outspoken in their favor, and, on the 16th, after a week's debate-which consisted of a series of professions of political faith on the part of the members rather than an argument against the acts, the resolutions passed.* Jefferson was the author of these resolutions.

In Virginia a similar set, written by Madison, at Jefferson's request, was presented to the Legislature by John Taylor on the 13th of December, and adopted eleven days later.† Verbal, and some have claimed doctrinal, differences distinguish these two manifestoes, known as the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions of '98. Whatever differences may have been found in them at a later day, they were originally intended to form a unit of political propagandism, and in that sense were the appeal of a new party to the States as sovereignties.

The character of the resolutions is easily understood. Those of Virginia declared that its Assembly viewed the powers of the federal government, as resulting from the compact to which the States were parties, as limited by the plain sense and intention of the Constitution, as no further. valid than authorized by the grants enumerated in the compact; and that in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of powers not granted, the States, who were the parties to the compact, had the right and were in duty bound "to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil." The Assem

* Elliot, Vol. iv., p. 540.

+ Id., p. 528.

Federal Sovereignty Attacked

bly complained that the federal government manifested a spirit "to enlarge its powers by forced constructions of the constitutional charter which defines them," "so as to consolidate the States by degrees into one sovereignty, the obvious tendency and inevitable consequence of which would be to transform the republican system of the United States into an absolute, or at best a mixed, monarchy." The Kentucky resolutions of '98 set forth the same doctrine of compact and of limited powers of the federal government, and entered at length into a proof of the unconstitutionality of the Alien and Sedition acts as violating the express provisions of the constitutions and bills of rights. "The acts, unconstitutional and obnoxious," should be at once repealed. In the second Kentucky resolutions, also written by Jefferson and concurred in the 22d of November, 1799, the doctrine was more clearly stated: "The States that formed the Constitution, being sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of its infraction," and "a nullification by those sovereignties of all unauthorized acts done under color of that instrument is the rightful remedy." brief, the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions denied sovereignty to the federal government and claimed it for the commonwealths. From this claim of State sovereignty came the claim of right to nullify federal laws, and, ultimately, to secede from the Union. The idea of State sovereignty

*

* Preston's Documents, p. 295.

In

was now fairly launched. The Virginia resolutions, like those of Kentucky, pronounced the obnoxious laws unconstitutional. But Madison emphasized the rights of the States. His resolutions were a protest against consolidating them by degrees into one sovereignty. The federal Constitution was a compact expressly defining and limiting the powers of the general government. The States must decide whether it had been violated at any time. Accompanying the resolutions there went an address to the people as the guardians of State sovereignty. Copies of the resolutions were sent to the executives of the other States, to be submitted to their Legislatures.

By the 1st of November seven States had formally replied.* Some defended the Alien and Sedition laws. Delaware thought the Virginia resolutions an unjustifiable interference with the powers of the general government. Massachusetts and Vermont denied the right of a State Legislature to usurp the powers of the federal courts. Pennsylvania, Maryland, the Carolinas, Georgia, and Tennessee kept silence; but the opinions of the seven States gave no welcome to the "doctrine of '98." So serious a repulse was not expected.

The replies were referred to a committee of the House of Burgesses, of which Madison was chairman, and he wrote a report which, taking up the original resolutions article by article, defended

etc.

*The answers of the States are given in Elliot, Vol. iv.,

p. 532,

Powerful Argument for State Sovereignty

them, and at great length analyzed the Constitution for the purpose of proving that the resolutions were in conformity with its express provisions.* Disclaiming any intention of the Legislature to diminish in any degree "mutual respect, confidence, and affection among the members of the Union," and pledging it "to maintain and defend the Constitution" and "to support the government of the United States in all measures warranted by their Constitution," Madison argued that the federal government resulted from a compact to which the States were parties; that federal powers were derivative, not original; that the term States signified the people of the particular governments, in their highest, sovereign capacity, and that in that capacity, each, acting for itself, sanctioned the Constitution. Therefore no tribunal above their authority existed which could decide, in the last resort, whether the compact was violated. With this idea as a principle of interpretation, he went through the Constitution, examining and expounding all its phrases bearing on the subject. He cited the history of the country in refutation of the idea of national sovereignty. It was not granted by the Constitution; it did not exist by the common law, because the United States had no common law. The States, on the other hand, were a permanent and necessary element. They could propose and alone could ratify amendments. In the subdivision of a State its Legislature acted

* The report is given in Elliot, Vol. iv., p. 546 et seq.

conjointly with Congress. They remained as they originated; they were the creators of the general government. It was their agent. Therefore, the Virginia Legislature adhered to its resolution and continued its protest.

But in this exhaustive report Madison in no way referred to nullification as the ultimate resource of a State. To what extent it was inferential would depend on what measure of residuary sovereignty one might demand for a State, and what degree of "palpable violation of the rights of a State" would be suffered. Nullification, like the idea of sovereignty, was left to be worked out in the practical administration of the govern

ments.

The century was closing while this interpretation of the doctrine of '98 was in progress. The silence of Pennsylvania, and of all the States south of it, save Delaware, was only negative testimony. But no State sent out a report on the sovereignty of the United States. Many party questions were already involved in the definition of sovereignty thus far made. National sovereignty, if clearly grasped by the leaders, was not thought of among the people. Everywhere among the people the idea prevailed, though more or less cloudy, that the general government was a common agent of the States. In democratic matters they had

the right of way; over foreign matters they had ultimate control. The States were united; the general government was thought of as a political compound-not as an organism.