his score shows the enormous total of 50 appeals, 28 of which were allowed. Mr. Justice North is sixteenth, with 57 per cent, 8 appeals allowed and 6 dismissed. Sir Francis Jeune is seventeenth, with 60 per cent, 3 appeals allowed and 2 dismissed. Mr. jury were requested to consider their verdict, whereupon one of their number said there was a member of the jury who had only heard part of the evidence. It was then discovered that the missing juror had been sitting in the body of the court during the hearing of the case, and the juryman | Justice Wills is eighteenth, with 66 per cent, 2 who ought not to have been in the jury-box was ordered to leave, and his place was taken by the juror who should have been there. The evidence which had been given was then read over, and in the end the jury acquitted the accused. It appeared | that the juryman who went into the jury-box by mistake had been sitting in court during the hear ing of the case on Tuesday and accordingly knew the facts. According to the annual return relating to jointstock companies, the total number registered in the United Kingdom from the 1st of January, 1899, to the 31st of December in the same year, amounted to 4,975, with a nominal capital of some 246 millions sterling. Of these, ninety-three were registered without nominal capital, eighty-nine being limited by guarantee, and four being mutual. No less than 2,044 have their registered offices in the city of London or within five miles of the general post-office. The following analysis of the results of the appeals heard by the lords justices during the year 1900 is given by the Daily Telegraph: Mr. Justice Bruce heads the list with a clean slate. From him there were five appeals, and all of them stood the test of review. Mr. Justice Bingham comes next, with 5 per cent of reverses, I appeal being allowed out of 18. Mr. Justice Kennedy is third, with 14 per cent, 13 appeals, 2 reversals. Mr. Justice Mathew is fourth, with 21 per cent, 19 appeals, 4 reversals. Mr. Justice Barnes is fifth, with 25 per cent, 12 appeals, 3 reversals. Mr. Justice Lawrance is sixth, with 27 per cent, II appeals, 3 reversals. Mr. Justice Byrne is seventh, with 31 per cent, 22 appeals, 7 reversals. Mr. Justice Wright and Mr. Justice Phillimore tie for the eighth place, with 33 per cent, the former was reversed 10 times in 30 appeals, the latter 3 times in 9. Mr. Justice Farwell is ninth, with 38 per cent, 5 appeals allowed and 8 dismissed. Mr. Justice Grantham is tenth, with 44 per cent, 4 appeals allowed and 5 dismissed. Mr. Justice Stirling (since glorified) is eleventh, with 45 per cent, 5 appeals allowed and 6 dismissed. Mr. Justice Cozens-Hardy and Mr. Justice Day are bracketed with 46 per cent, the equity and the Queen's Bench judge both having 13 appeals allowed out of 28. The late Lord Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Bucknil are thirteenth, with 50 per cent, the figures being 1 out of 2 and 8 out of 16, respectively. Mr. Justice Buckley, Mr. Justice Ridley and Mr. Justice Darling show 55 per cent, the first and the third each sustaining 5 reversals in 9 appeals, and the second 10 to 18. Mr. Justice Kekewich is fifteenth, with 56 per cent; appeals allowed and I dismissed. Mr. Justice Romer (now Lord Justice) is nineteenth, with 75 per cent, 3 appeals allowed out of 4; and Mr. Justice Channell is last, with 80 per cent, having had 8 reversals in 10 appeals. The results afforded by the figures in connection with appeals from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords are equally interesting. According to the rules of arithmetic, Lord Justice Rigby heads the list. The House of Lords declared his opinion to be sound on eight occasions and disagreed with him once. A. L. Smith, M. R., comes next. He was said to be right thirteen times, and wrong five times. Lord Justice Lindley was right in three cases and wrong in two; Lord Justice Vaughan William was right in six cases (in one of which he had grave doubts) and wrong in five; Lord Justice Collins was wrong in eight and right in eight, and Lord Justice Romer was wrong in five and right in three. Viewed from this standpoint, therefore, the lord justices must be "placed" as follows: Lord Justice Rigby, first; A. L. Smith, M. R., second; Lord Justice Romer, third; ex-Lord Justice Lindley, fourth; Lord Justice Vaughan Williams, fifth, and Lord Justice Collins, sixth. Sir Francis Jeune's declaration as judge advocate-general that no information as to whether verdicts in courts-martial are unanimous ought to be given, will command the assent of the legal profession. Courts-martial in such cases as the one that has recently attracted so great a degree of public attention are dealing with questions of fact, and a soldier who is acquitted is entitled to have a verdict in his favor unqualified by any statement as to whether it was unanimous or not. Where questions of law before the ordinary legal tribunals are involved different considerations arise. It may be remembered that after the privy council gave its judgment in the case of Ridsdale v. Clifton, Chief Baron Kelly, who was a member of the Board that heard the appeal, claimed the right to let it be known that he entirely dissented from the decision. In consequence of this action, however, an order in council of February 4, 1878, was made confirming an old order of February 20, 1627, and directing that "the ancient rule and practice" of the privy council should be observed, and that no publication should be made as to how the particular voices and opinions went. If the constitution of the privy council is revised, as there appears to be every prospect of its being in the near future, it is to be hoped that this "ancient rule and practice" will be abandoned. In the language of Professor Westlake, it detracts from the authority of the privy council without adding anything to its dignity.— Law Journal. The Albany Law Journal. True, by reason of increasing infirmities, to a which in the last few years was added almost total blindness, he had been almost as wholly as much subtracted from the world's great activities in which in his time he took such a large and important part, as if he were actually dead. But it was a comfort and consolation to know that he was still in the flesh living link binding us to past generations. A sketch of Mr. Evarts' brilliant career, for which we are indebted to the New York Mail and Express, appears in other columns of this issue. No one can read it without marveling at his prodigious industry and the remarkable versatility of his talents as lawyer, orator, statesman, scholar and diplomat. The recent celebration of John Marshall Day was fully as successful as its most ardent Our English exchanges seem to hold the promoter could have wished. All over the opinion that trial by jury is losing its popucountry public recognition of the day was larity in the British Isles. The Law Journal, made and eulogies on the life, character and for example, finds, or thinks it finds, some services of the great jurist were delivered. It ground for such a conclusion in the proporis a lamentable fact that when the celebration tion of actions to be tried without juries in was first proposed and agitated by Mr. Adolph the Queen's Bench Division during the presMoses, of Chicago, a great many persons ent term. But even more striking is said to asked "Who was John Marshall?" The ad- be the want of faith in trial by jury displayed dresses and discussion since then have enlight- by litigants in the County Courts. The total ened them, have set thousands to thinking, number of actions determined by these tribuinvestigating, reading history and studying nals in 1899 was 732,094, and only 1,018 were the Constitution which Marshall upheld and tried with juries. "Allowance must be made," interpreted so ably. Even the school children | says our contemporary, "for the fact that the throughout the land caught the inspiration. services of jurymen are not available where The beneficial influence of such a celebration the amount in dispute does not exceed as we have just witnessed-probably the five pounds, but the little use made of most general given to any jurist or civil officer jurymen in the County Courts is striking in the world is impossible to gauge. Its enough even when this restriction has been educational effect cannot be measured. As taken into account. The number of actions has been truly said, "the inspiration thus de- tried with juries in 1899 was, with the exceprived from the career and character of the tion of 1897, the smallest for sixteen years. great Chief Justice dignifies the bar, exalts Possibly this decline in the popularity of trial the bench and strengthens the republic." by jury is due to the increasing tendency of The gratifying results speak well not only for juries to disagree." the profession so many of whose distinguished members gave up their valuable time amidst most exacting duties to honor the day, but for the future of the republic. The question of the legal right of women to wear long skirts that trail upon the ground has at last gotten into court, as we feared (or hoped) it would. The case was that of Smith A great lawyer, statesman and diplomat v. Kingston City Railroad Company, decided passed from earth when William Maxwell by the Appellate Division of the New York Evarts departed this life on the twenty-eighth Supreme Court. It appears that the plaintiff, of February last, aged eighty-three years. Mrs. Smith, while alighting from one of the VOL. 63.- No. 3 defendant company's cars, caught her dress plaintiff obtained a verdict in the Superior on the platform and was dragged a consider- Court and before judgment the defendant was able distance and injured, as she alleged, by adjudged a bankrupt, the date of the adjudica-. the sudden starting of the car before she had tion being, however, more than four months been able to disentangle herself. It was after the giving of the bond; and a motion was claimed on behalf of the defense that the made by the defendant for a continuance by plaintiff was herself negligent in that she reason of the bankruptcy; whereupon the traveled upon the car wearing a dress so long plaintiff moved for the entry of special judgthat it would be more than likely to catch ment in its favor to enable it to proceed upon such appliances as were necessarily ex- against the surety on the bond given by the tending above the platform. The Appellate defendant. At the hearing upon the motion Division held that a woman was entitled not of plaintiff, the defendant contended that the only to wear long skirts but to an allowance of special judgment asked for could not be time sufficient to enable her not only to step allowed by reason of the fact that no attachoff the car but to clear her skirts in case they ment had actually been made and that the should be caught upon any obstruction. The plaintiff must come into court with the rest of court laid it down as a rule that it was the the creditors. The plaintiff then showed the duty of the conductor to see that a woman circumstances, as already stated, under which descending from a car was free from any the bond was given; and the court ordered attachment connecting her with the vehicle special judgment to be entered in accordance before he started again after she had descended with the motion of plaintiff, and the defendto the ground; adding that if the conductor ant excepted to the introduction of evidence started before he knew that the passenger was showing these circumstances. thus free, it was a negligent method of starting, and that he must take his chances. The verdict against the defendant company was, therefore, sustained. The court says: "There is no merit in these exceptions. The cases relied on by the defendant have nothing to do with the case. The rights of the surety, if he has any, are not now in question; if he has any defense to the claim against him as surety he can set it up The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the when sued on the bond. Judgment against case of O. Sheldon Company v. Cooke, the principal debtor must be obtained by the recently decided, holds that a defendant is plaintiff to charge the surety, because the conestopped to set up that there was no attach- dition of his bond is to pay a judgment if one ment on his property after he has represented is obtained against the principal debtor. But to the plaintiff that he admits that an attach- the judgment is a judgment against the prinment has been made, intending the plaintiff to cipal debtor and is to be disposed of as such rely on such representation and the plaintiff though a surety cannot question it when suit doing so and not making an attachment. The is brought against him. (Heard v. Lodge, 20 court also holds the defendant to be estopped from contending that there was no property that the plaintiff could have attached had he sought to do so, the defendant having previously stated to the plaintiff that he was "good for any reasonable amount." The court finds it to be a matter of daily occurrence to give bonds to prevent the making of an attachment and reciting the fact of attachment having been made. Pick., 53; McKim v. Haley, 173 Mass., 112.) "There is nothing in the defendant's objection to having judgment entered against him. There is nothing about the fact of an attachment of property for the purpose of giving a bond to dissolve an attachment and a special judgment founded on the attachment, which distinguishes it from any other fact, so far as the question of estoppel is concerned. If the defendant represents to the plaintiff that he In this case the defendant offered to accept admits that an attachment has been made, inservice of writ and to give a satisfactory bond tending the plaintiff to rely on it, and the to pay any judgment that the plaintiff might plaintiff does rely on it and relying on it does recover against him in the action. The not make an attachment, the defendant is |