« AnteriorContinuar »
the framing of "new forms of doctrine to correspond with them" by “Presidents, Secretaries of State and other statesmen," and whether appropriately or not, as the individual reader may decide, he calls these forms of doctrine by the names of the individuals who put them forth in their writings or speeches rather than in official acts of government, whether these individuals were persons charged by law and practice with formulating our foreign policy, or were mere senators or former senators or, in fact, it would seem, the American public in general. While it would be captious to object to the catch-phrase "paramount interest,” employed by Secretary Evarts in his report of March 8, 1880 (p. 170,) as fairly descriptive of one of the fundamental premises in the mind of the Secretary concerned, the author's view and adoption of these words as coextensive with a new doctrine supplanting the principles of the Monroe Doctrine entirely will not be readily accepted. This new doctrine Professor Hart says, should properly be called, the “American Doctrine" because it was subscribed to and applied from 1869 to 1884, and then ran on through what he calls the "Olney Doctrine" (1895), the "Cleveland Doctrine" (1895), the “Lodge Doctrine" (1895), and presumably on through the “Roosevelt Doctrine" (1901), the “Taft Doctrine" (1909), the “Root Doctrine," ascribed to Mr. Root when he was no longer in office, and culled from the remarks of this private citizen in an address given before the American Society of International Law, April 14, 1914. In these Mr. Root clearly showed “his unwillingness to admit the alteration of circumstances since 1823,” Professor Hart admits. Further Mr. Root most ably defended a thesis the exact contrary of that here attempted to be established by Professor Hart, who denies the permanence of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine by means of, and together with, apparent extensions recognized by most of the Presidents and Secretaries of State since Monroe and Adams. The author would even carry his new and so-called American Doctrine through the “Wilson Doctrine" of 1913 to 1915. All of this suggests an exaggerated and fantastic imagination whose flights probably cannot be followed by the credulous vision of the average reader, such as "journalists, writers, and public men,” who, the author admits, “have generally found it more convenient to keep on using the old term 'Monroe Doctrine' because,” he says, “it was hazy and because it seemed to make earlier generalizations responsible for the purpose and motives of the present time.” (p. 162.) Whatever the correct name may be for the doctrine
of the present, whether it be that of President Wilson's firm adherence to the principles and name of the Monroe Doctrine, even though it may be eventually broadened into a policy accepted by and applied to the world, or whether it be Secretary Lansing's doctrine of “special interest,” as expressed in his Lansing-Ishii agreement, Professor Hart, in his Search for the Doctrine of the Future, has discovered the name and “Doctrine of Permanent Interest” which advises the world that our policy is not temporary, transient, nor radically changeable, after it has been adopted, but that it is here for all time as respects LatinAmerica and the Caribbean regions and perhaps certain Pacific and Asiatic territories. (pp. 349–403.) Many things in the book, and especially Part IV (“Present-day Doctrines"), in which he discusses not only the “Latin-American,” the “Drago,” and “Calvo" doctrines, but also the "German Doctrine" and "Pacific and Asiatic Doctrines," and a portion of Part V (“Present World Conditions'), which contains a chapter on the “Doctrine of American Protectorates” in which Professor Hart speaks of the “protectorates” of Cuba, Panama, Santo Domingo, Nicaragua, and our attitude toward Mexico in the same direction, as if the United States' “Fixed Policy of Protectorates” was as definite in intent and as decided in quality as the relations of England to Egypt or of France to Morocco — these phrases of the author's own coinage, let me repeat, and other of his statements seem to indicate clearly that what the author has in mind oftentimes when he speaks of the Monroe Doctrine is the entire sum total of the foreign policy of the United States outside of specifically British and Continental relations of Europe with us respecting their own local and African affairs. He seems to forget that the Monroe Doctrine, important as it is, is but a part even of our relations with Latin-America.
In only one, but a serious, respect the work bears a remote but definite resemblance to such unscholarly, not to say unhistorical and ridiculous, productions as The Monroe Doctrine: An Obsolete Shibboleth, and portions of Pan-Americanism, and The Challenge of the Future, the example and deductions of whose authors, it is safe to say, Professor Hart would be the last consciously to approve or imitate. But apparently, scholarly and patriotic as he is, and advocating a strong American policy in reality, he has allowed himself loosely to ramble into a forest of verbiage and imaginings where, pottering more or less with descriptive titles and names for a policy and its various phases and expansions as if they were different things and realities in themselves,
he has permitted himself to lose all sense of the historical development of the foreign policy of the United States in general, and of that particular part of it that has had a clearly marked and discernible growth at the hands of American executives from Washington to Wilson, with the aid of their Secretaries of State, and perhaps of some others, and one which has retained with almost all of them, and probably will continue to retain it, the designation "Monroe Doctrine.” Unwittingly, unlike the authors of the books just mentioned, he has in this way, and explicitly in his preface, done as much to discredit the Monroe Doctrine and a safe American policy with respect to a part of our Latin-American and Caribbean affairs as any recent author, American or otherwise. The net result of the work, so far as it is a critique, is destructive, not constructive, in respect to an important and vital
merican foreign policy, and in actual use of the book with both graduate and undergraduate students the reviewer has found this to be the invariable effect upon their minds. It has lowered, without historical justification, the respect of such students for the political and diplomatic ideals of the United States and for the statesmen who had a part in forming them. This is certainly not the intention of the author, who is a seeker after truth, but it is the effect of his comments and not of the copious quotations with which the book is filled. It is regrettable that the uninformed and untutored reader or student should meet in the first two paragraphs of the preface to the book the statements that "the Monroe Doctrine itself is tinged with misapprehensions and abounds in contradictions" and "Its meaning and its immediate cogency are still uncertain and disputed.” Assertions of dogmas are not their proof, and as to the two matters quoted, as well as to many similar statements, the book offers, not the demonstration of proofs, but the assertion of the author's opinion, which a foreign reader or an uninstructed student might confuse with "evidence.”
The chief merit of the volume lies in the liberal employment of a method that has been previously used by other authors in this field, the quotation of the words of those whom he considered to have best outlined, or influentially or officially stated, the Monroe or an American doctrine. Had there been added to this a succinct statement of all the principles established by the actual cases in which the executive wing of the government has applied and defined the Monroe Doctrine, a much clearer conception of the basic and additional principles which make up the present Monroe Doctrine would have been given both to
the author and his readers. The student, and even the general reader, would have been glad if a citation had been made, either in a footnote or in the text, to the actual source (including edition, if more than one exists) from which the author took each quotation of any length or importance, that he might, if he desired, consult it for further information or to have the context clearly in mind when considering the writer's view or the author's deductions from that view as quoted. In a work of this kind, designed mainly for students, this ordinary good practice of the historian is greatly missed, for in only a few cases is it clearly and definitely stated in the text where one may look for the source of the excerpt. With such omissions as are noted supplied, the book might lay just claim to being a comprehensive, or indeed the most comprehensive, work on the subject by an American.
The volume has seven parts or divisions covering The Original Monroe Doctrine, 1775-1826; Variations of the Monroe Doctrine, 1827-1869 (including such chapter headings as, The United States out of her Sphere, 1845–1853; Doctrine of American Supremacy, 1853–1861; How to get on without Monroe, 1861–1869); The American Doctrine, 1869–1915; Present-day Doctrines; Present World Conditions; Doctrine of Permanent Interest; and a bibliography called Materials on the Monroe Doctrine.
It is well indexed and well printed, and is written in a fresh and vigorous style, partaking in an unusual degree of the frank and attractive personality of its author, which wins and fastens the interest of the reader whether he can indorse the opinions stated or not. The book is, and will continue to be, useful in colleges and universities in the hands of informed and intelligent teachers, who may add such correctives as they may severally regard necessary.
The criticism of Cleveland and Olney (pp. 202–204) somewhat expands the position taken by Professor Hart on page 302 of his National Ideals and in his article on the “Monroe Doctrine in its Territorial Extent” (published in 1906 in volume 32, No. 39, of the Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute), and it will impress the average reader as an unmerited one, particularly when the motives ascribed to Secretary Olney on pages 204 and 205 of the book are in direct contradiction to each other. President Cleveland, regardless of his own most positive statements to that effect in his Venezuela Controversy and Presidential Problems, is given no credit for an honest attempt to prevent a big state from doing apparent injustice to a small one, even
if the United States had practically to threaten war to secure a fair arbitration of the claims of the small state. The treatment of the Panama Congress of the time of Adams and Clay (pp. 93-98) is much less satisfactory than that in an earlier work of Professor Hart, The Formation of the Union (1910, p. 253), and that in a book by Professor Frederick J. Turner, Rise of the New West, edited by Professor Hart in his American Nation Series. It is also difficult to see why the doctrine of American expansion, so far as it has been applied in the Caribbean or elsewhere, is hostile and at variance with the doctrine of Monroe, or why the titles "permanent interest” or “American Doctrine" are not equally applicable to the Monroe Doctrine throughout its course, if it were ever conceived to stand for any interests of the United States and of Latin-America that were more than merely temporary and evanescent. President Wilson at least, in his memorable address to the Senate, on January 22, 1917, seems to have no particular aversion to either the name or the principles of the Monroe Doctrine: “I am proposing,” he says, “as it were that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world. ...I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power.'
JAMES CURTIS BALLAGH.
Leading Cases on International Law. By Lawrence B. Evans. Chicago:
Callaghan & Co. 1917. pp. xix, 477. $3.50.
This is a work of 477 pages, which the author dedicates “To My Friend, Robert Lansing.' Mr. Evans took his A.B. at Michigan and his Ph.D. at Chicago University. He has served for some years as Professor of History at Tufts College and had already compiled and published Leading Cases on Constitutional Law. The present collection of cases was intended to be a brief one and in such form as to make it useful to students. Therefore “it is confined to decisions from British and American jurisdictions.”
There are 102 cases included, 48 decided by British and 54 by American courts. Some of the cases are “abbreviated” by the omission of "unessential matter," but the facts are given and enough of “the opinion to show the line of reasoning by which the court reached its conclusion." There are references to about 800 cases and to more