demonstrations on the part of the European allies against the independence of the American states, the President would give to that condition of things every consideration which its importance would undoubtedly demand. This did not promise anything definite, yet it could be legitimately interpreted to mean that in case the contemplated emergency should arise the executive department would be disposed, so far as it was able, to assist the new states in maintaining their independence; but, Clay explained, the executive department could not bind the United States Government to support the policy, nor could it act alone, since to engage in war to support the independence of the new countries would require the consent of Congress. 3

When the question of the recognition of Brazil by the formal reception of her chargé, Rebello, was pending, Adams, then Secretary of State, said it would be advisable to appoint at the same time, or very soon thereafter, a chargé to represent the United States at Rio de Janeiro; and suggested that the appointment be conferred on Condy Raguet, a wealthy merchant, editor, author, and political economist of Philadelphia, who since 1822 had been residing at Rio de Janeiro as commercial agent, or consul, of the United States. President Monroe, however, thought the appointment might be deferred; and did not make it before the end of his administration, in spite of the fact that Rebello had manifested an earnest desire that the post should be filled in order to complete the diplomatic relations between the two countries. Among the many diplomatic appointments sent to the Senate immediately after the beginning of the Adams administration, March, 1825, was that of "Condy Raguet of Pennsylvania, chargé d'affaires to Brazil." His instructions were prepared in April.4

When Raguet's promotion and instructions reached him dark days were approaching for the new government to which he was thus accredited; and its troubles were destined to involve him in serious

• Robertson, W. S., South America and the Monroe Doctrine, Political Science Quarterly, XXX, 82-105; Manning, William R., Statements, Interpretations, and Applications of the Monroe Doctrine, etc., 1823-1845, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1914, 35.

4

• Adams, C. F., Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, VI, 475, 520, 530.

difficulties because of his new and more responsible position. All of these troubles grew out of a war in which Brazil found herself engaged with the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, or Argentina, over their conflicting interests in the region which emerged from the war about three years later as the independent republic of Uruguay, because of which fact this is usually spoken of as the War for Uruguayan Independence.

This quarrel over the Banda Oriental, or Eastern Province, as it had been known in Spanish colonial history, was inherited from the mother countries. The boundary line between the Portuguese dominions in Brazil and the Spanish possessions in the Rio de la Plata region had never been settled, although there had been many conflicts and many attempts at settlement throughout the colonial age, but especially during the last century, the eighteenth. For a few years after the beginning of the general Spanish-American revolution in 1810, Montevideo, the principal center of Spanish authority in the Banda Oriental, remained faithful to the mother country in spite of repeated and sustained efforts of the revolutionary government at Buenos Aires to revolutionize and dominate it.

Finally, in 1814, under the leadership of Artigas, a native of the province, with the assistance of Buenos Airean troops, the last remnant of Spanish authority was overthrown. Artigas insisted, however, that the region should not be subjected to Buenos Aires, and forcibly resisted the determined efforts of that city to control it. The Portuguese court at Rio de Janeiro still claimed the region as its Cisplatine Province and hoped to get peaceable possession by taking advantage of the rivalries between the Spanish factions. But Artigas was as determined to maintain independence of Portugal as of Spain or Buenos Aires. Apprehensive of an attack, he unwisely invaded neighboring Portuguese territory. The Portuguese retaliated, repeatedly defeated him, and finally in 1820 he fled to Paraguay, leaving them in control. In 1821 a special congress was convened at Montevideo under Portuguese authority, composed of representatives from all of the Cisplatine Province, which declared the region incorporated in the Portuguese dominions of Brazil. When, in the following year, the independent Brazilian Empire was proclaimed, it incorporated the Cisplatine

Province and retained peaceable possession for three years. So little opposition was there to Brazilian rule that the actual government was left largely in the hands of natives of the province, who administered affairs in the name of Brazil. The Government at Buenos Aires, however, never yielded its claim, and made repeated attempts to reach by negotiation a settlement of the conflicting claims in such a manner that the region might become a part of the United Provinces. A little after the middle of 1823 a special Buenos Airean commission went to the Brazilian court and presented a series of notes making propositions for a settlement that would be acceptable to Buenos Aires. No response having been made, a reply was demanded in February, 1824. The reply, which was given on the day following the demand, was a long, courteous, but firm statement of the Brazilian claim and Brazilian rights, and concluded with the declaration: "Therefore, on these important considerations, the Government of His Imperial Majesty can not enter with Buenos Aires on a negotiation which has for its fundamental basis the cession of the Cisplatine State, the inhabitants of which it can not abandon." The special commission returned and reported its failure to the Government at Buenos Aires; and conditions remained in statu quo for about another year.

When, early in 1825, news reached Buenos Aires of the crushing defeat of the last important Spanish army in Peru near the end of the preceding year, a number of Uruguayan refugees residing in that city determined to free their native province from the rule of the Brazilian Emperor or perish in the attempt. Under the leadership of La Valleja, they organized the famous band of adventurers immortalized in Uruguayan history as the "Treinta y Tres," or Thirty-three. Of this army of thirty-three, fifteen were officers and eighteen privates. Of course, they expected to recruit a real army from their compatriots in Uruguay; and they succeeded. Even Rivera, the Uruguayan who had been the chief executive of the province in the name of Brazil, joined the rebels. Most other officials followed his example, nearly the whole of the province being quickly lost, except Montevideo, the

Manifeste de la Cour de Rio de Janeiro, 10 décembre, 1825, British and Foreign State Papers, XIII, 775–783.

• Ibid., 748-766.

capital and chief port, which was held by the assistance of the warships in the harbor.

Because the evidences of official support from the Government of Buenos Aires were so strong, a Brazilian admiral with a naval force appeared before Buenos Aires in July, 1825, and demanded explanations as a measure short of war. The Argentine authorities protested against the attempt of Brazil to fortify the pen of the negotiator with the guns of an admiral. Several notes were exchanged, and finally the Argentine Government declared negotiations closed. The Brazilian admiral returned to report to his government the failure of his mission. In October the Brazilian Foreign Minister addressed a long argumentative protest to the corresponding official at Buenos Aires demanding that the latter government cease what appeared to the former as warlike preparations and also disavow all connection with Brazil's Cisplatine insurgents. The Argentine reply was a formal declaration that the Banda Oriental was reincorporated in the territory of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, and that the government of the latter would protect it. On December 10 Brazil issued a declaration of war against Argentina, and eleven days later declared all of the ports of the republic in a state of blockade. The Buenos Airean declaration of war was followed by a decree authorizing privateers to prey on Brazilian commerce.7

The disastrous influence which the Brazilian blockade of the Argentine ports was bound to have on the already considerable, and rapidly growing, trade from the United States to them led Raguet, the recently appointed chargé of the United States at Rio de Janeiro, to do everything he could to modify its rigor. Even before the declaration of war, notification of the blockade was addressed to him and to the British representative. Raguet was asked to inform his government and its citizens who were engaged in commerce to the Buenos Airean Republic. A few days thereafter he addressed a lengthy

8

...

7 Manifeste de la Cour de Rio de Janeiro, 10 décembre, 1825, British and Foreign State Papers, XIII, 767-785.

For the British notification, see ibid., 785. For the notification to Raguet, see S. Amaro to Raguet, December 6, and same to same, December 7, 1825, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, VI, 1025; or House Ex. Doc. No. 281, 20th Cong., 1st sess., 14, 15.

communication to the Brazilian Foreign Minister explaining the views of his government concerning the validity and invalidity of blockades. In two respects the Brazilian blockade as announced failed to conform to those principles, and hence could not be recognized as valid. In the first place the United States held that a blockade in order to be valid must be effective; that is, no port could be considered blockaded unless there were actually a sufficient blockading force before it to prevent access to it. It was manifestly impossible for Brazil to maintain a sufficient force before all ports of the Argentine Republic actually to prevent ingress and egress. Not only the United States, but many other nations held this view, one destined to be almost universally recognized later. In the second place, the United States denied the validity of general or diplomatic notifications alone and insisted that each vessel on approaching a blockaded port must be warned that it is blockaded and must not be seized as a prize unless it attempts to run the blockade after being warned, a principle by no means so generally recognized, and subsequently practically abandoned because of changed conditions due to rapid communication of news. He explained many other principles adhered to by his government, frankly admitting that they favored neutrals rather than belligerents, although they did not defeat any legitimate purpose of a blockade; and he argued that it was to the interest of Brazil as well as other new American nations to uphold the more liberal principles, since they were sure to find their greatest opportunity for development in the field of peace and commerce, like the United States, rather than in war, like many European nations. The United States chargé at Buenos Aires entered into communication with the Brazilian admiral of the blockading squadron and asserted the same principles as Raguet.10 Several United States naval vessels were sent to cruise along the coasts of Brazil and Argentina to protect United States merchants and citizens. The commanders of these vessels maintained a lively correspondence for many months with the Brazilian

• Raguet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, December 13, 1825, ibid., 9; or American State Papers, Foreign Relations, VI, 278, or 1023.

10 Forbes to Admiral Lobo, February 13, 1826, ibid., 281; or British and Foreign State Papers, XIII, 822.