The internal-revenue tax upon articles of Porto Rican manufacture remained as that imposed "upon the like articles of merchandise of domestic manufacture" (sec. 3). This, however, plaintiffs dispute, contending that the Foraker Act was intended to be, and was declared to be, an act temporarily to provide revenue, and that with the institution of a system of taxation in Porto Rico the act ceased to have operation. The contention is untenable. The act explicitly declares that the tariff duties shall cease. The distinction was deliberate and its effect unmistakable. We repeat, therefore, that the internal-revenue tax upon Porto Rican articles remains as that imposed "upon the like articles of domestic manufacture." Upon the quoted words the controversy in this case turns. What shall determine the likeness between articles of domestic and Porto Rican manufacture, their name or their substance? The latter is the Government's contention; the former is that of the plaintiffs. Supreme Court of the United States. TIACO v. FORBES. TICO v. SAME. SY CHANG V. Same. Error to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. Nos. 254, 255, 256. Argued April 24, 1913. Decided May 5, 1913. SYLLABUS. Where the act originally purports to be done in the name and by the authority of the State, a defect in that authority may be cured by the subsequent adoption of the act. The deportation of a Chinaman from the Philippine Islands by the Governor General prior to an act of the legislature authorizing such deportation is to be considered as having been ordered in pursuance of such statute. Sovereign States have inherent power to deport aliens, and Congress is not deprived of this power by the Constitution of the United States. The ground on which the power to deport aliens rests necessitates that it may The deportation of aliens in this case by the Philippine Government was not a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. The local Government of the Philippine Islands has all civil and judicial power necessary to govern the islands, and this includes the power to deport aliens. The extension by Congress of the Chinese exclusion and immigration laws to the Philippine Islands does not prevent the Government of the islands passing an act removing aliens therefrom. The English rule is that an act of the State is not cognizable in any municipal court. It is within the power of the Legislature of the Philippine Islands to declare an act of the executive which is within its power to authorize to be not subject to question or review. A statute which protects the executive protects the subordinates as well as the chief executive. Quaere whether the Governor of the Philippine Islands has authority by virtue of his office alone to deport aliens, or immunity from action for a deportation made in good faith whether he had the power or not. Quaere whether, historically speaking, prohibition was the proper remedy; but in this case this court should not interfere with the local practice in a matter relating to the administration of local statutes except for good cause shown. The act of the Philippine Legislature passed April 19, 1910, ratifying the action of the Governor General in ordering the deportation of plaintiffs, Chinamen, and declaring it to have been an exercise of authority vested in him by law in all respects legal and not subject to question or review, was within the power of the legislature, and took from the court, in which an action had been brought to enjoin the deportation, jurisdiction to try the case; and the judgment granting a writ of prohibition is affirmed. Opinion by Holmes, J. No dissenting opinion. The facts involve the power of the Philippine Government to deport aliens. The three plaintiffs in error severally sued the defendants in error, alleging that Mr. Forbes was Governor General of the Philippines, Trowbridge chief of the secret service of Manila, and Harding chief of police of the same; that the plaintiff was a Chinese person lawfully resident in the Philippines, and that the defendants forcibly deported the plaintiff to China and forcibly prevented his return for some months; that the plaintiff returned on March 29, 1910, and that the defendants threatened and were trying to expel the plaintiff again, Trowbridge and Harding acting throughout under the order of the defendant Forbes. There was a prayer for an injunction and damages. The defendants demurred, but the demurrer was overruled and a temporary injunction granted. Thereupon Forbes, Harding, and Trowbridge sued for writs of prohibition against the judge and the respective plaintiffs, alleging that the expulsion was carried out in the public interest and at the request of the proper representative of the Chinese Government in the Philippines, and was immediately reported to the Secretary of War. The complaints were demurred to; but the Supreme Court overruled the demurrers, granted the prohibition, and ordered the actions dismissed. The judge having declined to join in the applications for writs of error, was made a respondent, and the cases are here on the ground that the plaintiffs have been deprived of liberty without due process of law. Supreme Court of the United States. BROOKS v. CENTRAL SAINTE JEANNE. Error to the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico. (228 U. S., 688.) No. 283. Submitted May 2, 1913. Decided May 26, 1913. SYLLABUS. Whether one is in general service of another or not, if he is rendering the latter a service, even as a volunteer, and comes under his orders, he becomes his servant and fellow servant of the other employees. The servant is not only such while actually at work on the service for which he is specially employed, but also during its progress while absent from the location for the purpose of, and in connection with, such work. One going in the master's conveyance on the master's business, held, in this case, to be a fellow servant of the driver of the conveyance. In view of the adoption by Porto Rico in substantially the same form of the English employers' liability act, which presupposes the existence of the common-law rule as to fellow servants, and the provisions of that act in regard to exceptions in specific instances, and in the absence of any au thorities to the contrary, held that the law in Porto Rico in regard to the fellow-servant defense does not differ from the common law. A single expression in the testimony that the driver of an automobile was accustomed to drink while driving the machine, there being other testimony importing usual sobriety, does not justify a finding of negligence on the part of the employer for employing a servant, who was incompetent, as an excessive drinker. 5 Porto Rico Fed. Rep., 281, affirmed. Opinion by Holmes, J. No dissenting opinion. The facts involve the application in a case for personal injuries in Porto Rico of the defense of negligence of a fellow servant and the determination of whether the employee of the defendant whose negligence caused the injury was a fellow servant of the plaintiff. This is an action for personal injuries suffered in Porto Rico. The declaration alleges that the plaintiff, at the defendant's request, made a trip on an automobile of the latter " for the purpose of aiding other employees of the defendant in moving a certain boiler, which was the property of the defendant," and that in returning from the trip the automobile was so negligently operated by the defendant, its agents and employees, that it was driven into a ditch, and the plaintiff was badly hurt. There was a trial by jury, in which, at the end of the plaintiff's evidence, the judge directed a verdict for the defendant and the plaintiff excepted. The evidence showed that the machine was driven by a servant of the defendant, so that it appeared in proof that the plaintiff was suing for an injury caused by a fellow servant, as is to be inferred from the face of the declaration itself. Supreme Court of the United States. MACLEOD V. UNITED STATES. Appeal from the Court of Claims. No. 259. (229 U. S., 416.) Argued April 25, 1913. Decided June 10, 1913. SYLLABUS. The local government of a conquered country being destroyed, the conquerer may set up its own authority and make rules and regulations for the conduct of temporary government, and to that end may collect taxes and duties to support the military authority and carry on operations incident to the occupation. An occupation giving the right to the conquerer to exercise governmental authority must be not only invasion, but also possession of the enemy's country. Messages and papers of the Presidents may be referred to by the courts as matters of public history. The military occupation by the United States, during and after the War with Spain, of the Philippine Islands, and the conduct of the military government thereof, did not extend to places which were not in actual possession of the United States until they were reduced to such possession. Executive orders regarding the collection of duties on goods imported into the Philippine Islands during the military occupancy thereof by the United States did not apply to any ports, such as Cebu, during the time that they were not in the possession and under the control of the United States. The principles of international law were recognized by the Executive in issuing orders concerning the government of the Philippine Islands during military occupancy thereof, and this court will not construe an order directing payment of duties on imports as relating to goods brought into ports in the possession of the de facto government of the insurgents. The fact that the importer of goods brought into a port of the Philippine Islands which had not been reduced to possession by the United States, but was still under control of a de facto government of the insurgents, resided in Manila, which was under military occupancy, did not make him subject to the Eexcutive order of July 12, 1898, to pay duties on such goods. A state of war, as to third persons, continued during and after the War with Spain until the ratification of the treaty of peace. The act of June 30, 1906, sec. 3912, 34 Stat., 636, ratifying Executive acts imposing duties, does not apply to duties collected at points which the United States had not occupied and which were in possession of insurgent de facto governments. United States v. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370, distinguished. Statutes relating to territory occupied by the military forces of the Government should be construed in the light of the purpose of the Government to act within the principles of international law, the observance of which is essential to the peace and harmony of nations. Duties collected by the United States on cargoes imported at ports in the Philippine Islands which had not been reduced to possession by the United States but were in possession of the de facto government of insurgents were an illegal and unwarranted exaction covered neither by the order of the President nor the ratifying acts of Congress. 45 Ct. Cl., 339, reversed. The appellant, William Stewart MacLeod, surviving partner of MacLeod & Company, brought suit in the Court of Claims to recover from the United States the amount of certain duties paid by the firm under protest upon a cargo of rice imported into the island of Cebu, at the city and port of the same name, in the Philippine Islands, on January 29, 1899. The Court of Claims decided in favor of the United States and rendered judgment dismissing the petition. 45 Ct. Cls., 339. The case was then appealed to this court. The Court of Claims made findings of fact, the substance of which is as follows: The claimant firm, comprised of the appellant (the survivor) and two others, all citizens of Great Britain, had its head office at Manila and was engaged in doing a general mercantile business there and elsewhere in the Orient. On January 13, 1899, the claimants chartered an American steamship, the Venus, at Manila and cleared her in ballast for Saigon, China, whence she sailed for the port of Cebu with a cargo of rice on January 22nd, carrying the usual consular papers. Prior to that time it had been the practice of the military authorities at Manila to require importers residing in that city and shipping rice to points in the Philippines not actually occupied by the United States forces, to present certified manifests covering their cargoes and to pay the duties thereon to the United States military collector of customs at Manila, which practice was a matter of common knowledge and discussion among the business men in that city; but there is no other evidence charging the claimants with knowledge of the fact. The collector at Manila was informed by competitors of the claimants that the latter proposed to ship the cargo to Cebu without paying duty at Manila and that, as they complied with the requirements of the United States authorities, they would be unable to compete, under such unfair conditions, with the claimants; and the collector received confirmation of such report from the consul at Saigon on the twenty-first of January, and on the twenty-third officially notified the claimants that a certified manifest must be presented and duties paid on the cargo at the customhouse at Manila. The next day one of the claimants presented in person to the collector a letter stating that there had been no secret as to the movement of the Venus; that she had been openly dispatched to Saigon to load a cargo of rice for the Philippines, and that the captain had instructions to secure consular papers, if ordered to Cebu, in case that port should be in the possession of the United States authorities upon his arrival, and that they presumed his papers were in order; that according to their advice Cebu was in the hands of the Republican Government, whose authorities would exact the payment of duties, the same in amount as under the Manila tariff; that in selling the cargo they had been required to guarantee that the duties would not exceed those under the Manila tariff; that the claimants protested against paying the duties twice, as it was through no fault of theirs that the duties went to the Cebu authorities, and that, desiring to respect the notification, they would, if instructed, request their Cebu friends to protest against the payment in Cebu because, according to the notification, the Cebu customs were under the control of the United States. At the same time the collector was informed that a ship of the claimants was about to leave Manila for Cebu, which would arrive in time to head off the Venus (which did in fact sail from Manila that day and arrived in Cebu before the Venus); that their intention in so advising the collectors was that he might take the steps he thought most expedient, but that the claimants, unless otherwise ordered by the United States, intended to carry out their contract with the purchasers of the cargo, even if required to pay double duties. Upon the arrival of the Venus at Cebu, January 29, 1899, the native government demanded the payment of duties on the cargo and refused to allow its discharge until such payment was made. On February 4, 1899, the duties were paid and the cargo delivered to the purchasers. Upon the arrival of the Venus thereafter at Manila, with a cargo from Cebu, she was at first prevented from discharging her cargo without paying the duties involved in this case, but later was permitted to do so. Subsequently the collector refused to receive further business from the claimants until the duties in question were paid, and because of such refusal and in order to transact further business with the collector, the claimants, involuntarily and under protest, paid the duties demanded. War was declared with Spain on April 25, 1898, and on May 1, 1898, the forces of the United States captured Manila Bay and har bor. The following order of the President was thereafter promul gated: "EXECUTIVE MANSION, July 12, 1898. "By virtue of the authority vested in me as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States of America, I do hereby order and direct that upon the occupation and possession of any ports and places in the Philippine Islands by the forces of the United States the following tariff of duties and taxes, to be levied and collected as a military contribution, and regulations for the administration thereof, shall take effect and be in force in the ports and places so occupied. |