a table. They would come in contact with a highly organized and powerful force on the one hand, while on their side they are scattered and not in a position to send proper representatives to present their side of the proposition. It is possible that after the establishment of a governmental agency such as we have been talking about that we could meet around a table, with an agency of that kind to protect the interests of the producers and of the public, and do a great deal in the matter of cooperation and after consultation. But until that time, until we shall have that kind of impartial agency with authority, I do not believe there is anything in the settling of disputes around a

table.

Gentlemen of the committee, I come to the question of the decree in finishing my statement. I hesitate to discuss the decree. I can only discuss it from the standpoint of a farmer who does not understand these matters very well. I know that there are a good many lawyers on this committee, and they have probably studied this decree and understand it very much better than I do. I will say that in a general way to the ordinary farmer the decree looked pretty good to start with. We thought that as far as certain things were concerned it was going to accomplish something. The stockyards are dealt with, and unrelated lines are dealt with. But as we came to study these several questions of the decree it began to look a good deal to us like the month of March, which sometimes comes in like a lion and goes out like a lamb. A good many sections impress one with the idea that we have heard expressed: Now you have them and then you haven't them.

In looking over the decree it occurred to me that the Attorney General started with the very best of intentions, but before he got very far with negotiations, in his compromise, he came in contact with men who thoroughly understood every phase and crook and turn of the business, and possibly their interests were very thoroughly protected before he got the terms of the decree agreed on. Mr. ANDERSON. I understand that you think the Attorney General started out with intentions and ended with intentions?

Mr. BURKE. Yes; I think that might be a fair statement.
Mr. ANDERSON. You may continue.

Mr. BURKE. You gentlemen undoubtedly know that the petition and the answer and the decree itself were all agreed on before the suit was filed. It was in the nature of a compromise, and looked at from the packer point of view, I presume they feel that they accomplished two things: (1) That they headed off legislation-or at least they hoped to head off legislation by allaying the agitation, distrust, and suspicion that surrounds the business. Having come to an agreement with the Department of Justice, I assume that they thought the public would feel that everything was settled and all right. And (2) that, temporarily at least, they had stopped prosecution.

They were mistaken, I believe, in their first expectation. I believe as soon as the decree becomes thoroughly understood by the public and by the producers that instead of allaying agitation it will grow stronger than it has ever been. I do not believe these questions in this country can ever be settled until they are settled right, and the decree touches only on one of the tap roots of the

monopoly, and that is the stockyards. Other important features of the situation were left out of consideration altogether.

I would like to refer to the decree of 1904, handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States in order to show you how decrees have been working. I will first read you the decree. [Reading:]

In Swift & Co. v. United States, decided by the United States Supreme Court in October, 1904 (196 U. S.), 375, that court sustained a decree against Swift and the other large packers, reading as follows:

And now, upon motion of the said attorney, the court doth order that the preliminary injunction heretofore awarded in this cause, to restrain the said defendants and each of them, their respective agents and attorneys, and all other persons acting in their behalf, or in behalf of either of them, or claiming so to act, from entering into, taking part in, or performing any contract, combination, or conspiracy, the purpose or effect of which will be, as to trade and commerce in fresh meats between the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia, a restraint of trade, in violation of the provisions of the act of Congress approved July 2, 1890, entitled "An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," either by directing or requiring their respective agents to refrain from bidding against each other in the purchase of live stock; or collusively, and by agreement, to refrain from bidding against each other at the sales of live stock; or, by combination, conspiracy, or contract, raising or lowering prices or fixing uniform prices at which the said meats will be sold, either directly or through their respective agents; or by curtailing the quantity of such meats shipped to such markets and agents; or by establishing and maintaining rules for the giving of credit to dealers in such meats, the effect of which rules will be to restrict competition; or by imposing uniform charges for cartage and delivery of such meats to dealers and consumers, the effect of which will be to restrict competition; or by any other method or device, the purpose and effect of which is to restrain commerce as aforesaid; and also from violating the provisions of the act of Congress approved July 2, 1890, entitled "An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," by combining or conspiring together, or with each other or others, to monopolize or attempt to monopolize any part of the trade and commerce in fresh meats among the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia, by demanding, obtaining, or, with or without the connivance of the officers or agents thereof, or any of them, receiving from railroad companies or other common carriers transporting such fresh meats in such trade and commerce, either directly or by means of rebates. or by any other device, transportation of or for such meats, from the points of the preparation and production of the same from live stock or elsewhere, to the markets for the sale of the same to dealers and consumers in other States and Territories than those wherein the same are so prepared, or the District of Columbia, at less than the regular rates which may be established or in force on their several lines of transportation, under the provisions in that behalf of the laws of the said United States for the regulation of commerce, be, and the same is hereby, made perpetual.

But nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the said defendants from agreeing upon charges for cartage and delivery, and other incidents connected with local sales, where such charges are not calculated to have any effect upon competition in the sales and delivery of meats; nor from establishing and maintaining rules for the giving of credit to dealers where such rules in good faith are calculated solely to protect the defendants against dishonest or irresponsible dealers, nor from curtailing the quantity of meats shipped to a given market where the purpose of such arrangement in good faith is to prevent the overaccumulation of meats as perishable articles in such markets. Nor shall anything herein contained be construed to restrain or interfere with the action of any single company or firm, by its or their officers or agents (whether such officers or agents are themselves personally made parties defendant hereto or not), acting with respect to its or their own corporate or firm business, property, or affairs.

The milk in the coconut of the decree in the first part winding up with "or by any other method or device, the purpose and effect of which is to restrain commerce as aforesaid."

Now, I will read you what the Attorney General said in his statement to the press in regard to the packer decree. (Reading :)

Attorney General Palmer, in his statement to the pre s regarding the pro-. posed packer decree, said:

The parent companies and their controlling heads, appreciating the advantages which were to be gained by controlling the stockyards and the facilities pertaining thereto the stockyard terminal railways and market papers and journals—and realizing that the use of uch instrumentalities might thus enable them to obtain a primary profit, not only out of the sale of live stock purchased and slaughtered by them, but also on that purchased and slaughtered by their competitors, and realizing the opportunities thereby to repress and discourage the development of independent packers and slaughterhouses and to control the shipments of meats to the various markets, set about the acquisition of the various stockyards and the appurtenances and privileges incidental thereto. This in many in tances was done by a concert of action and pursuant to a common understanding. In most instances the acquisition of control of the aforesaid stockyards by any one or more of the parent companies was acquiesced in by the others, and in all instance the ownership or control of stockyards by other packers, or by anyone, in fact, other than the parent companies or one of their members or their controlling heads was discouraged and opposed.

The parent companies have availed themselves of the control sɔ acquired by them in the stockyards aforesaid to elect the officers and directors of said stockyards and to dominate and control the policies thereof. They have granted exclusive privileges, such as the right to purchase dead animals, the right to furnish supplies and facilities, and the location of cattle banks and cattleloan companies, to concerns and corporations in which they, or some of them, or individuals who are stockholders in said parent companies, hold the controlling stock, all of which has been done with the intent and purpose and has had the effect of discouraging and suppressing the establishment of independent packing establishments and dwarfing the growth of such independent packing companies which might then be in existence, to enable said parent companies, their subsidiaries, or the individulas who own and control the parent companies and their subsidiaries, to obtain vast profits from the management of the stockyard and the granting of the privileges appurtenant thereto, which profits are realized not only upon the live stock purchased by the packers but upon that purchased by their competitors, and have thus enabled them to enjoy and realize such profits without the same appearing or being disclosed in the profits of the parent companies; and otherwise to further the attempt of said parent companies to monopolize the meat industry of the country and artificially control the ultimate price which the consumer pays for meat and meat products.

Now, gentlemen of the committee, that is the statement of the Attorney General, and refers to practices which the defendants here have been engaged in while the decree of 1904 was in effect. So, if they would continue, as the Attorney General said, to violate the terms of the decree of 1904, what is to prevent them from violating the decree of 1920? And particularly as this present decree is something that the court has never considered. All that the court did. in the matter was simply to sign his name above the dotted line; and what reason have we to think that if the packers did not carry out in good faith the terms of the decree that any action will be taken; and, possibly, if they should violate the terms of this decree another decree would be the result? And is there anything illegal in violating the terms of this decree, except where the prohibitions are already covered by law? There are a great many prohibitions in this decree which are not covered by present law, and, as I look at it

Mr. WILSON (interposing). What prohibitions are not covered by present law?

Mr. BURKE. The question of ownership of stockyards is one thing. It is not covered by the present law. And dealing in these unrelated lines is not covered by the present law. The principal features of the decree, as far as products are concerned, are those things, and the stockyards, and they are not covered by the present law.

Mr. WILSON. I know; but they are covered by the decree, aren't they?

Mr. BURKE. Yes; they are covered by the decree; but I am predicating my statement here on the proposition that they do not follow the terms of the decree. And in violating the terms of the decree, I am taking the position that as far as the terms thereof which are not covered by present law are concerned, they can violate them with impunity; that it is merely a matter of good faith agreement between the Attorney General and the packers.

One fatal defect in my opinion in the decree is that there is no provision made for making the decree effective. A decree may be very, very good in itself, but if there is no provision for making it effective it is not likely to amount to anything. The Attorney General, even if he sets up some little machinery inside his own office, is not in a very good position to know currently what is going on at the stockyards. His facilities for keeping track of all these things are not such as would give him current knowledge of events; and whatever things might be brought to his attention, practices which violate the terms of the decree, the chances are it will be long after the happening of the events, and it will then be a matter of the institution of some kinds of proceedings, or the taking of some action to remedy the things rather than to nail down the practice right on the spot and remedy it at the time.

That is the reason why I believe if we had a commission or some kind of agency created by law to be right on the spot at the markets that it would greatly strengthen this very decree, because that agency could very well be used to make such decree effective, and could report to the Attorney General any violations.

Now, gentlemen of the committee, I believe that is all I have to say unless there are some questions you wish to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. Do any members of the committee wish to ask any questions?

Mr. RAINEY. Yes; I want to ask a few questions.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. RAINEY. Mr. Burke, were you present at the hearings on the Sims bill?

Mr. BURKE. Well, I testified on the Sims bill; yes.

Mr. RAINEY. Were you in favor of that?

Mr. BURK. Of the Sims bill?

Mr. RAINEY. Yes.

Mr. BURKE. No. By the time the Sims bill came up for discussion, as I remember, the war was at an end. And I considered the Sims bill a war measure and that the emergency was practically over and that the provisions of the Sims bill were not applicable by the time it got well under discussion in committee.

Mr. RAINEY. You testified at that hearing, didn't you?

Mr. BURKE. Yes; but not in favor of the Sims bill. I testified in favor of legislation, but not, as I say, along the lines of the Sims bill. Mr. RAINEY. Did you testify at the hearing of the Kenyon bill? Mr. BURKE. At the hearings of the Kenyon and Kendrick bills; yes.

Mr. RAINEY. Were you in favor of those bills?

Mr. BURKE. I was in favor of legislation along the lines of those bills; yes. You are speaking now of

Mr. RAINEY (interposing). Of the hearings held on those bills. Mr. BURKE. On which Kenyon and Kendrick bills are you talking about? There were two Kendrick bills. I suppose you refer to the Kenyon and Kendrick bills-let me see if I have them here. Mr. RAINEY. You were present at the hearings on the Kenyon and Kendrick bills?

Mr. BURKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. RAINEY. And you were testifying in favor of those bills?

Mr. BURKE. I was in favor of legislation along the lines of those bills. But I have never been in favor of the exact terms of those particular bills.

Mr. RAINEY. Do you favor the Gronna bill?

Mr. BURKE. I think my testimony shows the extent to which I am in favor of it. I think I said I came here distinctly to testify for the Gronna bill with certain additions and changes as may be necessary to strengthen the bill and to make it economically sound and to better it as far as it can be done.

Mr. RAINEY. Are you in favor of the appointment of a commissioner as suggested by the Anderson bill or commissioners as suggested in the Gronna bill?

Mr. BURKE. I do not understand that a commissioner is provided for in the Anderson bill. The Secretary of Agriculture is made the administrator, as I understand.

Mr. WELD. A commissioner of foodstuffs.

Mr. BURKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. RAINEY. Are you in favor of a commissioner under the De partment of Agriculture, or, under the Gronna bill, for the appointment of three commissioners?

Mr. BURKE. I would be in favor of a commission as provided under the Gronna bill with such modifications as I have already covered in my statement here.

Mr. RAINEY. Are you in favor of licensing the packers?

Mr. BURKE. Well, on that question if it were practicable to put a license bill through I should not object to it, but I doubt if we could get a license bill through, and therefore I have not argued in favor of licensing.

Mr. RAINEY. Do you think the appointment of commissioners would make for higher prices to the producer for live stock? Mr. BURKE. Do I think the appointment of what?

Mr. RAINEY. Of commissioners, of a commission, under the Gronna bill.

Mr. BURKE. Well, I would not want to put it on as narrow a ground as that, Mr. Rainey. If you ask me the question whether I believe in the enactment of legislation and a settlement of this whole