§ 30. he did not participate in the tortious act (u). And the Court of Appeal held that the defendant still remained liable. Brett, M.R., said, "Now it is clear the words 'any debt' must mean any debt of the bankrupt. That is a necessary implication, but the section then goes on 'incurred by means of any fraud or breach of trust.' Now to prevent Pritchard from coming within these words it is necessary to alter the word 'any' to 'his,' or to add the words 'committed by him.' But there is a sound rule of construction which forbids us to alter or to add to a statute unless it is impossible otherwise to make sense of the enactment. We have no right to speculate, but if we were at liberty to do so I think I could see very good reasons why the statute was only intended to protect honest bankruptcies, and this bankruptcy was caused by the dishonesty of one partner. There being then no reason which obliges or enables us to alter the words of the Act, it seems to be clear that Pritchard's case is not covered by the enactment as to release of debts, and that he is not discharged from his liability by the order of discharge in his liquidation." Although the decision in this case to some extent was based upon equitable grounds and upon the "intention of the statute to protect honest bankruptcies," it seems to have been considered by the Legislature as inequitable that an otherwise innocent trustee should be held responsible for the fraudulent act of his co-trustee, so far as such act affected the discharge of the innocent person, hence the words "to which he was a party" have been introduced so as to qualify the section. And therefore, unless it can be proved that the debtor was particeps criminis, he will be discharged from such liability just as if it were a civil debt. What will be deemed participation in the fraud will now become a question of fact to be determined upon the circumstances of each case. However, in any case a simple breach of trust, unless all breaches of trust are to be deemed fraudulent, will not be within the words of this section, the word "fraudulent" having been introduced, and the debtor will be (as he always was) liable for such a breach of trust (), the (u) And see Ex parte Adamson, 47 L. J. Bank. 103; 8 Ch. D. 807; and see also Debtors Act, s. 15, and s. 4, sub-s. 4, as to breach of trust, &c., and see Blair v. Brom ley, 5 Hare, 442. The Emma Silver Mining Co. v. Grant, 50 L. J. Ch. 449; 17 Ch. D. 122. (x) See supra, and Lewin's Trusts, 7 ed. p. 782. enforcement of the remedy, however, being suspended until 88 30, 31. after discharge (y). credit to extent demeanor. 31. Where an undischarged bankrupt who has been Undischarged bankrupt adjudged bankrupt under this Act obtains credit to the obtaining extent of twenty pounds or upwards from any person of 201. to be without informing such person that he is an undischarged guilty of mis. bankrupt, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and may be dealt with and punished as if he had been guilty of a misdemeanor under the Debtors Act, 1869, and the provisions of that Act shall apply to proceedings under this section. This is an entirely new provision-who for the purposes of this section will be deemed an "undischarged bankrupt" may become a question of some nicety. Will a bankrupt whose order of discharge is suspended or granted upon conditions be within the meaning of this section? Being a criminal liability, it is submitted the section must be strictly construed, and if so, it may possibly be argued that a "suspended" or conditional discharge is a discharge nevertheless, but not intended to operate as such until a certain time, (there are three courses always named in the Act; viz., (1) refuse the order, (2) suspend the operation of the order for a specified time, (3) grant an order of discharge subject to conditions, &c.), and therefore the bankrupt is discharged, subject to the time elapsing during which the operation of the order is suspended, or until the condition is fulfilled; whilst such suspense will leave him civilly liable as regards his person and property, but it does not follow that the criminal liability of this section will also attach in the absence of express words making the section applicable to the cases mentioned. The provision is framed in the interest of the new creditors or persons with whom the bankrupt inferentially is allowed to trade prior to obtaining his discharge, for so far as the property afterwards acquired by him is affected, the creditors in the bankruptcy are entitled to it so long as he is undischarged, unless they have previously sold the estate to the debtor (y) See Ross v. Gutteridge, supra. §§ 31, 32. or rendered it inequitable for them to repossess themselves of it (2). And when undischarged the new creditors would have no lien upon the property (a). Disqualifica- IV. c. 76, 8. 52. 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, ss. 21, 22. 34 & 35 Vict. c. 50. The silence of the debtor is here taken to be the false pretence in obtaining credit, which certainly would not have rendered him criminally liable but for the section (see Debtors Act, 1869). It throws on him the onus of informing the creditor, and he may not be silent as to the fact. Under the Debtors Act 1869, s. 13, obtaining credit within four months before liquidation or the presentation of a petition against him by a debtor, if so obtained by a "false representation" or "other fraud," is a misdemeanor if the goods are not paid for; and also obtaining credit on the false pretence of carrying on business and dealing in the ordinary way of his trade. And any person, whether bankrupt or not, who in incurring a debt or liability obtains credit under false pretences or by means of any other fraud, commits a misdemeanor under that Act, see Sect. 12 (aa). DISQUALIFICATIONS OF BANKRUPT. 32. (1.) Where a debtor is adjudged bankrupt he shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be disqualified for (a.) Sitting or voting in the House of Lords, or on any committee thereof, or being elected as a peer (b.) Being elected to, or sitting or voting in, the House peace; (d.) Being elected to or holding or exercising the office of mayor, alderman, or councillor ; (e.) Being elected to or holding or exercising the office (z) Ex parte Tinker re France, L. R. 9 Ch. 716; 43 L. J. Bank. 147 30 L. T. 806. (a) Ex parte Pitt re Gosling, 20 Ch. D. 308. (aa) And see W. N. 1883, 130, as to evidence of false pretences. of guardian of the poor, overseer of the poor, §§ 32, 33. school board, highway board, burial board, or (2.) The disqualifications to which a bankrupt is subject under this section shall be removed and cease if and when, (a.) the adjudication of bankrupt against him is annulled; or (b.) he obtains from the Court his discharge with a cer tificate to the effect that his bankruptcy was caused by misfortune without any misconduct on his part. The Court may grant or withhold such certificate as it thinks fit, but any refusal of such certificate shall be subject to appeal. (3.) The disqualifications imposed by this section shall extend to all parts of the United Kingdom. seat in House 33. (1.) If a member of the House of Commons is Vacating of adjudged bankrupt, and the disqualifications arising there- of Commons. from under this Act are not removed within six months Bankruptcy Act, 1869, from the date of the order, the Court shall, immediately after the expiration of that time, certify the same to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and thereupon the seat of the member shall be vacant. (2.) Where the seat of a member so becomes vacant, the Speaker, during a recess of the House, whether by prorogation or by adjournment, shall forthwith, after receiving the certificate, cause notice thereof to be published in the London Gazette; and after the expiration of six days after the publication shall (unless the House has met before that day, or will meet on the day of the issue), issue his warrant to the clerk of the Crown to make out a new writ for electing another member in the room of the member whose seat has so become vacant. (3.) The powers of the Act of the twenty-fourth year §8 33, 34. of the reign of King George the Third, chapter twentysix, "to repeal so much of two Acts made in the tenth and fifteenth years of the reign of His present Majesty as authorise the Speaker of the House of Commons to issue his warrant to the clerk of the Crown for making out writs for the election of members to serve in Parliament in the manner therein mentioned; and for substituting other provisions for the like purposes," so far as those powers enable the Speaker to nominate and appoint other persons, being members of the House of Commons, to issue warrants for the making out of new writs during the vacancy of the office of Speaker or during his absence out of the realm, shall extend to enable him to make the like nomination and appointment for issuing warrants, under the like circumstances and conditions, for the election of a member in the room of any member whose seat becomes vacant under this Act. Vacating of municipal and other offices. Peers. 34. If a person is adjudged bankrupt whilst holding the office of mayor, alderman, councillor, guardian, overseer, or member of a sanitary authority, school board, highway board, burial board, or select vestry, his office shall thereupon become vacant. Prior to this Act the disqualification of Peers was to be found in the Disqualification Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 50). Now some of the provisions of that Act as amended are to be found in this section. It will be observed, that whereas under that Act the bankruptcy of a Peer might have been annulled on the ground. that the person against whom the order was made ought never to have been adjudged a bankrupt, or where the bankrupt was duly discharged, either by payment or satisfaction or by the Court, and as to debts not affected by the discharge, where he satisfied the House that he had discharged them. Now, either upon annulment, or upon obtaining a discharge with a certificate that the bankruptcy was caused by misfortune without misconduct the disqualification |