intention, the following cases have been decided. If the debtor goes abroad, though for a proper purpose, and thereby his creditors are delayed as a natural consequence, as when he, being a trader, omits to make provision for the payment of bills coming due, he is assumed to know and intend the consequences of his acts (n). On the other hand, his merely going abroad for a lawful pur pose, as, for instance, to look after his affairs, if his creditors are not thereby delayed, will not be an act of bankruptcy (0). So if a partner, not being pressed by creditors, goes abroad, leaving a solvent partner to manage his business, this will not be an act of bankruptcy (p). Being pressed for debts is strong - evidence of the intention to defeat and delay creditors at the time of such departure (q). It would seem also that the act of bankruptcy becomes complete at the time of the departure (r). Remains out of England. It is possible for a person to have departed out of England without any direct motive to delay or hinder his creditors; but having so departed, if he protracts his residence abroad for an unreasonable time, assigning no cause for his absence and leaving no funds and making no arrangements to pay his debts, the inference will be that he remains abroad with intent to defeat and delay his creditors, and will be an act of bankruptcy, and so long as he remains abroad, the act of bankruptcy will continue to exist and to support a petition (s). And such intent may be inferred from the fact that he so continues to remain abroad without making provision to meet his engagements (t). Departs from his Dwelling-house or otherwise absents Himself. A mere failure to keep an appointment with a creditor is not enough, unless there is some additional evidence showing intent (n) Er parte Kilner, 2 Dea. 324; Windham v. Paterson, 2 Rose, 466; Holroyd v. Whitehead, 3 Camp. 530; Ramsbottom v. Lewis, 1 Camp. 279; Ex parte Goater, 30 L. T. N. S. 620. (0) Windham v. Paterson, supra ; and Warner v. Barber, Holt, 175. (p) Ramsbottom v. Lewis, 1 Camp. 279. (q) Williams v. Nunn, supra; (t) Bayly v. Schofield, 1 M. & S. 8 4. § 4. to delay(); but as a general rule the failure to keep an appointment with a creditor is some evidence of an intent to delay, and will, if proved, amount to an act of bankruptcy, but such presumption may be rebutted by evidence showing that there was no such intention (x). Failure by a debtor to call and pay a debt according to promise was held not to be an act of bankruptcy, it appearing there was no intention to delay (y). A departure with intention to delay is an act of bankruptcy, though no creditor be thereby in fact delayed (2). "Or begins to keep House." Denial of a trader has been considered strong evidence of beginning to keep house. The denial should be committed with the order to deny, but if the debtor hears and acquiesces in such denial it will be sufficient (a). Such denial should either be to a creditor or to his duly authorised agent (b) ; but the hour at which the creditor calls should be a reasonable one (c). Although the words are "keep house," it would seem more strictly to mean any house, including his place of business, where he may happen to be (d). But it is not an act of bankruptcy for a debtor to cause himself to be denied to a creditor calling, by the debtor's appointment, for payment on a Sunday or at a late or unreasonable hour (e). Retirement from one part of a house to another and unusual part, or to prevent importunity, will be a sufficient act of bankruptcy (ƒ). (u) Ex parte Meyer re Stephany, L. R. 7 Ch. Ap. 188; and sec Russell v. Bell, 10 M. & W, 340. (x) Ex parte Lavender, 2 M. & A. 11; Tucker v. Jones, Bing. 2; Ex parte Addison, 3 De Gex & S. 580; Widger v. Browning, 9 D. & R. 306. (y) Ex parte Meyer, L. R. 7 Ch. Ap. 188; 25 L. T. N. S. 733. (2) Robertson v. Liddel, 9 East, 487; Williams v. Nunn, 1 Taunt. 270 Rouch v. Great Western Railway Co., 4 P. & D. 686; 1 Q. B. 51. (a) See Barnard v. Vaughan, 8 T. R. 149; Lloyd v. Heathcote, 2 Bro. & B. 388; Hare v. Waring, 3 M. & W. 362; Ex parte Forster, 17 Ves. 416; Smith v. Moon, Moo. & M. 458. (b) Ex parte Bamford, 15 Ves. 449. (c) Ex parte Salaman re Taylor, supra. (d) Park v. Prosser, 1 C. & P. 176. (e) Ex parte Preston, 2 Rose, 21 ; 2 Ves. & B. 311; Hughes v. Gillman, 10 Moore, 480; Lazarus v. Waithman, 5 Moore, 313. (f) Fisher v. Boucher, 10 B. & C. 705; Dudley v. Vaughan, 1 Camp. 271; 9 East, 491. (e.) If execution issued against him has been levied by seizure and sale of his goods under process in an action in any Court, or in any civil proceeding Under the Act of 1869 the corresponding act of bankruptcy was as follows:: sale. § 4. "That execution issued against the debtor on any legal Executions by process for the purpose of obtaining payment of not less than seizure and fifty pounds, has in the case of a trader been levied by seizure and sale of his goods." So that execution, although levied by seizure and sale, whatever the amount, was not, in the case of a non-trader, an act of bankruptcy. Owing to the very great change which the present law must necessarily bring about, as regards executions generally, it is proposed hereafter to show what changes have taken place under successive Bankruptcy Acts, as affecting executions against the goods of the debtor. At Common Law the judgment, and not the writ of execution, bound the lands of the party (g). And a judgment at Common Law had relation to the first day of the term whereof it was entered, unless from the record itself it appeared that it would not have had that relation. And by statute (h) where a judgment is pronounced by the Court or a Judge in Court, the entry of the judgment shall be dated as of the day on which such judgment is pronounced, and the judgment shall take effect from that date. In all other cases the entry is dated as on the day on which the requisite documents are left with the officer, and the judgment takes effect from that date (i). But as to goods and chattels they were only bound by the writ of execution from the time of the teste (k). (g) See 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, requiring registration of writs to bind lands, and to be put in force within three months; and see 27 & 28 Vict. c. 112; requiring land to be actually delivered in execution; and see also 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, 3 & 4 Vict. c. 82; 18 & 19 Vict. c. 15; and as to vacating a registered lis pendens, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 47, By the (h) Judicature Act, 1873 and 1875, R. S. C., Or. 41, r. 3; and see Salter v. Slade, 1 Ad. & E. 608; Colbron v. Hall, 5 Dowl. 534. (i) Or. 41, r. 4. (k) See Com. Dig. tit. Executions; and by Or. 42, r. 13, every writ of execution must bear date of the day on which it is issued and is tested in the name of the Lord Chancellor, § 4. Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II. c. 3, s. 16), however, no writ of fi. fa., or other writ of execution, was to bind the property in the goods of the debtor, but from the time that such writ was delivered to the sheriff, &c., to be executed, but this statute was intended only to protect purchasers from an injury which might arise to them from the relation which writs of execution had to their teste at Common Law, and, therefore, as far as related to the party himself and to all others but purchasers for a valuable consideration, writs of execution bound the parties' goods from the time of their teste (1). But the property in the goods was not altered by the writ until execution and sale by the sheriff (m). Then by the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 1, it was provided that such execution should not affect goods in the hands of a person bona fide and for valuable consideration, who acquired his title. before actual seizure or attachment of such goods provided he had not when he acquired such title notice that such writ (or any other writ by virtue of which the goods might be seized or attached) had been delivered to and remained unexecuted in the hands of the sheriff, &c. The Bankruptcy Act, 1849 (Sect. 133), afforded protection to such executions against the goods of a bankrupt only where such execution was levied by sale as well as seizure before the filing of the petition for adjudication, and without notice of a prior act of bankruptcy, and it was held under the Act of 1849, that the prior act of bankruptcy, named in Sect. 133, meant an act of bankruptcy prior to the seizure, and that notice of an act of bankruptcy committed after the seizure but before the sale would not deprive the creditor of the fruits of his execution provided such sale took place before the filing of the petition for adjudication (n). It was also held that having regard to the 184th section of the same Act, which deprived a (7) See Chitty's Arch. Prac., 13 Ed., vol. i., p. 522; and Houghton v. Rugby, 2 Show. 485; Ranken v. Harwood, 10 Jur. 794. (m) Lucas v. Nockells, 10 Bing. 182; Samuel v. Duke, 6 Dowl. 536; Payne v. Drewe, 4 East, 523; 1 Smith, 170; Giles v. Grover, 1 Cl. & F. at p. 177; Harris v. Loyd, 5 M. & W. 432; Woodland v. Fuller, 11 Ad. & E. 859; where Littledale, J., said "the seizure confers only a right to sell, and not a property, for the party whose goods are taken in execution may sell them subject to the right of the execution creditor. And where the goods are worth more than the sum for which execution issues, such sale passes the right to the residue," (n) See s. 133, secured creditor from receiving more than other creditors, the creditor was not entitled to the fruits of his execution, notwithstanding the seizure was prior to the act of bankruptcy, if the sale did not also take place before the filing of the petition (6). By the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, an execution levied by seizure and sale of the goods of a trader debtor upon a judgment recovered in a personal action for the recovery of a sum exceeding 501., was made an act of bankruptcy as from the date of the seizure (p). But if a petition for adjudication against the debtor was not in the meantime presented, the sheriff was, at the end of seven days after the sale, to pay over the proceeds or so much as ought to be paid to the execution creditor, who was to be entitled thereto, notwithstanding the act of bankruptcy committed by such seizure, unless the debtor was adjudged a bankrupt within fourteen days from the day of sale, in which case the money so received by the creditor was to be paid over to the assignees. The Bankruptcy Repeal Act, 1869, entirely repealed the Acts of 1849 and 1861. And by the Bankruptcy Act, 1869 (q), as we have seen, an execution issued against a trader debtor, on any legal process, for the purpose of obtaining payment of not less than 50%., and levied by seizure and sale of his goods, was made an act of bankruptcy. But this Act also gave an opportunity to the creditor to reap the reward of diligence, except certain events happened within the time limited. By Sect. 87 it was provided, that where the goods of a trader had been taken in execution in respect of a judgment (r) for a sum exceeding 50l. and sold, the sheriff or high bailiff was to retain the proceeds of the sale for a period of fourteen days, and upon notice being served upon him within that period of a bankruptcy petition having been presented against such trader, should hold the proceeds of such sale after deducting expenses in trust to pay the same to the trustee; but if no notice of any such petition having been presented should be served on the sheriff or high bailiff within such period of fourteen days, or if such notice having been served, the trader was not adjudged bankrupt on such petition (0) Edwards v. Scarsbrook, 3 B. & S. 280; 32 L. J. Q. B. 45; and Edwards v. Gabriel, 6 H. & N. 701; Young v. Roebuck, 2 H. & C. 296; 32 L. J. Ex. 60. (p) S. 73. (q) See s. 6, sub-s. 5. (r) A judgment whether in a personal action or otherwise. § 4. |