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since the Revolution, will find few even of the most questionable measures of administration, about which the best-instructed judgement might not have doubted at the time; but of which we may affirm with certainty, they were indifferent to the greatest part of those who concurred in them. From the success, or the facility, with which they who dealt out the patronage of the crown carried mea- . sures like these, ought we to conclude, that a similar application of honours and emoluments would procure the consent of parliaments to counsels evidently detrimental to the common welfare? Is there not, on the contrary, more reason to fear, that the

prerogative, if deprived of influence, would not be long able to support itself? For when we reflectupon the power of the House of Commons to extort a compliance with its resolutions from the other parts of the legislature; or to put to death the constitution by a refusal of the annual grants of money to the support of the necessary functions of government; when we reflect also what motives there are, which, in the vicissitudes of political interests and passions, may one day arm and point this power against the executive magistrate; when we attend to these considerations, we shall be led perhaps to acknowledge, that there is not more of paradox than of truth in that important, but much-decried apophthegm, “ that an independent parliament is «« incompatible with the existence of the mon

archy.”

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

The first maxim of a free state is, that the laws be made by one set of men, and admi- . nistered by another; in other words, that the legislative and judicial characters be kept. separate. When these offices are united in the same person or assembly, particular laws are made for particular cases, springing oftentimes from partial motives, and directed to private ends: whilst they are kept separate, general laws are made by one body of men, without foreseeing whom they may

affect; and, when made, must be applied by the other, let them affect whom they will. For the sake of illustration, let it be

supposed, in this country, either that, parliaments being laid aside the courts of West

minster-Hall made their own laws; or that the two houses of parliament, with the King, at their head, tried and decided causes at their bar: it is evident, in the first place, that the decisions of such a judicature would be so many laws; and in the second place, that, when the parties and the interests to be affected by the law were known, the inclinations of the law-makers would inevitably attach on one side or the other; and that where there were neither any fixed rules to regulate their determinations, nor any superior power to control their proceedings, these inclinations would interfere with the integrity of public justice. The consequence of which must be, that the subjects of such a constitution would live either without

any constant laws, that is, without any known pre-established rules of adjudication whatever; or under laws made for particular per: sons, and partaking of the contradictions and iniquity of the motives to which they owed their origin.

Which dangers, by the division of the legislative and judicial functions, are in this country effectually provided against. Parliament knows not the individuals upon whom its acts will operate ; it has no cases or par

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