Restrictions on Municipal Representation

tion on the number of qualified voters, but in all these States each county was given at least one Representative. The constitution of Louisiana of 1812 was but a transcript of the Kentucky constitution of 1799. The inland States could never have vast cities with overpowering influence and interests. antagonistic to those of the country, and therefore their constitutions were not precedents for Louisiana. Alabama, Missouri, and Arkansas were cited to show that these carried out the principle that each county shall have at least one Representative. The relation which the rural inhabitants of these States bore to the inhabitants in large towns was not like that which the inhabitants of Louisiana bore to the city of New Orleans. This city was the metropolis of the whole Mississippi Valley. If South Carolina, Maryland, New York, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania had found it necessary to make constitutional provisions confining the influence of cities within their boundaries, was not this limitation a sufficient precedent for Louisiana? It should follow the experience of twenty States-give each organized parish one Representative, and limit the city of New Orleans to a fixed proportion—say, one-sixth of the entire representation.

To these arguments a member from New Orleans replied that the precedents cited from other State constitutions were originally derived from the method of apportioning representation in England, were part of the rotten - borough system of that country, and were not adapted to Louisiana.

The system in the Northern States prevailed, as it were, by force of habit. Massachusetts was an illustration of the degree to which it might be carried. In that commonwealth, in an isolated spot, situated on the sea-coast, frequented by watermen and fishermen, and containing but a few huts, was a town, and it had a Representative. There were doubtless other towns of no greater magnitude similarly distinguished. Certainly Louisiana would not agree to apportion representation on that basis.

The constitutional history of the commonwealths was freely drawn upon, accurately and inaccurately, and with equal weight with the convention. It is as necessary to record the inaccurate citations as the accurate, for oftentimes an erroneous citation leads to the adoption of a clause in a constitution. The history of representative government is the history of fiction and of fact, for fact and fiction are curiously blended when a constitution of a commonwealth is made. The interstate influence of the commonwealth constitutions can probably be no better illustrated than by recording such citations as these which occur in the Louisiana convention. Though loosely made, and probably without the means of verification at hand, the fact that constitutions of other States are quoted in these conventions contributes to a general uniformity in the fundamental law. The primary influence of the eighteenth-century constitutions was chiefly felt in the earlier Western States. After 1800, in slave-holding States the Virginia prece

Native-Americanism and the Naturalized Citizen

dents were always authoritative; in free States the New York precedents prevailed.

On the 11th an effort to prescribe a real-estate qualification for Representatives was defeated by a vote of four to one, and further efforts in this direction were abandoned. By a majority of three votes the time for residence was fixed at three years. The spirit of Native-Americanism, a political characteristic of the country at this time, was quite strong in the convention, and it sought to exclude naturalized citizens from filling the office of Governor. In speaking against this proposition, a member remarked that he could see no necessity for it, because members of many families in the State had intermarried into foreign families, and had so interwoven their own interests with those of naturalized citizens that these should be regarded as Americans. To discriminate between the native-born and the naturalized citizen would produce great mischief in society. A period of sixteen years' residence as a citizen of the United States, ten of which had been spent within the State, would be a sufficient guarantee of interest and attachment to the commonwealth. In the Florida parishes there were many men born prior to the acquisition of that part of the State, and they should not be deprived of eligibility to office.

This convention was in session at a time when there existed great prejudice against foreigners and the Native-American party was at the height of its influence. At this time New York, Maine,

and Virginia required their Governors to be nativeborn citizens, and the constitutions of these States were cited as sufficient precedent for Louisiana. Indeed, the Governor should be further qualified, as was the case in Massachusetts, by possessing landed property of the value of five thousand dollars, so as to make the State wholly secure in electing him. If a native American, he would fairly understand the wants of the people; if a slave - property holder, he would exercise the taxing power with discretion. The principal argument in defence of a property qualification was always its guarantee of protection by means of taxation. One member was satisfied that the Constitution of the United States prohibited a State from limiting office to native - born Americans. Another thought that the United States. and a State were not in the same relation to the citizen. If a State wished to make a discrimination among its own citizens, those of other States had no right to complain. A citizen from another State might challenge the right of Louisiana to exclude him. It excluded not only the naturalized citizen of the United States, but also proposed to exclude from eligibility to certain offices all the naturalized citizens of Louisiana. This would practically reduce the citizens of other States and of Louisiana to the same level. But what is the right of the State to make such a discrimination? asked a member. Even those most jealous in upholding the rights of the States knew that no State sovereignty had any right to destroy

Supremacy of Congress over State Laws

the effect of federal legislation when that legislation was authorized by the national Constitution. The Constitution gave to Congress the power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization throughout the country. Several States had conceded to the general government all control over this subject; and, therefore, any legislation which the national government adopted must be regarded as supreme. Congress had adopted uniform rules of naturalization, nor could any one of the States legislate contrary to the act of Congress.

Any person having the act and the judgment of the court in his favor was an American citizen, and his citizenship could not be invalidated by any law emanating from State authority. The convention had power to prescribe any qualification it pleased for the office of Governor, provided that in doing so it made no discrimination between American citizens. Such discrimination was prohibited by the national Constitution when it declared that a citizen of each State is entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States. All American citizens were upon the same footing of equality; the Constitution did not distinguish between native and naturalized citizens.* The national Constitution was an an injunction upon the several States, and with the strong voice of supreme authority forbade them to enact any legis lation discriminating against the citizens of a par

* Except that the President and Vice-President must be native-born.