without symptoms of fear or excitement is admissible.-McCullough v. State, 76 S. E. 393.

§ 351 (Ga.App.) Where testimony has been introduced by the prosecution to show flight as evidence of conscious guilt, evidence that accused notified the sheriff of his desire to submit himself to custody is admissible.-Dixon v. State, 76 S. E. 794.

§ 351 (N.C.) In a trial for homicide, the flight or concealment of the accused after the killing is competent evidence in connection with the other circumstances.-State v. Tate, 76 S. E. 713.

$364 (Ga.) Threats before a homicide by a defendant to kill the sister of deceased, to whom she fled for protection, are admissible as res gesta.-Helms v. State, 76 S. E. 353.

It was not error to admit evidence as to threats by accused, about a week before the homicide, after a difficulty with a sister of deceased, with whom accused lived, where the killing occurred at the home of the deceased, where the sister had fled for protection.-Id.

§ 364 (N.C.) The circumstances under which accused and a witness met shortly after the homicide, and what was done at the time of a statement by accused to the witness to the effect that the tale about his poisoning dogs in the country was the cause of the trouble, are competent as a part of the res gesta.-State v. Bradley, 76 S. E. 720.

(C) Other Offenses, and Character of Accused.

§ 372 (Ga.App.) In a prosecution for larceny after trust, it was competent to show that, while accused was purporting to represent a corporation named in the indictment, he engaged in similar transactions, and by similar means procured money from other persons and converted it to his own use.-McCrory v. State, 76 S. E. 163.

(D) Materiality and Competency in General.

§ 393 (N.C.) Testimony comparing the tracks found where a crime has been committed with

the shoes worn by accused does not deprive accused of his privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by Const. art. 1, § 11.-State v. Thompson, 76 S. E. 249.

The testimony of an officer of the results of his observation of accused brought to the place of the crime did not deprive accused of his privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by Const. art. 1, § 11.-Id.

$394 (Ga.App.) Evidence obtained by an illegal search of the house of accused is admissible against him.-Young v. State, 76 S. E. 753. $394 (Ga.App.) In a trial for unlawful sexual intercourse, testimony that a witness, without the consent of accused, placed a searchlight through a broken window pane and discovered accused in bed with a man, both undressed, was not objectionable as having been obtained by unlawful search.-Leatherman v. State, 76

S. E. 102.

§ 406 (Ga.App.) In a prosecution for lar

as a cash bond for an employé, it was not error to admit evidence that, when demand was made on accused for the money, he stated that he would repay it "as soon as he landed another."-McCrory v. State, 76 S. E. 163.

$413 (Ga.) There was no error in excluding testimony that defendant, about 10 days prior to the homicide, stated that defendant had heard that decedent was going to kill him, and that the witness advised him to take out a peace warrant; no threat to defendant having been previously shown.-Ware v. State, 76 S. E. 857. $$ 419, 420 (Ga.) The saying of a witness for the state a short time before the shooting in reference to his pistol with which there was evidence that the witness, and not defendant, had shot decedent, that it was not loaded, was mere hearsay.-Jones v. State, 76 S. E. 748.

(G) Acts and Declarations of Conspirators and Codefendants.

§ 422 (S.C.) Evidence of a statement by one of defendants in a homicide case was competent as to him, if relevant and material.-State v. Angel, 76 S. E. 190.

(H) Documentary Evidence and Exclusion of Parol Evidence Thereby.

$430 (Ga.App.) A certified copy from the internal revenue records, showing that accused has paid a tax as a retail liquor dealer, is admissible, whether or not it is evidence of an application for a tax receipt required by Rev. St. § 3239 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2093), so as to shift the burden of proof on defendant, under Acts 1911, p. 180.-Daniel v. State, 76 S. E. 162, following Huckabee v. State, 67 S. E. 837, 7 Ga. App. 677, and Cassidy v. State, 72 S. E. 939, 10 Ga. App. 123.

§ 448 (N.C.) In a trial for manslaughter, a question whether accused, when he threatened to whip deceased, seemed to be in jest or in ear nest was not objectionable as calling for an opin ion, but called for a matter of observation. State v. Tate, 76 S. E. 713.

§ 451 (S.C.) Where all of the facts were before the jury on a question, it was not error to permit a witness to give an opinion as to what another should have said as to whether she knew anything about the case.State v. Angel, 76 S. E. 190.

(K) Confessions.

8517 (Ga.) Where the evidence makes out a prima facie case for the admission of a confession, a witness for the state could testify that defendant said to him, shortly after the homicide, that he had killed the brother of deceased for nothing.-Lindsay v. State, 76 S. E. 369.

§ 531 (Ga.) Where it was sought to prove a confession, and a witness testified that it was made voluntarily, not under the influence of any threat or promise, the court did not err in admitting evidence of confession over objection that it was made by defendant after he had been run down by a posse and caught by dogs, and was in the possession of the coroner.Smith v. State, 76 S. E. 1016.

(M) Weight and Sufficiency.

§ 552 (Ga.App.) Where the evidence in support of a conviction was circumstantial, and raised only a bare suspicion of guilt, and was consistent with innocence, a conviction was unauthorized by law.-Seckinger v. State, 76

$553 (Ga.App.) The jury can believe one witness, who testifies positively to the fact of the sale of liquors, though his evidence be directly contradicted by that of many witnesses. -Lambert v. State, 76 S. E. 73.

§ 554 (Ga.App.) Where the evidence for the state would not have authorized a finding for a lower grade than voluntary manslaughter, the jury were not required to prefer the statement of accused setting up self-defense.-Knight v. State, 76 S. E. 1047.

§ 564 (Ga.App.) Evidence as to the venue of a prosecution for carrying a pistol held sufficient. -Williams v. State, 76 S. E. 785.

§ 668 (Ga.App.) When defendant's counsel, after defendant made his statement, offered to swear him and allow him to be cross-examined, but the solicitor general declined to cross-examine, it was not error to refuse to allow counsel for accused to interrogate him as a witness.-Roberson v. State, 76 S. E. 752.

$668 (Ga.App.) The right of defendant to make a statement to the jury is not controlled by the rules governing the introduction of evidence, and defendant may make a statement at any time before the close of the evidence when the prosecution is not introducing testimony.-Dixon v. State, 76 S. E. 794.

§ 681 (Ga.) Where evidence is objected to as

$595 (Ga.) In a prosecution for rape, the overruling of a motion for continuance for absence on account of sickness of defendant's mother, who employed his counsel, and would have testified as to the nonchastity of prosecutrix, held not error.-Burger v. State, 76 S. E. 863.

§ 596 (S.C.) Refusal of continuance of trial for larceny held not an abuse of discretion when asked on ground of absence of witness, who would merely corroborate the testimony of defendant as to his possession of the stolen articles.-State v. Madry, 76 S. E. 977.

XII. TRIAL.

(A) Preliminary Proceedings.

§ 622 (Ga.App.) It was not error to allow the state to withdraw its election to try first one jointly indicted with plaintiff in error and to put the latter on trial first; the election on the part of the state not being final.-Dixon v. State, 76 S. E. 794.

$628 (Ga.) That the name of a witness for the state was not indorsed on the indictment, or, if indorsed, that he had not testified before the grand jury, is no ground for excluding his evidence. Taylor v. State, 76 S. E. 347. (B) Course and Conduct of Trial in Gen

eral.

§ 656 (S.C.) Remark by the trial judge in a homicide case, in ruling on evidence, held not erroneous on the ground that it was an opinion as to the effect of a witness' evidence.-State v. Angel, 76 S. E. 190.

It was proper for the court, ruling on the admissibility of evidence, to state whether it was relevant.-Id.

A remark by the trial judge in a homicide case, when accused introduced a proclamation offering a reward for the conviction of the murderer, "I think that is a very proper resolution," was not improper.-Id.

(C) Reception of Evidence. $668 (Ga.) Whether accused should be allowed to supplement his first statement with another, because the state has introduced additional evidence against him, is discretionary with the trial court.-Williams v. State, 76 S. E. 347.

668 (Ga.) It was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to allow counsel for defendant to examine accused after he had made his statement, not under oath, and had been cross-' examined by the state.-Lindsay v. State, 76 S. E. 369.

sel that he would connect it with other evidence, it is not error to fail to exclude the tes

timony later of the court's own motion, on failure of counsel to connect it as promised.Lindsay v. State, 76 S. E. 369.

evidence the bond given for his personal ap$ 683 (Ga.App.) Where accused introduced in pearance to rebut evidence of flight, it was not error to permit the state to show the forfeiture of the bond.-Davis v. State, 76 S. E. 391.

low the state to prove venue is not error.§ 686 (Ga.App.) The reopening of a case to al Brooks v. State, 76 S. E. 765.

(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel.

$711 (Ga.) Where a counsel for accused consumed two hours in his argument, and, his time having expired, was granted an additional half hour, a refusal of further time, no request having been made therefor before beginning the argument, as required by superior court rule 5, as embodied in Civ. Code 1910, § 6264, was not a violation of Const. art. 1, § 1, par. 4, granting accused the right to defend by attorney.-Lindsay v. State, 76 S. E. 369.

§ 714 (Ga.App.) Counsel for accused may not read a discussion of the facts of the case on trial on review of a former conviction.-McCullough v. State, 76 S. E. 393.

(F) Province of Court and Jury in General.

ed a finding that deceased came to his death § 762 (Ga.App.) Where the evidence demandfrom a kick, an instruction that a person may kill another without the use of any other weapon than his hands and feet did not violate the rule prohibiting a judge from expressing an opinion.-Smith v. State, 76 S. E. 647.

(G) Necessity, Requisites, and Sufficiency of Instructions.

§ 772 (Ga.App.) An instruction, on a prosecution for selling intoxicating liquors, that "the state was not bound to go outside of this indictment," in which it was alleged that accused sold the liquor, was not an implication that the state could go outside of the indictment to prove the offense, if it so desired.-Buchanan v. State, 76 S. E. 73.

§ 776 (Ga.App.) An instruction that, where the guilt of accused appears to the satisfaction of the jury, they are authorized to convict, regardless of the good character of accused, but they may consider his good character, not merely when his guilt is doubtful, but to generate the doubt, is proper.-McCullough v. State, 76 S. E. 393.

§ 778 (Ga.App.) An instruction that every person charged with crime is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty by competent evidence, and that reasonable certainty is all that can be obtained, is not erroneous.-Thigpen v. State, 76 S. E. 596.

§ 778 (Ga.App.) It is the duty of the court to charge that every person accused of crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is es

§ 782 (N.C.) Where accused produced no evidence, it was not error to charge that he might rely on the state's evidence to make out his defense.-State v. Johnson, 76 S. E. 679.

§ 782 (S.C.) Instruction in a homicide case held not erroneous, as authorizing a conviction on a preponderance of the evidence.-State v. Angel, 76 S. E. 190.

§ 786 (Ga.) An instruction that a statement is an admission by defendant of facts tending to prove his guilt, but not enough to authorize a conviction, was not error, where the court also charged that admissions should be scanned with care, and, uncorroborated, are insufficient to justify a conviction.-Turner v. State,

76 S. E. 349.

§ 789 (Ga.App.) The words "reasonable doubt," being of ordinary signification, require no definition.-Buchanan v. State, 76 S. E. 73. § 789 (Ga.App.) Failure to explain the words

"reasonable doubt" is not reversible error.Thigpen v. State, 76 S. E. 596.

§ 789 (N.C.) Defendant is given the full benefit of the doctrine of reasonable doubt by an instruction that the jury must be "fully satisfied" of defendant's guilt before they can convict him; and if not "fully satisfied" that he did the act charged, they must acquit.-State v. Charles, 76 S. E. 715.

$ 797 (Ga.App.) The judge having instructed that if the jury found accused guilty generally he would be punished as for a felony, unless by their recommendation he be punished as for a misdemeanor, it was not error to fail to add that such recommendation could be ignored.Gaskins v. State, 76 S. E. 777.

$814 (Ga.) Where the evidence presented no theory of a forcible attack or invasion of property of another by the person killed, there was no error in omitting to charge on the law applicable to such theory.-Taylor v. State, 76 S. E. 347.

§ 814 (Ga.) Where the evidence authorized an inference that accused and his father, and perhaps others, conspired to shoot deceased and others with him, a charge on conspiracy was justified.-Turner v. State, 76 S. E. 349.

§ 814 (Ga.) An instruction that a brother had the right to defend his sister from an assault by accused held not open to the objection that there was no evidence on which to base it.Helms v. State, 76 S. E. 353.

§ 814 (Ga.) It is not error to refuse a request to charge, unless it is pertinent.-Lindsay v. State, 76 S. E. 369.

§ 814 (Ga.) Evidence held to authorize a charge on the subject of confession.-Jones v. State, 76 S. E. 748.

§ 814 (Ga.App.) There being direct evidence that accused made a profit from an illegal sale of whisky, it was not error to refuse to instruct as to the law of circumstantial evidence. -Guilford v. State, 76 S. E. 103.

§ 814 (Ga.App.) One mode of impeaching a witness being, under Pen. Code 1910, § 1051, by disproving the facts testified to by him, where a witness for accused testified to a contrary state of facts from that testified to by a witness for the state, it was not error to charge as to the impeachment of witnesses.-Moore v. State, 76 S. E. 159.

§ 814 (N.C.) Where evidence showed that accused was the aggressor and took advantage of decedent, who was unarmed, and shot him without provocation, and then pursued decedent and shot him again, an instruction as to the right of self-defense after decedent, as one of the adversaries, had withdrawn from a mutual combat was not erroneous.-State v. Bradley, 76 S. E. 720.

§ 822 (Ga.) An instruction that if the jury

ant was acting in self-defense, though inaccurate, is not ground for a new trial, where the instructions as a whole show that the court correctly instructed as to the law in criminal cases.-Helms v. State, 76 S. E. 353. $822 (N.C.) A charge must be considered as a whole.-State v. Tate, 76 S. E. 713.

§ 823 (Ga.) Where the court defines direct and circumstantial evidence, and instructs that, before conviction on circumstantial evidence, alone, the facts proven must both be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis, the omission to instruct that defendant's guilt was sought on circumstantial evidence alone is not ground for a new trial.-Owens v. State, 76 S. E. 860. § 823 (N.C.) Error in using "or," instead of "and," in a charge that, if defendant did the killing with premeditation "or" deliberation, it was murder in the first degree, was corrected tion thereof, with "and" in place of the "or.”where the charge closed with a practical repetiState v. Logan, 76 S. E. 1.

(H) Requests for Instructions. faith of defendant, charged with entering the § 824 (Ga.App.) Where the inference of good cultivated land of another after having been forbidden to do so, arises only from his own statement, failure to charge as to the effect of good faith is not error, in the absence of request therefor.-Tyler v. State, 76 S. E. 102. fail to charge on the theory of defense arising $ 824 (Ga. App.) It is not reversible error to under the prisoner's statement, in the absence of a request.—Thigpen v. State, 76 S. E. 596.

§ 824 (Ga.App.) It is only where the state relies entirely upon circumstantial evidence that it is incumbent, without request, to instruct as to the probative value of circumstantial evidence.-Young v. State, 76 S. E. 753.

§ 824 (Ga.App.) It is the duty of the court, even without request, to charge that every person accused of crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.-Webb v. State, 76 S. E. 990.

§ 824 (Ga.App.) In a prosecution for assault with intent to kill, where the real issue is the portunity to commit the offense, defendant canidentity of the offender and defendant's opnot complain if the trial judge does not of his own motion suggest conclusions which_may tend to mitigate the penalty.-Jones v. State, 76 S. E. 1070.

§ 825 (Ga.App.) Where the judge instructed that if accused shot at a person without any intent to kill him, and not in his own defense, or other circumstances of justification, he would be guilty of the statutory offense of shooting at another, it was not error, in the absence of request, to fail to give more specific instructions.Gaskins v. State, 76 S. E. 777.

§ 828 (Ga.) Failure to instruct as to the weight of the confession is not error, in the absence of a timely written request.-Lindsay v. State, 76 S. E. 369.

§ 828 (Ga.) Failure of the court to charge the jury on the law of confessions is not ground for new trial, where there was no written request for a charge on that subject.-Smith v. State, 76 S. E. 1016.

§ 829 (Ga.) Where a request to charge was fully covered by the instructions as far as it was correct, the refusal of the charge was not cause for new trial.-Phillips v. State, 76 S. E. 352.

§ 829 (Ga.) Instructions fairly covered by the general charge are properly refused.-Lindsay v. State, 76 S. E. 369.

§ 834 (N.C.) Since the court need not use the language of a request, but may instruct substantially as requested in its own words, held

fining the evidence to that of the prisoner, taken with other parts of the charge requiring a finding upon the whole evidence, was not reversible error.-State v. Tate, 76 S. E. 713.

(J) Custody, Conduct, and Deliberations

of Jury.

§ 922 (Ga.) Where the court fully charges the law as to the right of the slayer to kill to prevent the commission of a felony, failure to define felony, in the absence of a request, is not ground for a new trial.-Helms v. State, 76 S. E. 353.

XIII. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL AND IN ARREST.

8913 (Ga.) Where there is no error or any ruling of law, and the evidence supports the verdict, refusal of a new trial was not an abuse of discretion.-Nasworthy v. State, 76 S. E. 999.

§ 915 (Ga.) Overruling a demurrer to an indictment is not ground for a new trial, and direct exceptions should be filed, if a review was sought.-Lindsay v. State, 76 S. E. 369.

§ 918 (Ga.App.) A refusal to allow to defendant the right to make a second statement is not cause for new trial, except in an extreme case of an abuse of discretion.-Jones v. State, 76

S. E. 1070.

§ 918 (W.Va.) Upon a trial for felony, where the judge and attorneys go into another room where a motion to strike out evidence is heard and decided against accused, though on discovery of the absence of accused he is sent for and the judge offers to allow him to again make the motion, which he declines, his absence demands a new trial.-State v. Sutter, 76 S. E. 811.

§ 921 (Ga.) Where illegal testimony was received in evidence, and subsequently the jury were instructed not to consider it, and the evidence was immaterial, it was not error to refuse a new trial on that ground.-Williams v. State, 76 S. E. 347.

§ 921 (Ga.App.) The admission of evidence as to a difficulty between witness and accused several years before the trial was not ground for new trial, where the judge instructed to disregard the testimony.-Smith v. State, 76 S. E. 647.

§ 921 (Ga.App.) Though generally an error in admitting evidence is cured by subsequently ruling it out, where the evidence may have worked injury to accused, so as to render it probable that its subsequent withdrawal did not heal the injury, the error would justify the grant of a new trial.-Thompson v. State, 76 S. E. 1072. § 922 (Ga.) Where counsel for defendant did not contend that he should be found not guilty, but stated that he was guilty of voluntary manslaughter, it was no ground for new trial that the judge did not instruct as to a form of verdict of not guilty, or state that the jury could so find.-Durham v. State, 76 S. E. 351.

Inaccuracies in the charge, which are more favorable to defendant than a correct statement of the law would be, are no ground for new trial.-Id.

$923 (Ga.App.) It is not ground for a new trial that a juror, who was stricken by the State, 76 S. E. 162. state, was incompetent to serve.-Daniel v.

dence, impeaching in character and not calcu§ 938 (Ga.) Alleged newly discovered evilated to produce a different result, is not ground for new trial.-Williams v. State, 76 S. E. 347.

$938 (Ga.App.) A new trial was properly denied for alleged newly discovered evidence, impeaching in character, which would not probably have produced a different result.-Buchanan v. State, 76 S. E. 73.

$938 (Ga.App.) Alleged newly discovered evidence, impeaching in character and not such as would probably produce a different result on a second trial, is no ground for new trial.-Duke v. State, 76 S. E. 368.

$ 942 (Ga.App.) Newly discovered evidence, ficient cause for a merely impeaching in its character, is not sufState, 76 S. E. 163. new trial.-McCrory v.

§ 945 (Ga.App.) Refusal of a new trial, because the alleged newly discovered evidence would not probably change the result, is not an abuse of discretion.-Manning v. State, 76 S. E. 70.

$945 (Ga.App.) Where the evidence was close, and alleged newly discovered evidence would probably have resulted in a different verdict, the refusal of a new trial was error.-Deason v.

State, 76 S. E. 73.

$950 (S.C.) Upon the resignation of a judge a judge assigned to hold the remaining term of the court can properly hear a motion for a new trial on the minutes of a case tried before the former.-State v. Madry, 76 S. E. 977.

$956 (Ga.) A new trial for newly discovered evidence was properly denied, where affidavits as to residence, means of knowledge, and credibility were not offered, as required by Civ. Code 1910, § 6086.-Phillips v. State, 76 S. E. 352.

$956 (Ga.) Where evidence as to misconduct of jurors on a motion for new trial was conflicting, there was no error in overruling the motion.-Marshman v. State, 76 S. E. 572.

XIV. JUDGMENT. SENTENCE, AND FINAL COMMITMENT.

$ 994 (Va.) The court had authority to enter judgment of conviction for illegally selling intoxicants on a verdict rendered at a preceding term.-Flint v. Commonwealth, 76 S. E. 308.

(B)

XV. APPEAL AND ERROR, AND
CERTIORARI.

Presentation and Reservation in Low

er Court of Grounds of Review. $1030 (Ga.App.) An ordinance, for violation of which accused was convicted, cannot be challenged as invalid for the first time on appeal.-Dill v. City of Washington, 76 S. E. 156.

§ 1031 (Va.) A warrant issued by the mayor of a city, charging accused with illegally selling intoxicants at retail to the person named, within one mile of the corporate limits of the city, accused not then having a license, was sufficient to sustain a conviction, in the absence of objections at trial.-Flint v. Commonwealth, 76 S. E. 308.