Opinion of the Court.

an opportunity to reconsider the record for the purpose of correcting or modifying any conclusions thereupon, and to make any amendments of the record necessary to perfect it."

This regulation would seem to warrant the course of conduct followed in the present case. In Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13, a somewhat similar contention was made. There a court-martial had imposed a sentence which was transmitted with the record to Admiral Nichols, the revising officer, who returned it with a letter stating that the finding was in accordance with the evidence, but that he differed with the court as to the adequacy of the sentence. The court revised the sentence and substituted another and more severe sentence, which was approved. The accused filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court; and it was claimed that the court had exhausted its powers in making the first sentence, and, also, that it was not competent for the courtmartial to give effect to the views of the revising officer by imposing a second sentence of more severity. The Navy Regulations were cited to the effect that the authority who ordered the court was competent to direct it to reconsider its proceedings and sentence for the purpose of correcting any mistake which may have been committed, but that it was not within the power of the revising authority to compel a court to change its sentence, where, upon being reconvened by him, they have refused to modify it, nor directly or indirectly to enlarge the measure of punishment imposed by sentence of a court-martial.

This court held that such regulations have the force of law, but that as the court-martial had jurisdiction over the person and the case, its proceedings could not be collaterally impeached for any mere error or irregularity committed within the sphere of its authority; that the matters complained of were within the jurisdiction of the court-martial; that the second sentence was not void; and, accordingly, the application for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. We agree with the Court of Claims that the ruling in Ex parte Reed, in principle, decides the present question.

We think that the Court of Claims did not err in hold

Statement of the Case.

ing that where an officer is suspended from duty he is not entitled to emoluments or allowances. United States V. Phisterer, 94 U. S. 219.

We have felt constrained to, at least briefly, consider the several propositions urged upon us with so much zeal and ability on behalf of the appellant, though we might well have contented ourselves with a reference to the able and elaborate opinion of the Court of Claims delivered by Justice Nott. 28 C. Cl. 173.

As we have reached the conclusion that the court-martial in question was duly convened and organized, and that the questions decided were within its lawful scope of action, it would be out of place for us to express any opinion on the propriety of the action of that court in its proceedings and sentence. If, indeed, as has been strenuously urged, the appellant was harshly dealt with, and a sentence of undue severity was finally imposed, the remedy must be found elsewhere than in the courts of law.

The decree of the Court of Claims is

Affirmed.

DE VAUGHN v. HUTCHINSON.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA.

No. 114. Argued October 30, 1896. Decided March 1, 1897.

This court looks to the law of the State in which land is situated for the rules which govern its descent, alienation and transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills and other conveyances; and in the District of Columbia those rules are the rules which governed in Maryland at the time when the District was separated from it.

Under a will devising real estate in the District of Columbia to M. A. M. during her natural life, and after her death to be equally divided among the heirs of her body begotten, share and share alike, and to their heirs and assigns forever, M. A. M. takes a life estate only, and her children take an estate in fee.

SAMUEL De Vaughn, a resident of the District of Columbia, died on the 5th day of July, 1867, leaving a last will and

Statement of the Case.

testament dated April 20, 1861. This will was admitted to probate September 1, 1867, and was, as to those of its provisions which are involved in the present litigation, as follows: "I give and bequeath unto my sister, Susan Brayfield, all my personal property of whatever description.

"Item. I give and devise unto my sister Susan Brayfield the whole square four hundred and eighty-three and improvements, also lots twenty, twenty-one and part of lot twentytwo in square three hundred and seventy-eight, situated in the city of Washington, during her natural life, and at her death to her daughters Mary Rebecca Brayfield, Catharine Sophia Harrison and Martha Ann Mitchell, to be divided in the following manner, that is to say: Martha Ann shall have one half of lot twenty, as subdivided, being seventy-three feet deep, having on the same two houses. To Catharine Sophia, the other half (being the east half) of said lot twenty, having also on the same two houses, and Mary Rebecca shall have the corner store situated on lot twenty-one. Catharine Sophia shall have the two houses next south of said corner store on said lot twenty-one, and Martha Ann shall have the next two houses south of the two to Catharine Sophia, and adjoining the same on said lot twenty-one, and Mary Rebecca shall have the whole of that part of lot twenty-two, as subdivided from lot twenty and improvements, during their natural lives, and after their death to their heirs begotten of their bodies, and to their heirs and assigns forever.

"I also desire that square four hundred and eighty-three shall be subdivided at the death of my sister Susan Brayfield, and distributed as follows: Mary Rebecca Brayfield shall have the whole front on K street, ninety feet deep to a ten-foot alley, which comprises lots one and two, with all improvements on the same. Martha Ann Mitchell shall have ninety feet on Sixth street, running that breadth through the square to Fifth street, and Catharine Sophia Harrison shall have the remainder north portion of said square four hundred and eightythree, during their natural lives, and at their death to be equally divided among the heirs of their bodies begotten, share and share alike, and to their heirs and assigns forever.

Statement of the Case.

"Item. I give and devise to Mary Rebecca Brayfield the east part of lot nineteen, in square three hundred and seventyeight, and all improvements on said lot, front and rear, during her natural life, and after her death to her heirs and assigns forever.

"Item. I give and devise to Catharine Sophia Harrison the east part of lot seventeen, in square three hundred and seventy-eight, including all improvements, and also that part as subdivided in the rear in said square, during her natural life, and after her death to the heirs of her body begotten, and to their heirs and assigns forever.

"Item. I give and devise to Martha Ann Mitchell, daughter of Susan Brayfield, the west part of lot eighteen in square three hundred and seventy-eight, and all improvements, including that part as subdivided in the rear on said square, and to her heirs and assigns forever.

"I give and bequeath to my mother during her natural life, out of the rents of lots No. twenty, twenty-one and part of twenty-two, in square three hundred and seventy-eight, and also the whole of square four hundred and eighty-three, devised to my sister Susan Brayfield, the sum of twenty-five dollars per month; or, if properly provided for by my said sister, then only five dollars per month for her own use as she may think proper.

"Item. I give and devise to my brother John De Vaughn, in square four hundred and eight, lot D and parts of lots five in square four hundred and five, and lot two in square four hundred and eighty-seven, and all improvements, also lot eleven in square five hundred and seventeen, lots four and five in square four and five in square seven hundred and eighty-five, and to his heirs and assigns forever. All of which property is situated in the city of Washington, District of Columbia.

"Item. I give and devise to my brother William De Vaughn, of the city of Alexandria, State of Virginia, lot three in square one thousand and ninety-five, lot one in square six hundred and seventy-seven, lot four in square forty-four, lot two in square one hundred and twenty-nine. Also lots B, C, D, F and G in square forty-three, all lying and being in the city

Statement of the Case.

of Washington and District of Columbia, also the house and lot on Henry street in the city of Alexandria, State of Virginia, and to his heirs and assigns forever."

Martha Ann Mitchell, one of the devisees named in the will, died in the year 1866, before the death of the testator, Samuel De Vaughn, leaving as her only children and heirs at law Benjamin D. Mitchell, Richard R. Mitchell and Sarah W. Hutchinson. Mrs. Susan Brayfield, the tenant for life, died in December, 1891.

In May, 1892, James H. De Vaughn, Emily De Vaughn and Rebecca J. Kirk, as heirs at law of Samuel De Vaughn, brought, in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, a bill in equity against William H. De Vaughn and others, also heirs at law of Samuel De Vaughn. The purpose of the bill was to have a declaration that by reason of the decease of Martha Ann Mitchell during the lifetime of the testator the devise to her lapsed and became void, and that thereupon, upon the death of the testator and of Susan Brayfield, the real estate described in said devises became vested in the heirs at law of the said testator as if the said testator had died intestate as to said real estate; and, upon such declaration, that the said real estate should be sold and the proceeds of such sale should be distributed among the parties lawfully entitled thereto as heirs at law of the said Samuel De Vaughn.

To this bill appeared Benjamin D. V. Mitchell and others, the children of the said Martha Ann Mitchell, who were living at the death of the said testator, and who filed a demurrer to said bill. Upon argument in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the demurrer was sustained, and, the complainants electing to stand on their said bill, a final decree was entered, dismissing the bill and awarding an account of rents and profits.

From this decree an appeal was taken to the general term, but the cause was thereafter transferred to and heard in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, and on April 2, 1894, the decree of the Supreme Court was affirmed. From the decree of the Court of Appeals an appeal was duly prayed and allowed to this court.