tiations Harding arranged with the appellant, Mrs. Zimmerman, to join him in the lease and option and to form a partnership to operate the hotel. Each agreed to contribute one-half of an agreed capital, their personal services, and to share in the profits and losses equally. The agreement of partnership was never reduced to writing, and there was no express stipulation as to its duration.

Under date of February 1, 1911, the owners of the hotel properly executed a lease to the partnership for the term of two years, with right of renewal for another term of two years at an advanced rental. This lease included an option of purchase during the term at a price named. Thereupon the partnership took possession of the property and its operation as a hotel. Harding undertook the office side of affairs and Mrs. Zimmerman the other departments. The business seems to have run along smoothly and with profit until about August 9, 1911, when Mrs. Zimmerman, who was in sole charge by reason of the temporary absence of Harding upon a vacation in the United States, assumed of her own motion to dissolve the partnership. To this end she notified Harding by letter that she had dissolved the relation and published a card in the local papers that the partnership had been dissolved, and that she would thenceforth conduct the business for her own benefit. From that moment she assumed the entire ownership and possession of the partnership business and property. Harding was excluded from all possession, control, or voice, and all benefits which had accrued, she claiming that he had drawn more than his share upon an accounting.

When Harding returned to San Juan, he at once brought an action at law against Mrs. Zimmerman to recover damages for the breach of the partnership contract. This suit was removed by Mrs. Zimmerman to the District Court of the United States for the District of Porto Rico. Thereupon Harding obtained leave to dismiss his action at law, without prejudice, and filed this bill. Its object was to obtain a decree of dissolution and an accounting of the partnership affairs. The appointment of a receiver to manage the business pending the litigation was at once sought by Harding under the averments of the bill. This was resisted, and denied by the court. Upon the coming in of her answer an auditor was appointed to report upon the partnership accounts. Mrs. Zimmerman remained in full control of the hotel business down to the date of final decree, May 18, 1912, by which the partnership was dissolved. At that date a special master was put in charge of the business to conduct it until a sale of the assets should be had and distribution made. The partnership property, including the unexpired term of the lease, was sold and the auditor and master's report confirmed. The final result was that the share of Harding in the proceeds of the business, including profits realized to date of sale, was fixed at $3,008.02, and that of Mrs. Zimmerman at $4,878.22. From this decree both parties have appealed.

Supreme Court of the United States.

MATHESON V. UNITED STATES.

Error to the District Court of the United States for the Fourth Division of the Territory of Alaska.

(227 U. S., 540.)

No. 148. Submitted January 24, 1913. Decided February 24, 1913.

SYLLABUS.

Where the jurisdiction is coextensive with the district, multiplication of places at which courts may be held or mere creation of divisions does not nullify it. (Barrett v. United States, 169 U. S., 231.) Jurors summoned by the District judge in Alaska before the act of March 3, 1909, creating a fourth division, became effective, to attend the first term of the court in that division when the act did become effective, Held, properly summoned, as the act did not create a new tribunal or revoke the power of the district judges to summon jurors to attend at any session of the court.

It is the duty of the judge to determine whether nonexperts are qualified to express an opinion as to sanity of the accused, and in this case there does not appear to have been any abuse of discretion.

An instruction that while the burden of proof is on defendant to establish the fact of insanity, the jury can not convict if they had reasonable doubt as to his sanity, held proper and sufficient. (Davis v. United States, 160 U. S., 469.) The court properly instructed the jury as to the definition of insanity and as to what relieves defendant from criminal responsibility by giving the charge approved in Davis v. United States, 165 U. S., 373.

Opinion by Lamar, J. No dissenting opinion.

Affirmed.

The facts involve the construction of certain provisions of the Alaska Code of 1900 and the validity of a trial and conviction for murder in Alaska.

Congress, by the act of June 6, 1900 (31 Stat., 321, 322, c. 786), established a district court for Alaska with general civil and criminal jurisdiction. There were three judges who, though given jurisdiction over the entire district, were required to reside in that one of the three divisions to which they were respectively assigned by the President. On December 29, 1908, the grand jury of the third division indicted Matheson for murder. On the next day he was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. Before his case was called for trial Congress passed the act of March 3, 1909 (35 Stat., 838, 839, c. 269), providing for a fourth division to be held at Fairbanks by the judge of the former third division. This act was not to become effective until July 1, 1909, but in preparation for the first term convened thereunder the district judge assigned to the fourth division passed an order under which jurors were drawn and summoned in June to attend at the session of court to be held in July at Fairbanks.

On July 13, during this term, the defendant applied for and obtained an order to have his witnesses subpoenaed at the expense of the Government. His case was called for trial in September. He announced ready and, without making any question as to the qualifica7345°-S. Doc. 173, 63-1-29

tion of the jurors or the method and regularity of their selection, objected to the entire panel on the ground that the judge of the third division was without jurisdiction to issue the call at a time when the fourth division had not come into existence. The objection was overruled. Several of those on the jury which tried his case were taken from this panel. After a verdict of guilty and sentence to imprisonment for life the case was brought here by writ of error, in which complaint is made of the action of the judge in allowing a jury to be selected from a panel drawn in June, before the act creating the fourth division became effective.

The Alaskan Code (June 6, 1900, 31 Stat., 321, 322, secs. 4 and 5, c. 786) created one district court with three judges having general civil and criminal jurisdiction over the entire district, and authority to hold regular terms at Juneau, St. Michael's, and Eagle City and special terms at such times and places in the district as they or any of them might deem expedient. The act of March 3, 1909 (35 Stat., 838, 839, c. 269), in providing for a fourth division did not contemplate an interruption of the functions of the judge throughout the entire district, nor did it destroy the unity of the district court. But while preserving unimpaired the power of the court and judges, it fixed a new place, at which the same district court must be held. It did not create a new tribunal, with new officers, to be organized in a new political division, but it continued the jurisdiction and power of the judge to be exercised anywhere in Alaska. It did not revoke his authority to summons jurors to attend at any session of the district court, whether permitted to be held at Fairbanks under the act of 1900 or required there to be held after July 1 under the act of 1909. The principle involved is, in some of its aspects, like that considered in Rosencrans v. United States (165 U. S., 257), where it was said. that "jurisdiction is coextensive with district and no mere multiplication of places at which courts are to be held or mere creation of division nullifies it." (Barrett v. United States, 169 U. S., 231, 299; Bird v. United States, 187 U. S., 118.) There was no error in overruling the objection made by the defendant to the panel.

The case was one peculiarly for the jury; and, finding no error in matter of law, the judgment must be affirmed.

Supreme Court of the United States.

ROSALY, WIDOW OF RABAINNE, v. GRAHAM Y. FRAZER.

Appeal from the Supreme Court of Porto Rico.

No. 64.

(227 U. S., 584.)

Submitted December 5, 1912. Decided February 24, 1913.

SYLLABUS.

The jurisdiction of this court on appeals from the Supreme Court of Porto Rico is confined to determining whether the facts found by that court support the judgment, and whether there was material and prejudicial error in the admission or rejection of evidence manifested by exceptions duly certified.

In the absence of findings on a special verdict there is nothing for this court to review except rulings on evidence, and in absence of error in those rulings the judgment must be affirmed.

When the judgment record itself discloses that the opinion of one of the judges deciding the case was made part of the judgment, this court may accept the statement of fact therein contained in lieu of more formal findings.

A finding by the appellate court that the fundamental fact of plaintiff's interest in the property sued for has not been proven is equivalent to a negative finding upon a fact essential to maintain the suit and supports a judgment of dismissal by the trial court.

16 Porto Rico, 156, affirmed.

Opinion by Pitney, J. No disserting opinion.
Judgment affirmed.

The facts involve the jurisdiction of this court of appeals from the Supreme Court of Porto Rico and whether the facts found support the judgment in a suit to determine title to real estate in Porto Rico.

This action was brought in the district court for the judicial district of Ponce by the appellant against the respondent, for the purpose of establishing her ownership of an undivided interest in certain real property in Ponce of which the defendant was in possession, and for setting aside the registration of possession and of ownership of the same property in the name of the defendant, alleged to have been fraudulently procured by him and to stand as a bar preventing the registration of the plaintiff's alleged undivided interest.

The action was fully tried before the district court without a jury upon the issues raised by the plaintiff's amended complaint and the defendant's answer thereto, and the following decision was rendered:

PONCE, P. R., April 26, 1909.

The question involved in this suit is to determine the rights of Doña Marcelina Rosaly in a property which she, as a member of a mercantile partnership, gave in lease to the defendant in the year 1880. The other members of said partnership were relatives of the plaintiff herein. It seems that in the year 1886 and following years the defendant bought the respective interests of the several partners, and it seems also that he did not buy the interest belonging to Doña Marcelina, for the reason that she had lost her rights to an interest in the property belonging to said mercantile partnership. More properly speaking, the defendant acquired all the interests belonging to all such persons as he believed to have an interest in the property referred to. Twenty-three years have elapsed since the year 1886. The plaintiff lacks absolutely any means to show what was her interest in the properties of the partnership, and whether or not she had any interest whatever in the year 1886. There is absolute lack of evidence on the part of the plaintiff. The court does not look at old claims with favor, especially when the plaintiff's delay in bringing the action is not explained. Counsel for both parties have entered into a lengthy argument upon the construction of the mortgage law and other points. But the court does not make any decision with regard to such questions at the present time. The most important matter is the absolute want of evidence on which to base a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Therefore the action is dismissed with costs against the plaintiff.

MARTIN E. GILL, District Judge.

Judgment having been rendered accordingly, the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Porto Rico. Thereafter her attorneys filed in the district court what purports to be a full history of the proceedings at the trial. It is entitled "Statement of Facts and Bill of Exceptions," and is certified by Hon. Charles E. Foote, who succeeded

Judge Gill as judge of the district court, to contain a "true and accurate statement of all the evidence introduced, exceptions taken, and proceedings had during the trial of this case in the District Court of Ponce."

The Supreme Court of Porto Rico affirmed the judgment.

The essential facts as recited in the opinion may be summarized as follows: That prior to the year 1868, Don Mateo Rabainne and his son, Don Luis Rabainne, as partners in the name of M. Rabainne é Hijos, were the owners of the property in question; that Don Mateo died April 23, 1868, and Don Luis died April 8, 1869; that the partnership was liquidated by deed executed January 29, 1870, by the heirs and representatives of the deceased partners; that in the liquidation a certain part of the interest of Don Luis was found to belong to his widow, the present plaintiff and appellant; that she, together with the widow of Don Mateo and with Don Jobo Lopez, son-in-law of the latter, entered into a new partnership to continue the former business under the firm name of M. Rabainne é Hijos, to which partnership the plaintiff contributed all her interest in the property in question; that the plaintiff's interest in the firm was subsequently reduced by withdrawals of capital and finally extinguished, so that she became a debtor of the partnership. Therefore the Supreme Court held that the fundamental fact of the plaintiff's interest in the property at the time of her action against the defendant had not been proven. This is equivalent to a negative finding upon a fact essential to the maintenance of her suit, and it of course supports the judgment affirming the judgment of the district court that dismissed the action.

There remains only the question whether prejudicial error was committed by the trial court respecting the admission or exclusion of evidence. There are numerous exceptions with assignments of error based thereon. They have been examined without finding substantial error in the rulings complained of. They do not merit detailed discussion here.

Supreme Court of the United States.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. PACIFIC AND ARCTIC RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY, PACIFIC COAST STEAMSHIP COMPANY, ALASKA STEAMSHIP COMPANY, CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILROAD COM

PANY.

Error to the District Court of the United States for Alaska, Division No. 1.

(228 U. S., 87.)

No. 697. Argued February 26, 1913. Decided April 7, 1913.

SYLLABUS.

While under the interstate commerce act a carrier may select its through route connections, agreements for such connections may constitute violations of the antitrust act if made not from natural trade reasons or on account of efficiency, but as a combination and conspiracy in restraint of interstate