Supreme Court of the United States. GONZALES v. BUIST. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico. (224 U. S., 126.) No. 181. Submitted March 4, 1912. Decided April 1, 1912. SYLLABUS. Appellant's contention that he was not accorded a proper hearing in the court below can not be availed of here if the record does not show that he formally excepted or objected to the rulings. (Apache County v. Barth, 177 U. S., 538.) Under paragraph 35 of the Porto Rican act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat., 85, c. 191), writs of error to and appeals from final decisions of the Supreme Court for the District of Porto Rico are governed by the rules that govern writs of error to and appeals from Supreme Courts of the Territories, which confine this court to determining whether the court below erred in deducing its conclusions of law from the facts as found and to reviewing errors committed as to admission or rejection of testimony upon proper exceptions preserved. (Young v. Amy, 171 U. S., 179.) On appeal from the Supreme Court of a Territory the agreed statement on findings must be of the ultimate facts; for if they are merely, as in this case, a recital of testimony or evidentiary facts, there is nothing brought to this court for consideration, and the judgment must be affirmed. (Glenn v. Fant, 134 U. S., 398.) 4 Porto Rico Fed. Rep., 243, affirmed. Opinion by White, Chief J. No dissenting opinion. Judgment affirmed. The facts involve the rules governing appeals from the Supreme Court of Porto Rico and the District Court of the United States for the District of Porto Rico. Gonzales, the appellant, sued the court below to be declared the owner and entitled to the possession of a tract of land valued at $6,000, situated in the district of Porto Rico, from the possession of which he claimed to have been unlawfully ousted by the defendants in March, 1907. In addition to specifically denying the averments of the complaint, the defendants by an amended answer pleaded that as the result of a controversy between them and the grantor of the plaintiff concerning the land in dispute, the title and right of possession were adjudicated in their favor, and in virtue of the judgment they were put in possession of the property, which was the ouster complained of. Averments were also made which tended to show that the conveyance under which plaintiff asserted his ownership was made and received in bad faith after the commencement of the action the judgment in which was pleaded as res judicata, in order to deprive the plaintiffs in that action of the benefit to result from a recovery therein. On July 9, 1908, the case was called for trial, a jury was waived, and after the allowance of amendments to the pleadings the following took place, according to recitals in the journal of the court: Whereupon the court, not being satisfied with the situation of the pleadings, calls upon the respective counsel for argument as to the question whether or not the plea as to the matters in issue being res judicata should not be sustained. Thereupon such argument is proceeded with, and the court, after having heard counsel for the respective sides in that behalf, gave them until Monday, the 13th instant. to file briefs and memoranda of authorities, after which the issue will be passed upon. On July 31, 1908, the court filed a written opinion sustaining the plea of res judicata, and ordering the complaint to be dismissed. An entry of dismissal was made on the same day. The next step in the litigation was the filing on October 12, 1909, of a petition for the allowance of an appeal to this court, and the granting of the same on October 12, 1909. Supreme Court of the United States. GROMER, TREASURER OF PORTO RICO, v. STANDARD DREDGING COMPANY. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico. (224 U. S., 362.) No. 174. Submitted February 28, 1911. Decided April 22, 1912. SYLLABUS. Quaere: Whether paragraph 12 of the act of Legislative Assembly of Porto Rico of March 8, 1906, providing that an injunction may issue to prevent collection of illegal tolls, applies to the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico. Even though the bill might not be sustained because complainant has an adequate remedy or because the court has not power to issue an injunction, the court prefers, in this case, to rest its decision on the fact that the bill should be dismissed upon the merits. Under paragraph 13 of the Foraker Act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat., 77, c. 191), and the act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat., 731, c. 1383), the Territory of Porto Rico has jurisdiction for taxing purposes over the harbors and navigable waters surrounding Porto Rico. The purpose of the Foraker Act was to give local self-government to Porto Rico, conferring an autonomy similar to that of the States and Territories. reserving to the United States rights to the harbor areas and navigable waters for the purpose of exercising the usual national control and jurisdiction over commerce and navigation. While the United States can reserve control over such places as it sees fit within a territory to which it gives autonomy, it does not reserve any such places unless it is so expressed in the act. Property which has acquired a situs within the jurisdiction of the Territory of Porto Rico is not exempt from taxation by the Territory simply because it is exclusively used by the owner for carrying out a contract with the Government. Where jurisdiction to tax property exists, the validity of the tax can not be determined by an inquiry as to the extent to which the property may be benefited. In this case there is nothing in the record to show that the property taxed had not acquired a situs in Porto Rico, or that takes it out of the rule that tangible personal property is subject to taxation by the State or Territory in which it is, no matter where the domicile of the owner may be. 5 Porto Rico Fed. Rep., 142, reversed. Opinion by McKenna, J. Day, Hughes, Lamar, J., dissenting. Decree reversed, with directions to sustain the demurrer and dismiss the bill. The question in the case is the power of Porto Rico to tax certain machinery and boats which at the time of the levy of the taxes were in the harbor of San Juan engaged in dredging work in pursuance of a contract of the Standard Dredging Co. with the United States Government. The dredging company filed a bill to enjoin the appellant, treasurer of Porto Rico, from enforcing the tax. Appellant demurred to the bill for insufficiency and want of equity, which was overruled. He declined to answer, and the injunction which had been granted was made perpetual This appeal was then taken. Supreme Court of the United States. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Error to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. No. 859. Argued April 16, 1912. Decided April 29, 1912. SYLLABUS. Alaska is a Territory of the United States within the meaning of paragraph 1 of the interstate commerce act, as amended June 29, 1906 (34 Stat., 584, c. 3591). An organized Territory of the United States does not necessarily mean one having a local legislature as distinguished from one having a less autonomous form of government, such as that of Alaska. Even if "Territory of the United States" as used in paragraph 1 of the interstate commerce act as amended includes only organized Territories, Alaska falls within its meaning. (The Steamer Coquitlan, 163 U. S., 346; Binns v. United States, 194 U. S., 486; Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U. S., 516.) The Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat., 584, c. 3591), extended the provisions of the interstate commerce act to interterritorial commerce and for the first time gave to the commission the power to fix rates. In so doing it made the act completely comprehensive, and the power given to the commission supersedes the power of the Secretary of the Interior to revise and modify rates of railroads in Alaska given by paragraph 2 of the act of May 14, 1898 (30 Stat., 409, c. 299). Mandamus can be issued to direct performance of a ministerial act but not to control discretion. It may be directed to a tribunal, one acting in a judicial capacity, to proceed in a manner according to his or its discretion. The jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction (Ex parte Harding, 219 U. S., 363) does not exist in an administrative body which is subject to having its jurisdiction defined by the courts. The United States Commerce Court has no jurisdiction to review the action of the Interstate Commerce Commission in refusing to entertain a complaint because the subject is beyond its jurisdiction. In such a case the remedy is by mandamus to compel the commission to proceed and decide the case according to its judgment and discretion. The Interstate Commerce Commission has jurisdiction to investigate violations of the act to regulate commerce in Alaska and to compel carriers in that Territory to conform to the law; and if the commission refuses to act on the ground that it has no jurisdiction, mandamus will issue directing it to take jurisdiction. 39 Washington Law Reporter, 386, affirmed, and 19 I. C. C., 81, disapproved. Opinion by McKenna, J. No dissenting opinion. Judgment affirmed. The facts involve the status of common carriers in Alaska under the interstate commerce act, and the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission over common carriers in Alaska. The ultimate question in the case is whether Alaska is a Territory of the United States within the meaning of the interstate commerce act as amended. The Interstate Commerce Commission resolved the question in the negative and dismissed the petition of the Humboldt Steamship Co., the relator, which alleged violations of the act by the White Pass & Yukon Railway Co., operating in Alaska, applying its decision in Matter of Jurisdiction Over Rail and Water Carriers Operating in Alaska (19 I. C. C. Rep., 81). The steamship company instituted an action in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia praying for a mandamus against the commission to require it to take jurisdiction and proceed as required by the act and grant the relief for which the steamship company had petitioned, hereinafter specifically mentioned. The proceeding was dismissed. The court expressed the view that the commission had ample authority to assume jurisdiction over common carriers in Alaska, the same as in any other Territory, and over those carriers operating between the State of Washington and Alaska, and between Alaska and Canada; and if they took jurisdiction, no one could successfully question their right to do so." The court, however, held that it had no power "to require the Interstate Commerce Commission to act contrary to its own judgment in a matter wherein, after investigation, it had reached a conclusion honestly and fairly which might be contrary to the conclusion which the court would reach." The Court of Appeals, to which court the case was taken by the steamship company, entertained the same view of the interstate commerce act as that expressed by the Supreme Court, but took a different view of the power of the courts to compel action upon the part of the commission, and reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court, and remanded the cause, " with directions to issue a peremptory writ of mandamus directed to the Interstate Commerce Commission requiring it to take jurisdiction of said cause and proceed therein as by law required." To this ruling the Interstate Commerce Commission prosecutes this writ of error. The proceedings before the commission were instituted by the steamship company filing a petition (No. 2578) against the White Pass & Yukon route, consisting of the Pacific & Arctic Railway & Navigation Co., Columbia-Yukon Railway Co., British-Yukon Railway Co., and British-Yukon Navigation Co., to require said companies to file with the commission, in the form prescribed by the act to regulate commerce, and to print and keep open for public inspection, schedules showing their rates and charges for transportation of passengers and property between points in Alaska and points in the Dominion of Canada and other places; to establish through routes and joint rates in conjunction with the petitioner between certain named places in Alaska and Seattle, in the State of Washington; to afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines; and to cease and desist from preventing by sundry devices the carriage of freights from being continuous from place of shipment to place of destination when such freight is originated or in any wise handled by the Humboldt Steamship Co. The companies proceeded against filed answers. vening companies on both sides of the controversy. There were inter A hearing was assigned and had in October, 1909, and subsequently, July 6, 1910, the commission decided that it was "without jurisdiction to make the order sought by complainant," resting its ruling upon the authority of its decision in Matter of Jurisdiction Over Rail and Water Carriers Operating in Alaska. Supreme Court of the United States. AMERICAN RAILROAD COMPANY OF PORTO RICO v. BIRCH. Error to the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico. (224 U. S., 547.) No. 224. Submitted April 24, 1912. Decided May 13, 1912. SYLLABUS. The employers' liability act of 1908 expressly applies to and is in force in Porto Rico; but quaere, and not necessary to decide in this case, whether the safety appliance acts apply to, or are in force in, Porto Rico. Where words of a statute are clear, they must be strictly followed, even if the construction causes apparently unnecessary inconvenience. Where the purpose of Congress is clear, the courts must yield to such purpose, and assume that all contending considerations were taken into account by Congress. The national employers' liability act of 1908 gives the right of recovery to the personal representatives and not to the heirs of one killed by the negligence of the employer, and the heirs can not maintain an action even where the local statute, as in Porto Rico, gives a right to the heirs as well as to the personal representatives to maintain such an action. A defendant company has the right under the employers' liability act of 1908 to have its liability determined in one action. 5 Porto Rico, Fed. Rep. 273, reversed. Opinion by McKenna, J. No dissenting opinion. Judgment reversed without prejudice to such rights as the personal representatives may have. The facts involving the construction of the employers' liability act of 1908 and its application to Porto Rico, are stated in the opinion. Action for damages for the death, through the alleged negligence of plaintiff in error, of the husband and father of defendants in error, who are, respectively, deceased's widow and son. The action was originally brought by Ann Elizabeth Birch. A demurrer was filed to the complaint, which was sustained in part, and the court directed counsel "to so amend the complaint as to show whether or not the plaintiff is the sole heir of the deceased, or if she sues for the benefit of certain other heirs, then the complaint must specifically state the name of said other heirs and state under what law the said action is brought. An amended complaint was filed alleging that the deceased, Francisco Abraham Birch, was, when killed, at his post of duty as brake 1 |