. Gestos at Brazil, a very busybody; with all Chateaubriand's restlessness and vapouring about him I cannot expect his recall; but I wish he was ordered to be quick. The next that I shall take in hand will be Fredk. Lamb, and with his instructions I will consider well of Cuba. I agree with Villèle in thinking that there is great danger there, and that we have a common interest in preventing it if we can. Ever, my dear Granville, Sincerely and affectionately yours, G. C. P.S.-I have not been out yet, but I think of going down to the H. of C. to-morrow. [He here sends a despatch, adapted for communication to M. de Villèle, and possibly to Metternich, who was at Paris at this time, but Lord Granville is warned against any appearance of making up to Metternich, until Canning has found out the exact force of his expression 'J'en suis indigné.' ('I am insulted by it,' 'indignant at it.') Communication to M. de Damas is, however, left to Lord Granville's direction. What the precise topic might be to which the above-mentioned despatch referred is not clear. It possibly may be a despatch sending Lord Granville formally a copy of the instructions to Sir Charles Stuart, as it subsequently appears in a letter to Lord Granville of April 1, that the instructions were shown to Metternich. He next congratulates himself on having cleared off the lengthy 'instructions' required for Sir Charles Stuart on his mission of mediation between Portugal and Brazil; and sends a message of acknowledgment to Villèle for the withdrawal of Hyde de Neuville from Lisbon, and for the consequent cessation of hostile intrigues at Lisbon; he also desires a hint to be given for a partial suppression of a M. Gestos at Brazil. We find the Foreign Secretary doing his best by acting at the French head-quarters to get the hindrances removed, which French Diplomatic Agents might otherwise deem it their duty to place in the way of Sir Charles Stuart's mission at Lisbon, and at Rio de Janeiro. In Life and Times,' pp. 504-506, there will be found letters from Sir W. A'Court to Mr. Canning, and from Mr. Canning to Lord Granville, of dates of December 18, 1824, and January 15, 1825, respectively, which explain the precise nature of the pressure brought to bear on the Portuguese Government to bring about a change of Ministry; it consisted simply in a threat to withdraw the British squadron in the Tagus, thereby leaving the Portuguese capital exposed to an inroad from a hostile Brazilian naval expedition. Hyde de Neuville, French Minister at Lisbon, when the change of the Portuguese Administration was accomplished, departed for France by sea, just missing counter-orders which, if reaching him in time, might have detained him at Lisbon ; but anyhow he was gone, and Canning had the satisfaction of finding the Portuguese Government formed on a basis of which he approved, and the everlasting irritation of the intriguing French Agent withdrawn. In referring to his next business, the drafting instructions to Sir F. Lamb at Madrid-he notices the question of Cuba, and the danger which he agrees with Villèle in thinking existed in regard to that Island, whether from the United States, or from the new Spanish States, is not made clear. It appears that Spain anticipated danger from the United States, who were apprehensive of the intentions of Great Britain with respect to Cuba, and might be expected to take active measures to secure their own interests, unless reassured by some self-denying declaration of the British Government as to that island; whereas lookers on rather expected that Cuba would become the prize of one of the New States, if Spain persisted in keeping up hostilities with them.] MR. CANNING TO VISCOUNT GRANVILLE. Foreign Office: March 11, 1825. VOL. I. S 1825 |