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SERMON XII.

PSALM CXIX. 96.

THY COMMANDMENT IS EXCEEDING BROAD.

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"I HAVE seen," says the Psalmist, an end of all perfection;" the glory of human greatness vanishes; the objects of human pursuit disappoint us; the wonders of nature and art decay; and what we call moral perfection, as it is exhibited in human character, is either frail, defective, or delusive; but "thy commandment," O God, " is exceeding broad."

The opposition between the two parallel portions of the verse may not, at first, be understood. The meaning, undoubtedly, is, of that, which is perfect in human estimation, we soon find a limit, but the wisdom and perfection of thy law who can represent? This comprehensive law of goodness, which appeared to the Psalmist so "exceeding broad," is more clearly defined and illustrated in the New Testament; and, if there were nothing else to prove the divine origin of Christ's religion, the very nature of his moral precepts would, perhaps, be sufficient. Of the evangelical morality it may be truly said, that it cannot be improved. The world had before known nothing like it, as a whole; and it would be, perhaps, impossible to collect all its precepts, even if we were permitted to search, and select, here and there, a maxim or a sentiment from all the works

of all the ancients. It is distinguished for the grandeur and efficacy of its sanctions, which lay hold on eternity to come; for the restraints which it lays on the heart, the source of action; and for its elevating, purifying, and spiritualizing influence. In short, the instructions of Christ partake of the divinity of their author; the spirit, which "descended like a dove, and rested upon him," breathes in every line which he has left us.

When we consider the vast extent of the Christian morality, and compare it with the inadequate conceptions of duty entertained by many Christians, it may be well thought surprising, that we should have discovered so much more solicitude to erect standards of faith than standards of practice. We have guarded the articles of our belief against invasion or evasion, by every possible barrier; and have considered the church in danger, when the perfection of these formularies has been doubted or denied. But no church has thought it equally necessary to take care of its system of duties. Diversity of sentiment on the subject of practice has been thought a less dangerous heresy; and a church cannot be shown in ecclesiastical history, which has established a creed in morals.

Whence this strange inconsistency in our zeal? Is it because the intentions of Scripture are more plain on this subject than on articles of faith? Or is it because our love of power is more flattered by subjecting other men to the standard of our speculations than by guarding them from mistaking their duty?

Whatever answer may be given to these questions, I think no man, who makes the Scriptures his study, need be more surprised or concerned at the variety of doctrines, which men have attempted to draw from them, than at the

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imperfect notions, which still exist, on the subject of duty. The cause of this diversity is to be sought, not in the obscurity of our Savior's precepts, for, in general, their spirit cannot be mistaken, but in our ignorance of ourselves, in our slavish subjection to custom and fashion, in our thoughtless lives, and, above all, in the great reluctance, which every man feels, to suffer the standard of duty to be raised much higher than the point to which he has himself attained.

I shall devote this discourse to an inquiry into the inadequate conceptions, which prevail, as to the extent of the divine law. The subject naturally divides itself into the four grand points, of justice, benevolence, purity, and piety. We shall consider the prevailing defects of our moral sentiments on each of these branches of the Christian law.

Upon the subject, then, of justice, upon which, if on any branch of morals, we may suppose men to entertain accurate ideas, because it is intimately connected with all their business and with all their labors, it will be found that few of us have either very exact, comprehensive, or evangelical conceptions.

It is a general sentiment in society, that, if a man of business observes a common honesty in his negotiations, if he is true to his word, faithful in his engagements, and punctual in his appointments, it is not only as much as we, but as God has a right to expect. Instances of deliberate, high-handed fraud excite, it is true, a temporary indignation; but the awakened sensibility too soon subsides; the knowledge of successful dishonesty seems rather to prepare us better for the next example; and often is the most deliberate injustice covered over, at last, by forms and the

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show of precedent, and men consent to enjoy, all their lives, the fruits of the very wickedness they have execrated.

But, after all, my friends, is the bare observance of the laws, in commercial transactions, the extent of the Christian duty of justice? There is a sense of equity in a man of Christian principles, which mere law cannot prescribe, and to which custom does not always reach. There is a sense of right, which can neither be inspired nor supported by a common regard to reputation; and a high sense of duty, which asks only the eye of God for its witness and reward.

What do we think, also, of the great duty of restitution, in innumerable cases which the laws and customs of society hardly contemplate? If we have either designedly or undesignedly wronged our brother, it is our duty to make him compensation, even in cases where he is ignorant of his loss, in others where he does not demand it, in many where he cannot require it by any positive compact, and in many more where there is no common tribunal, to which we may appeal, to decide the proper measure of retribu

tion.

There are some cases of injury known only to God and ourselves; there are others, where the world would smile at us, if we felt bound to redress them. There are cases in which, though we are entirely guiltless in the sight of God, yet we may become guilty by withholding that compensation, which nothing but a tender conscience, or, if you choose to call it so, a delicate sense of honor, knows how to estimate.

Again; are there not some who venture to propagate, or, at least, not to contradict, a false report, by which, for

the sake of gain, they may practise on the credulity of the public? Are there not those who will encounter risks, undertake adventures, and hazard speculations, to which their means are entirely inadequate? and this, too, with the prospect before them, not merely of their own ruin, but of the ruin of others, to whose kindness they have been indebted, and whose interests they have no right to endanger?

But there is another more extensive branch of justice, upon which there prevails an astonishing insensibility in the minds even of honest men; I mean justice to the reputation of others. We enjoy the benefits of society only on condition of preserving its rights; and in every civilized country justice is due to every man's character, whether we are his friend or his enemy. We are not only to render "tribute to whom tribute is due," but "honor to whom honor." Every man has a right to our good opinion, till he has forfeited it. Every man has a right to have his character as inviolate as his property, even when he cannot protect it by positive laws. Whatever be the principles which he is supposed to entertain, the amount of his importance in society, or the relation in which he stands to ourselves, he has a claim for justice to his character on every individual in the community. I speak not now of charity, but of justice. He has a right to expect that no doubtful or malicious insinuations should obtain that currency which is often given them in inconsiderate conversation. For not only are we injurious by the direct propagation of unjust reports, but we have not even a right to give them countenance in our more private and confidential intercourse. Nay, more; the sufferer, whatever be his rank or consequence, has a right to demand of us that we

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