involved a reconsideration of the question; that however for domestic reasons it is necessary for the Japanese Government to include in the budget estimate for the fiscal year beginning April 1st 1925 an item for an Embassy at Peking although this would not necessarily mean that the government had decided to change the status of the mission. My opinion is that Baron Shidehara means during December next to suggest to the powers that the status of their diplomatic missions. at Peking be raised to that of Embassies and that in case the powers decline the Japanese Government intends nevertheless next spring to raise the status of their mission." The telegram above quoted seems to indicate that the Japanese Government is unwilling to accept the proposal contained in your 302, August 1, 3 p.m. In view of the determination of the Japanese Government to postpone action on the matter until December, the Department doubts whether a formal note as suggested in your 323 August 7, 5 p.m. would be the means of causing the Japanese Government to reconsider its decision. It now seems apparent that the Japanese Government not only declines to accept the formula which was orally suggested by the British Ambassador at Tokyo and by the American Chargé d'Affaires, but it appears also to have definitely receded from its original suggestion that the Chinese Government be notified in the sense informally suggested by Baron Shidehara as reported in Tokyo's telegram 192, July 22, 5 p.m., which was repeated to you in the Department's 236 July 26, 1 p.m.5 It would seem to be useless to urge the Japanese Government to change its decision in this matter and the Department therefore desires to suggest to the British Government that it would seem to be both inexpedient and futile to despatch the formal note as suggested in your 323, August 7, 5 p.m. If the British Government has in mind good reasons to the contrary the Department will be glad to consider the matter further. It desires, however, to stress the point that the action of the Japanese Government seems to close the matter for the time being at least. Tokyo's 200 July 26, 11 [10] A. M. was repeated to you in Department's 237 July 26, 2 p. m. You may bring the foregoing orally to the attention of the Foreign Office. Repeat to Paris as Department's No. 265. Telegram no. 192, ante, p. 472; telegram no. 236 not printed. GREW 124.93/97 The British Embassy to the Department of State AIDE MEMOIRE His Majesty's Government have had under careful consideration the question of taking some action in regard to the decision of the Japanese Government to raise their Legation at Peking to the status of an Embassy. It appears to His Majesty's Government that some attempt is now being made by the various conflicting groups in China to arrive at some form of cooperation which may emerge into an effective Government and His Majesty's Government feel that any action which might discourage such efforts would be unfortunate. Inasmuch, however, as the present Provisional Government in China includes a strong element favourable to Japan, it is thought that the present moment is unfavourable for asking the Japanese Government to cancel their decision regarding a Japanese Embassy at Peking. On the other hand, it is thought that if the situation in China does in fact show definite improvement the Powers might, in due time and acting in concert, use the proposal to raise the status of their Missions in China to Embassies as an inducement to persuade the Chinese Government to press on with the re-organization of the Administration and to afford effective protection to foreign interests in China. To take such joint action might more easily enable the Powers to exercise their influence in China for the general benefit in the future. For these reasons His Majesty's Government would welcome the postponement of the actual execution of the decision of the Japanese Government to raise their Legation at Peking to an Embassy. In making this suggestion His Majesty's Government are not in any way binding themselves to appoint an Ambassador at Peking under any circumstances, but their idea is that it would be unfortunate not to take advantage of any means of joint influence such as the execution of the above suggestion would offer. If the United States Government agree and will send instructions to the United States Ambassador at Tokio to approach the Japanese Government unofficially in the above sense, with a view to the postponement of the execution of their decision in this matter, His Majesty's Government will be happy to instruct their Representative at Tokio to support the action of his United States Colleague. [WASHINGTON,] December 3, 1924. 124.93/98 The Department of State to the British Embassy AIDE-MÉMOIRE With reference to the Aide-Mémoire which was left with the Secretary of State on December 3, 1924, stating that the British Government would welcome the postponement of the actual execution of the decision of the Japanese Government to raise its Legation at Peking to the status of an Embassy, and suggesting that, if the situation in China shows a definite improvement, the Powers might, in due time and acting in concert, use the proposal to raise the status of their Missions in China to Embassies as an inducement to the Chinese Government to press on with the reorganization of the Administration and to afford effective protection to foreign interests, the British Embassy is informed that the Department of State at once caused inquiry to be made by the American Ambassador in Tokyo concerning the present status of this matter. He has now informed the Department that, although the Japanese Government, for domestic reasons, found it necessary to include in the budget for the fiscal year beginning April 1, 1925, an item for an Embassy at Peking, this does not necessarily mean that the Government has decided to change the status of the Mission; and that, although there has been considerable speculation on the subject, both in the vernacular press and among the public in general, the Foreign Office has as yet made no public declaration in the premises. The Ambassador is of the opinion that the action thus far taken may be construed to indicate not a present intention on the part of the Japanese Government to raise the status of its Mission in Peking, but a desire to be in a position to make such a change during the next Japanese fiscal year in case it should then deem it expedient to do so. In view of the present indeterminate status of the matter, and of the unlikelihood of the Japanese Government proceeding further in it without consultation with the governments of the other Powers principally interested, it would appear that the present moment is somewhat premature to approach the Japanese Government in regard to it. Should the British Government, however, in the light of the situation as known to it, feel that there is occasion for urgency in dealing with the question, the Department of State would be glad to give further consideration to the matter upon being so informed. [WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1924. RESERVATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER POWERS REGARDING DISPOSAL TO BE MADE OF THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY UNDER THE SINO-SOVIET AGREEMENT' 861.01/745: Telegram The Minister in China (Schurman) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] PEKING, February 28, 1924-noon. [Received February 28-8:55 a.m.] 66. Karakhan seriously intended to go to Canton but the trip was suddenly canceled, probably because the Chinese Government used its influence against his going. The two parties have since been conducting negotiations with more hope. The Chinese wanted settlement of outstanding questions to precede recognition, while Karakhan demanded just the opposite. They are proceeding now on the basis of a new formula, which is that the establishment of principles for the settlement of their national differences shall come first, then China shall recognize the Soviet Union, and after that the difficulties between the two countries will be actually adjusted. The problem of the Chinese Eastern Railway is the one fundamental obstacle. China wishes to gain ownership by purchase before the date fixed in the original agreement. The Chinese are prepared to accept in the meantime cooperative management on a 50–50 plan. The Soviet Union is holding out for Russian rights in accordance with the provisions of the agreement. Karakhan and the Japanese Minister here are also holding conversations. SCHURMAN 861.01/760: Telegram The Minister in China (Schurman) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] PEKING, March 11 [129], 1924-11 a. m. 76. My telegram February 28, noon. C. T. Wang, Director of the Commission on Sino-Russian Affairs, presented to the Cabinet on March 8 a long report regarding his negotiations with Karakhan. 'For previous correspondence concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway, see Foreign Relations, 1923, vol. 1, pp. 758 ff. 112731-VOL. I-39-38 This report has been discussed since by the Cabinet in long sessions. I had an intimate after-dinner talk with Yen on March 10 and a similar conversation with Koo on March 11. I have also talked with others who are close to Karakhan. The following is the situation: 1. China has been affected to a marked degree by British recognition of the Soviet Union. 2. Public opinion, so far as it exists in China, has not been hostile at any time to recognition. Forty-seven professors in the National University of Peking quite recently petitioned the Cabinet in favor of immediate recognition. This has stimulated and encouraged the Cabinet members to go ahead with recognition, for this is a country where scholars always have exerted a great influence on the Government and continue to do so, though to a lessened degree. 3. The Chinese do not want to be among the last to recognize the Soviet Union and specifically they do not want to be behind the Japanese. 4. Karakhan has been exceedingly conciliatory according to all the information I have received. 5. The Cabinet approved in substance Wang's report which is now before the President. The Cabinet will probably consider it again this week. 6. The present agreement is preliminary and only lays down the general lines for the final settlement. After recognition detailed agreements are to be signed. 7. Apparently agreement has been reached on the following points: reestablishment of full diplomatic relations between China and Russia; formal cancellation by Russia of extraterritoriality; abrogation of old treaties; return of Boxer Indemnity; Russian [recognition] that Mongolia is part of China; withdrawal of all Russian influence from Mongolia, determination of frontiers; drafting of new commercial agreement; drafting of new rules for the navigation of the Sungari and Amur Rivers. 8. The chief difficulty has always been the Chinese Eastern Railway. Apparently, however, the general lines of a settlement have been agreed upon. Russia declares that the title to the Chinese Eastern belongs to China and gives up all claims to sovereignty in the Railway Zone. The Chinese may take over the Chinese Eastern by paying for it earlier than the time fixed in the 1896 agreement, which was to be 40 years from that date. Russia is to share equally in the management in the meantime. Probably this will be accomplished by Russia's merely replacing the Russo-Asiatic Bank in its relation to the railway. 9. The purchase price for the Chinese Eastern is to be fixed later. Russia wants China to pay the original cost. Yen told me that Ka |