Mr. ANDERSON. We have had a good many on both sides.
Mr. NAIL. They are not coming from our country.

Mr. ANDERSON. No; down in your country they tell us that while they pass resolutions in favor of the legislation that the real sentiment of the convention was against it?

Mr. NAIL. Yes.

Mr. ANDERSON. And that somebody prevented the convention from a real expression of its views.

Mr. NAIL. Well, some of the fellows that run the convention are not cow men, they are cow men for political purposes, not real cow men; they are playing a game of politics.

Mr. ANDERSON. They are all Democrats down in Texas?

Mr. NAIL. Not that anybody knows of; not now.

Mr. ANDERSON. Then, previous to this administration they were.

That is all.

Mr. RAINEY. Is that all, Mr. Anderson?

Mr. ANDERSON. Yes, sir; that is all.

Mr. RAINEY. We thank you very kindly, Mr. Nail.

Mr. NAIL. I thank you.

Mr. RAINEY. I will call Mr. Reynolds, of Fort Worth.

STATEMENT OF MR. W. D. REYNOLDS, FORT WORTH, TEX.

Mr. ANDERSON. You may proceed, Mr. Reynolds.

Mr. RAINEY. Just proceed with your statement, Mr. Reynolds, and offer any suggestions you desire.

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes, sir.

I have been in the cattle business practically all of my life, and it has been my sole business, you might say. I have been up against it mighty hard at times, and again I have had better times. I do not believe that the packers are responsible for my mishaps or for losing on cattle, and for that reason I am opposed to putting any shackles

on them.

Mr. ANDERSON. I can not hear you, Mr. Reynolds.

Mr. REYNOLDS. I say that I have been in the cattle business all my life. I have had my ups and downs. Sometimes you make some money and sometimes you lose, but I have never blamed it on the packers, and I am opposed to any legislation that puts shackles on рас kers or any other legitimate line of business. I just came up here to enter my protest, as far as it might go, against any legislation that would be detrimental to the packers or to any other legitimate business.

the

That is about all I have to say.

Mr. RAINEY. Mr. Anderson, have you any questions?

Mr. ANDERSON. No, sir.

Mr. RAINEY. Mr. Reynolds, I will ask you the same question that I asked Mr. Nail, as to how many acres of land you operate? Mr. REYNOLDS. I am just like Mr. Nail on that.

Mr. RAINEY. You have had considerable experience in shipping live stock to the various markets of the country?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes, sir.

Mr. RAINEY. In your experience, have you felt that you always received the market price for your live stock?

Mr. REYNOLDS. I have; sometimes much lower than I expected, but under the market conditions on that day I went away satisfied. Mr. RAINEY. When you did get a lower price you did not attribute it to the packers' domination?

Mr. REYNOLDS. No, sir.

Mr. RAINEY. Do you know from your experience of the big packers at any time taking any unfair advantage of you?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Not that I know of.

Mr. RAINEY. You have been satisfied with the treatment accorded you?

Mr. REYNOLDS. Yes, sir.

Mr. RAINEY. That is all. that you desire to ask?

Mr. Anderson, have you any questions

Mr. ANDERSON. I have no questions.

Mr. RAINEY. That is all, Mr. Reynolds. I thank you very kindly. Mr. VEEDER. Some days ago the committee asked me to submit the charge of Judge Carpenter to the jury in the 1912 case against certain of the packers.

I have with me to-day the charge of Judge Carpenter. The request followed a statement of mine at the time that the same issue as to the purchase of live stock by these packers was in the case and was submitted to the jury in the case as we now have raised it before this committee.

I have here the charge, which is quite a long document. I will read just one short paragraph from that and then hand the document to the stenographer to be included in the record:

The second count expands the charge contained in the third count, in that it states defendants' supposed combination was one to restrain interstate trade. not only in the matter of selling the fresh meat, but also in the matter of buying the cattle, it being charged that this latter end was accomplished by the defendants refraining, by agreement, from competing with each other in the purchase of cattle and fixing by agreement the number of cattle to be bought and the amounts to be bid for them.

There are some other references to the same subject of buying cattle in other parts of the charge.

(The charge of Judge Carpenter, submitted by Mr. Veeder, follows:)

I, G. Russell Leonard, public stenographer and shorthand reporter do hereby certify that the pages 1153 to 1196, inclusive, attached hereto, are a correct transcript of the judge's charge to the jury, and other proceedings, in the cases of United States v. Louis F. Swift et al, in the District Court of the United States, being cases numbered 4509, 4510, 4511, and 4620, on or about Monday, March 25, 1912, as taken down by myself and my assistants in shorthand and subsequently transcribed under my direction on the typewriter.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 16th day of March, A. D. 1920.

State of Illinois, County of Cook, ss:

G. RUSSELL LEONARD.

G. Russell Leonard, being by me first duly sworn, on his oath states that he signed the foregoing certificate and that the statements contained therein are true.

[SEAL.]

ROBERT E. FISHER,
Notary Public.

GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY: At this stage in the proceeding which has been engrossing our attention since the sixth day of last December, it becomes my duty to instruct you as to the law of the case.

At the outset I wish to express to you my sincere appreciation of the patience and attention which you have exhibited throughout the trial. There is no

greater duty to be performed in our system of Government than that performed by a jury in a criminal case. There is no greater duty imposed upon any citizen, for that duty is to stand between the accused and conviction, if the facts do not warrant a conviction, and to bring about a conviction if in fact the accused are guilty. The responsibility in itself should be sufficient reward for any man or set of men. And it would seem unneccessary, therefore, to refer to any personal sacrifice made in the interest of our institutions. But I wish to congratulate you upon having had an opportunity to perform so great a public service and at the same time acknowledge full realization of the personal sacrifice which each one of you has made. And in this I am sure that I express the sentiments of both those interested in the prosecution and those interested in the defense.

It may be well at this point to impress upon you certain fundamental principles of law applying to all criminal cases, and to this case in particular.

Before you were selected and sworn as jurors in this trial you were asked certain questions by the attorneys for the Government and by the attorneys for the defendants, and you made certain answers to those questions. I charge you that those answers are just as binding upon you now as they were at the time you made them, and that you may not disregard them.

You must realize, and I so instruct you, that yours alone is the right, power, and duty to determine from the evidence what are the real facts. Mine is the duty to advise you of the law to be applied to those facts. I wish you to understand this clearly, and no matter what I may say in these instructions about the facts or the witnesses, no word of mine is permitted to influence you one way or the other so far as the determination of any material fact is concerned. If, perchance, I make any reference to the evidence, remember please that it is for the sole purpose of enabling you to exercise your best judgment in settling the issues of fact involved. It is my duty to declare to you the law, and it is your duty to apply the law so declared. You must determine what are the facts, uninfluenced by any views which you may think the court has. The court has not given, or intended to give or even intimate, at any time during the trial, nor in these instructions, any views as to what are the facts, or as to what inference, if any, may or should be drawn from the facts. You are charged, therefore, to disregard any notion you may entertain as to what the court's views may be on the evidence or its sufficiency. Yours is the responsibility with reference to the facts; mine, as to the law.

The indictment in this case is a mere formal charge against the defendants; is not evidence of anything, and raises no presumption of guilt. No juror should permit himself to be influenced to any extent against the defendants because or on account of the indictment. In arriving at your vervict, therefore, you should give no consideration to the indictment, save only as it states the formal charges or accusation made by the grand jury against the defendants, and which the Government must prove by evidence to your satisfaction beyond all reasonable doubt, before you can return a verdict of guilty.

The guilt of the defendants, if they are guilty, can be established only by evidence admitted at the trial, and then only if such evidence satisfies you beyond all reasonable doubt of the charges in the indictment, or in some one of the counts thereof.

Every defendant in this case is, by the law, presumed to be innocent of each and every charge in the indictment, and each one of the defendants is entitled to this presumption of innocence at your hands until such time as the Government, by evidence, has convinced you beyond all reasonable doubt to the contrary. The burden of the issue at every stage of the proceedings is upon the Government. Every element necessary to constitute the offense must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the duty of the jury to reconcile (if it can be rationally and consistently done) the evidence in this case with such presumption of innocence. This presumption of innocence requires of the jury, if, after a full consideration of all the evidence in the case, the conduct of the defendants is as justly and reasonably consistent with innocence as it is justly and reasonably consistent with guilt, to return a verdict of not guilty.

This rule, however, which clothes every person accused of crime with the presumption of innocence, and imposes upon the Government the burden of establishing his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt, is not intended to aid anyone who is in fact guilty of crime to escape, but rather is an humane provision

of the law, intended, so far as human agencies can, to guard against the danger of any innocent person being unjustly convicted.

A reasonable doubt in law means a substantial and well-founded doubt, and not the mere possibility of a doubt. A doubt to justify an acquittal must be reasonable, and must arise from a candid and impartial investigation of all the material evidence in the case; and unless it is such, that, were the same kind of doubt interposed in the graver transactions of life it would cause a reasonable and prudent person to hesitate and pause, it is insufficient to authorize a verdict of not guilty. If, on the other hand, after considering all the evidence, you can say that you have not an abiding conviction, amounting to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge against these defendants, you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, and must acquit them.

However, a doubt is not a reasonable one which is inspired by undue sensibility in the mind of any juror in the view of the consequences of his verdict, or by sympathy, superstition or prejudice.

You may not base your verdict upon conjecture or suspicions. Conjectures are inferences from inferences-presumptions resting upon the bases of other presumptions.

You have been told by the lawyers for both sides that the determination of the ultimate facts in this cast depends upon circumstantial evidence, and well have they illustrated what is meant by circumstantial evidence.

Circumstantial evidence in criminal cases is the proof of such facts and circumstances com ected with or surrounding the commission of the offense charged as tends to show the guilt or innocence of the parties accused. And if the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence are sufficient to satisfy you of the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt, then such evidence is sufficient to authorize you in finding the defe: dants guilty. The law demands a conviction wherever there is sufficient legal evidence to show the defendants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and circumstantial evidence is legal evidence.

Whenever circumstantial evidence is relied upon to prove a fact, the cir cumstances must themselves be proved, and not presumed. There must be a visible and open connection between the fact out of which the presumption arises and the fact sought to be established by the depei dent presumption. It is not every fact or circumstance from which an ingenious or imaginative mind may infer, by some process of reasoning, the existence of the fain fact in issue, that the law admits as possessing the force of evidence.

In attempting to prove a fact by circumstantial evidence there must be observed certain rules which reason and experience have found esse: tial to the discovery of truth and the protection of innoce: ce. The circumstances themselves must be established by direct proof and can not be left to rest upon conjecture or suspicion; and the inference which may be based upon the facts and circumstances proved must be a just and reasonable inference. When a criminal charge is sought to be established wholly by circumstantial evidence the hypothesis of guilt should flow naturally, reasonably, consistently, and justly from the facts and circumstances proved. And the facts and circumstances must be such as to exclude to a moral certainty every just and reaso: able hypothesis but that of guilt. In other words, all the facts and circumstances must be consister t, and not only point to the guilt of the accused, but must be rationally inconsistent with innocence, before conviction can be had. But the law does not require that each particular incriminating fact which may aid the jury in determining whether the accused is guilty, shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The doubt which will justify an acquittal is not a doubt of a y particular fact constituting the sum of guilt of the accused, but a doubt upon all the evidence that he is guilty.

You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses, and of the weight that should be given to their evidence. You take into consideration their interest. if any, in the outcome of the trial; their relation, if any, to the parties; their demeanor while testifying; their frankness and candor while on the witness stand, or the contrary, as the case may be; the fact, if it is a fact, that they have been contradicted or corroborated by other credible evidence, or circumstances in evidence; and, all things considered, you are to determine what weight is to be given to the evidence of each.

If you believe from the evidence that any witness has intentionally and knowingly sworn falsely as to any material fact or circumstance, you are at liberty to disregard altogether the evidence of such witness, except in so far as he may have been corroborated by other credible evidence or circumstance in

evidence. Furthermore, while you are the judges of the credibility of the witnesses, you have no right to disregard the testimony of an unimpeached wit-ness simply because such witness was or is in the employ of the company in which the defendants, or some one of them, are interested. But it is the duty of the jurors to receive the testimony of such witness in the light of all the evidence, the same as they would receive the testimony of any other witness, and to determine the credibility of such witness by the same principles and tests by which they determine the credibility of any other witness.

You are not required, though, to believe any statement to be a fact simply because a witness has sworn it to be a fact (if you believe from the evidence that such witness is mistaken or has knowingly and willfully sworn falsely), even though such witness be not directly contradicted with respect to such matter by some other testimony. In considerating this case you are not obliged to set aside your own common observation and experience as men in the affairs of life. You have the right, upon a consideration of all the evidence in this case, and your own experience and observation, to say where the truth lies upon any material fact.

The law under which this prosecution was instituted is entitled "An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restrains and monopolies." The first section provides:

"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract, or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments in the discretion of the court."

That statute means that every contract, combination or conspiracy made or entered into for the dominant or controlling purpose of excluding competition between independent traders, of controlling prices, or of maintaining a monopoly, is unlawful and is subject to punishment in the Federal courts where it affects interstate trade.

The offense charged against the defendants here is the engaging in a combination in restraint of interstate trade within three years next prior to September 12, 1910. This is a legal conclusion based upon allegations that the defendants combined together to eliminate competition between themselves, or to fix, regulate, and control prices of fresh beef. The question of fact for the jury to decide, therefore, is whether or not the defendants deliberately and intentionally combined together to eliminate competition among themselves, or to fix, regulate, and control prices of fresh beef.

The question whether or not a combination for such a purpose constitutes a combination in restraint of trade is a question of law, and you are instructed in that regard that a combination between several independent concerns or traders engaged in interstate commerce, the dominant and controlling purpose of which is to eliminate competition between themselves, or to fix, regulate, and control prices of fresh beef, is a combination in restraint of trade, within the meaning and intent of the law.

If, therefore, you do not believe from all the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the different groups of defendants, or any two of them, were engaged in interstate commerce, carrying on separate enterprises, and were, within three years prior to September 12, 1910, engaged in a combination among themselves, deliberately and intentionally planned, the main or controlling purpose of which was either to eliminate competition or to fix, regulate and control prices of fresh beef in manner and form as charged in the indictment or some count thereof, then you will not be justified in finding the defendants guilty.

In passing let me say by way of warning that the second section of the Sherman Act, which denounces monopolies, is in no way involved in this case. Nor are the defendants charged with a specific design of injuring other persons in the same line of business, except as such injury would be suffered by those persons in common with all other citizens. Nor are the defendants charged with combination or conspiracy to drive competitors out of business. You must be told also that the mere size of the businesses operated by the defendants or corporations in which they are interested is no proof of the accusations made in the indictment, nor is their individual wealth, nor the wealth of the corporations in which they are interested.