trade and for the purpose of obtaining a monopoly of traffic by refusing to establish routes with independent connecting carriers. In reviewing the decision of the lower court sustaining a demurrer to an indictment charging a combination in violation of the antitrust act, this court is not called upon to consider what the elements of the plan may be independently, or whether there is or is not a standard of reasonableness which juries may apply. If a criminal violation of the act is charged, the criminal courts have cognizance of it, with power of decision in regard thereto. A combination made in the United States between carriers to monopolize certain transportation partly within and partly without the United States is within the prohibition of the antitrust act, and also within the jurisdiction of the criminal and civil law of the United States, even if one of the parties combining be a foreign corporation. While the United States may not control foreign citizens operating in foreign territory, it may control them when operating in the United States in the same manner as it may control citizens of this country. The purpose of the interstate commerce act is to establish a tribunal to determine the relation of communities, shippers and carriers, and their respective rights and obligations dependent upon the act, and the conduct of carriers is not subject to judicial review in criminal or civil cases based on alleged violations of the act until submitted to and passed on by the commission. Quaere, what the effect is of a finding by the Interstate Commerce Commission in such a case. Where the District Court holds that the averments of the indictment are not sufficient to connect certain defendants with the offense charged, it construes the indictment and not the statute on which it is based, and this court has no jurisdiction under the criminal appeals act to review the decision. An objection to the demurrer made by certain defendants and sustained as to one count, and not passed on as to other counts which were struck down by the District Court but sustained by this court, may be raised in the District Court by such defendants in regard to such counts when the case is again before that court. Opinion by McKenna, J. No dissenting opinion. The judgment is therefore reversed as to counts 1 and 2 and the case remanded, with instructions to proceed in accordance with this opinion. Indictment for alleged violations of the Sherman antitrust act and of the interstate commerce act. Supreme Court of the United States. PICO v. UNITED STATES. Error to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. No. 319, Argued February 25, 26, 1913. Decided April 7, 1913. SYLLABUS. Under art. 403, Philippine Penal Code, a person can be guilty of murder with alevosia (treachery) although there may have been no specific intent to kill; and so held that one who had his victim bound and then caused him to be violently beaten with an instrument likely to cause death was guilty of murder with alevosia, even though he did not specifically intend that death should result. Under the Philippine Penal Code, as at common law, men are presumed to intend the natural consequences of their acts. An objection that a complaint charging murder with alevosia by beating a person to death is defective because it did not allege all the details proved as to the fact that the victim had been bound so as to make defense impossible should be made in the lower court, where amendments are possible. It comes too late when made in this court for the first time. The conviction by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands for murder with alevosia of one who had caused his victim to be bound and then beaten with an instrument likely to cause death, and a sentence of 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of cadena temporal and the accessories, and an indemnity to the heirs of his victim of 1,000 pesos, being a modification of the sentence of the Court of First Instance of cadena temporal for life and accessories and indemnity, sustained by this court as being in accordance with the evidence, without error of law and not in any manner depriving the defendant of his liberty without due process of law. 15 Phil. Rep., 549, affirmed. Opinion by Lamar, J. No dissenting opinion. The facts involve the validity of a conviction and sentence for murder in the Philippine Islands. Juan Pico, claiming the right as patrol to arrest suspicious persons in the hacienda of Malunó, within the municipality of Ilagan, Province of Isabela, Philippine Islands, on March 1, 1909, entered the house of Eugenio Castellanes in the nighttime and inquired if there was anyone else on the premises. He was told that there was a Chinaman asleep in the next room, and, going there with several attendants, ordered him to get up. Receiving no answer, Pico struck him with a gun. The Chinaman arose and seized the gun as Pico again attempted to strike him. After some altercation he was overpowered, and Pico ordered his attendants to bind him. This they did, putting a rope around his neck, tying his arms behind his back, and, in this condition, he was ordered out of the house for the purpose of being taken to the near-by hacienda, of which Pico was manager. Whether through unwillingness or physical inability resulting from the blow previously inflicted does not clearly appear, but the Chinaman refused to walk, and Pico again struck him several times with the gun. Partly dragged and partly carried, the Chinaman was in a state of collapse when he reached the hacienda, where. a few hours later, he died. The next morning at 8 o'clock he was buried, a medical employee on the estate giving a certificate that he had died of heart failure. The suspicion of the authorities having been aroused, the body was disinterred, and, as it exhibited signs of external violence, Pico and two of his attendants were arrested, Pico being charged "with the crime of murder, with qualifying circumstance of alevosia (treachery) as defined and penalized in article 403 of the Penal Code, in that he feloniously ordered his two * * * servants to seize and tie the Chinaman, Go-Siengco, and thus tied and unable to defend himself, the said Pico, with the intention of killing the said Chinaman, struck him several blows with a shotgun, as the result of which blows the Chinaman subsequently died." Supreme Court of the United States. SY JOC LIENG v. GREGORIO SY QUIA. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. No. 177. Argued March 7, 10, 1913. Decided April 14, 1913. SYLLABUS. Every presumption is in favor of the validity of marriage where the marital relations have continued uninterruptedly for over forty years without any question being raised or right asserted by anyone claiming under an earlier marriage of one of the parties until more than ten years after the death and five years after the distribution of the property. of that party. The validity of such a marriage should not be impugned except upon clear, strong, and unequivocal proof; or in the absence of such proof will this court reverse the judgment of the lower court sustaining its validity when attacked by those who had opportunity to do so before the death of both spouses. 16 Phil. Rep., 137, affirmed. Opinion by Van Devanter, J. No dissenting opinion. The facts involve conflicting claims to the estate of a Chinese merchant domiciled in the Philippine Islands and of the valadity of his marriage. This appeal brings under review a decree of the Supreme Court of the Philippines in a suit involving conflicting claims to the estate of a Chinese merchant domiciled in those islands and there known as Vicente Romero Sy Quia, who died intestate at Manila in 1894. The appellants, who were plaintiffs in the Court of First Instance, claim as descendants of a marriage between the intestate and Yap Paun Niu, a Chinese woman, said to have been contracted in 1847 at Am Thau, in the Province of Amoy, China. The appellees claim as the descendants of a marriage with Petronila Encarnacion, a Filipino woman, celebrated in 1853 at Vigan, in the Philippines. The principal question here, as in the insular courts, is whether the proof sufficiently established the Chinese marriage. On this the insular courts differed, the Court of First Instance finding the marriage adequately proved, and the Supreme Court, one justice dissenting, holding the other way. 16 Phil. Rep., 137. The facts about which there is no dispute are as follows: Sy Quia was born at Am Thau, China, in 1822, and went to the Philippines at the age of 12. At first he was located in Manila, but at some time before 1852 went to Vigan and entered the service of a merchant at an annual salary of 200 pesos. During that year he was converted to the Catholic faith and was baptized in the parish church. The next year he married Petronila, the banns being regularly published and the marriage publicly solemnized according to the rites of the church, as a preliminary to which he affirmed under oath, and the civil and ecclesiastical authorities certified after inquiry, that he was then unmarried. Shortly after the marriage he and Petronila took up their permanent home in Manila. They were then without any particular property other than 5,000 pesos which she received from her mother and brought into the conjugal society. He became a merchant, and through their united efforts they accumulated real and personal property amounting at the time of his death to upward of 600,000 pesos. They lived in a manner becoming the marital state and were universally recognized as husband and wife. Three sons and two daughters were born of the marriage. One of the daughters married and predeceased her father, leaving a son surviving. The other died after the father, leaving the mother as her only heir. Following Sy Quia's death the widow administered the estate, with the aid of the sons until 1900, when through appropriate judicial proceedings the property was distributed among the widow, sons, and grandson as the persons rightly entitled thereto. The present suit was brought in 1905, more than half a century after the marriage, and then for the first time was its validity or its good faith as to either spouse brought in question a fact which is of particular significance, first, because Yap Puan Niu, the alleged Chinese wife, visited in Manila at the home of a brother of Sy Quia twice during the life of the latter, and, second, because two of the plaintiffs were adults living in Manila at the time of Sy Quia's death and during the eleven years intervening before the suit was brought. Supreme Court of the United States. JORDON, COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, v. ROCHE. Certificate from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. (228 U. S., 436.) Nos. 202, 203. Argued April 15, 1913. Decided April 28, 1913. SYLLABUS. Bay rum imported from Porto Rico subsequent to the passage of the Foraker Act and prior to the passage of the act of February 4, 1909, was subject to the payment of a tax equal to the internal-revenue tax imposed in the United States under secs. 3248 and 3254, Rev. Stat., on distilled spirits, spirits, alcohol, and alcoholic spirits. The provision of sec. 3 of the Foraker Act, that with the institution of a system of taxation in Porto Rico, tariff duties on goods coming to and from Porto Rico and the United States should cease, is explicitly confined to such duties and does not relate to internal-revenue taxes established in the act. A statute declaring that a specified article shall be taxed and how is not necessarily a declaration by Congress that such article was not taxed under prior statutes; its history may show, as in the case of the act of February 4, 1909, that it was not the declaration of a new policy but a more explicit expression of prior statutes. The purpose of the Foraker Act was the equal taxation of Porto Rican articles and domestic articles. The language of sec. 3248, Rev. Stat., is comprehensive enough to cover all distilled spirits. Under the revenue laws of the United States articles are taxed, not by their commercial names or uses, but according to their alcoholic contents, under the generic name of "distilled spirits." Opinion by McKenna, J. No dissenting opinion. The question certified is answered in the affirmative. The facts, which involve the liability of bay rum, imported from Porto Rico subsequent to the Foraker Act, to a tax equal to the internal-revenue tax under secs. 3248 and 3254, Rev. Stat., on distilled spirits, are stated in the opinion. Actions were brought in the Circuit Court, Eastern District of New York, to recover money paid upon certain importations of bay rum from Porto Rico. Judgment was entered for defendants in the actions, and error was prosecuted from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and that court certifies the following question to this court: "Was bay rum imported from Porto Rico subsequent to the passage of the act of April 12, 1900, and prior to the passage of the act of February 4, 1909, subject to the payment of a tax equal to the internal-revenue tax imposed in the United States under secs. 3248 and 3254 on distilled spirit, spirits, alcohol, and alcoholic spirit?" The facts are these: In the years 1907 and 1908 plaintiffs imported from the island of Porto Rico certain casks of bay rum manufactured in said island. Upon arrival at the port of New York the collector of internal revenue for the first district collected taxes upon the same under the act of April 12 and secs. 3248 and 3254 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. Plaintiffs duly protested against such exaction and paid the same to obtain delivery of the goods. Bay rum is a fragrant spirit obtained by distilling rum with the leaves of the bayberry or by mixing various oils with alcohol. The act of April 12, 1900, referred to in the question certified, is known as the Foraker Act (31 Stat., 77, c. 191). Section 3 provides that after the passage of the act all merchandise coming into the United States from Porto Rico, and reversely, shall be subject to a duty of 15 per cent of the duties which were required to be levied upon like articles imported from foreign countries; and, in addition thereto, articles of merchandise of Porto Rican manufacture coming into the United States shall pay "a tax equal to the internal-revenue tax imposed in the United States upon the like articles of merchandise of domestic manufacture." Articles of United States manufacture coming into Porto Rico were required to pay a tax equal to the internal-revenue tax imposed on like articles of Porto Rican manufacture. It was provided that whenever the Legislature of Porto Rico should put into operation a system of local taxation the President should make proclamation thereof, and thereupon all tariff duties upon goods going from the United States into Porto Rico, or from Porto Rico to the United States, should cease, and all such articles should be free of duty. Section 4 of the act provided that the duties and taxes imposed under sec. 3 should not be paid into the Treasury of the United States, but should be placed at the disposal of the President, to be used for the Government of Porto Rico, and that upon the organization of the Government of Porto Rico such moneys should be transferred to the local treasury of Porto Rico, the duties and taxes to be collected at such ports and by such officers as the Secretary of the Treasury should designate. And it was provided that as soon as civil government was established in Porto Rico the President was to make proclamation thereof, and thereafter all duties and taxes in Porto Rico under the provisions of the act should be paid into the treasury of Porto Rico and expended as required by law. The proclamation of the President referred to in sec. 3 was issued July 25, 1901, 32 Stat., part 2, p. 1983, and all tariff duties on merchandise coming into the United States from Porto Rico ceased. |