admiral, urging the adoption of their government's views. Finally, the Brazilian authorities agreed to modify the blockade to the extent of confining it to the ports actually within the Rio de la Plata, but not to the two or three principal ports for which the United States diplomatic, consular, and naval representatives had so long and ably contended, and which alone might have been effectively blockaded."

The principle that the individual ship should receive warning and not be liable to capture unless it thereafter tried to violate the blockade was as vigorously contended for, but with less success, although something was conceded in this regard also. At first all ships were seized whether they had or could have had knowledge of the blockade or not and whether they were trying to enter a blockaded port or were on the high seas, if it appeared on examination that they had any intention under any contingency of approaching a blockaded port. Finally the Brazilian authorities agreed that no vessels should be detained unless they were found attempting to enter a blockaded port; and many ships were actually allowed to go after having had a warning entered on their registers, although the Brazilians refused to concede this as a right.12

One of the greatest difficulties with which Raguet and the other United States representatives had to contend was the fact that England did not support either of these two important contentions of the United States. On the contrary, correspondence with English representatives shown to the United States chargé expressly declared that the maintenance of an effective force on the spot was not necessary

" Elliott to Raguet, March 14, 1826, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, VI, 277; Elliott to Secretary of the Navy, March 18, 1826, ibid.; Elliott to Bond, April 1, 1826, ibid., 288; Elliott to Admiral Lobo, April 3, 1826, ibid., 284; or British and Foreign State Papers, XIII, 824; Lobo to Elliott, April 6, 1826, ibid., 827, or American State Papers, Foreign Relations, VI, 285; and many other letters in subsequent pages of one or both works.

12 Elliott to Secretary of Navy, May 5, 1826, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, VI, 283; Raguet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, November 14, 1826, ibid., 1047, or House Ex. Doc. No. 281, 20th Cong., 1st sess., 65; Minister of Marine to Admiral Da Prata, November 29, 1826, ibid., 74, or American State Papers, Foreign Relations, VI, 1051; Raguet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, November 30, 1826, ibid., 1048, or House Ex. Doc. No. 281, 20th Cong., 1st sess., 67; and many other documents in subsequent pages of both publications.

in order to render the blockade valid and make the seizure of vessels bound for nominally blockaded ports legal; and this correspondence also asserted that the declaration of the blockade and the general or diplomatic notification were all that were needed, and that thereafter any ship was liable to capture without warning if it had knowledge of the existence of the blockade and showed any evidence that it intended to approach the blockaded port.13 English merchants were suffering as much as those from the United States, but were receiving far less support from the diplomatic and consular representatives of their government.

Another Brazilian practice against which Raguet frequently and vigorously protested was what he and the commanders of the United States naval vessels who seconded his efforts called the impressment of seamen from United States merchant vessels into the service of Brazilian warships. By employing fraud or deceit or intoxication the unwary seamen were frequently enticed on board Brazilian naval vessels and persuaded or frightened or forced to enter the Brazilian service. Some who had gone on vessels built in the United States and sold to the Brazilian Government, finding themselves without employment, had entered voluntarily and then after the expiration of their period of enlistment were detained. Such seamen frequently requested the representatives of their government to secure their release. As such cases multiplied, the patience of Raguet became more and more exhausted and his reclamations and protests became more vigorous. The replies of the government usually promised to investigate and if conditions were found as represented promised that the seamen should be released. When United States merchant vessels were detained under charges of violating, or attempting or intending to violate, the blockade, most of the seamen, instead of being left on board their own vessels under the supervision of the prize crews, as Raguet insisted they should, were removed to the capturing vessel and sometimes inveigled into the Brazilian service, sometimes placed on Brazilian prison ships, and sometimes detained on shore under virtual if not actual imprisonment. They were often deprived of

13 Raguet to Clay, June 27, 1826, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, VI, 1028, or House Ex. Doc. No. 281, 20th Cong., 1st sess., 21.

their personal property, their clothing and bedding, and placed in unsanitary, uncomfortable, and criminal surroundings. Bodily punishment was sometimes inflicted on them. Sometimes it turned out that their cases had been misrepresented to Raguet and that they were really prisoners of war taken from Buenos Airean cruisers, many of them built in the United States and manned and commanded by United States citizens under Buenos Airean commissions. Under these circumstances it is not strange that both reclamations and responses were couched in vigorous language, and relations grew more and more strained. In one case the commander of one of the United States naval vessels had sent a force and demanded two seamen under circumstances which made it appear that he intended to take them by force if his demand were not complied with, though he later explained that he would not have done so. They were surrendered without resistance. But the Foreign Minister took up the matter with Raguet, who had apparently been privy to the plan, and demanded the return of the seamen until the pending investigation should show whether they were properly or improperly detained. But they were not returned.14 Finally orders were given by the Brazilian admiral that all Brazilian ships which had on board any United States seamen who had entered involuntarily or were detained beyond their period of enlistment should be brought in and surrendered.1 But even this did not end the disputes concerning impressment and mistreatment of seamen.

14 Raguet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 20, 1826, American State Papers, Foreign Affairs, VI, 1029, or House Ex. Doc. No. 281, 20th Cong., 1st sess., 23; Minister of Foreign Affairs to Raguet, June 28, 1826, ibid., 23, or American State Papers, Foreign Affairs, VI, 1029. And see also the following documents in the subsequent pages of one or both publications: Hoffmann to Biddle, August 26, 1826; Raguet to Clay, October 2 and October 31, 1826; Biddle to Admiral Pinto Guedes [Da Prata], January 3, 1827; deposition of Jesse Powell before Consul Bond, January 13, 1827; Biddle to Pinto Guedes, January 14, 1827; Da Prata [Pinto Guedes] to Biddle, January 14, 1827; Biddle to Pinto Guedes, January 22, 1827; Da Prata to Biddle, January 23, 1827; and many others.

15 Order of Da Prata, January 25, 1827, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, VI, 1081, or House Ex. Doc. No. 281, 20th Cong., 1st sess., 141; Da Prata to Biddle, January 27, 1827, ibid., 140, or American State Papers, Foreign Relations, VI, 1081.

In October, 1826, after a number of Raguet's earlier and less strenuous notes, protests, and reclamations had reached Washington, Clay wrote that the President approved his zealous exertions to prevent an abuse of the blockade privileges, referred him to earlier correspondence with European governments in which the United States had upheld the principles which Raguet was defending, and exhorted him to insist at all times on these principles and remonstrate against their violation.16 This instruction from his superior strengthened the already stiffening diplomatic backbone of Raguet, and his notes to the Brazilian Government grew more vigorous and undiplomatic. Before Clay's approval had been written, Raguet declared to Clay that his patience was exhausted, reviewed the continuous record of wrongs and indignities which he had been sending to the Department of State during his four years' residence at Rio de Janeiro, and suggested the advisability of bringing the relations with Brazil before Congress in the President's annual message, saying he thought that would have a good effect. He asked authority to demand the immediate restoration of all vessels which had been detained in violation of the principles for which the United States contended; and, in case the demand should not be complied with, he asked consent to demand his passports, saying that he felt sure Brazil would yield for fear the protest of the United States would strengthen the cause of Buenos Aires. In his annual message President Adams did mention in mild language the great irregularities among the Brazilian naval officers, "by whom principles in relation to blockades and to neutral navigation have been brought forward to which we can not subscribe." He believed that the just reparation which had been demanded would not be withheld.18

17

Between the time of Raguet's request for more vigorous instructions and his receipt of Clay's approval, which was followed a little

16 Clay to Raguet, October 22, 1826, ibid., 1051, or House Ex. Doc. No. 281, 20th Cong., 1st sess., 74.

17 Raguet to Clay, September 23, 1826, ibid., 30; or American State Papers, Foreign Relations, VI, 1032.

18 Adams's annual message to Congress, December 5, 1826, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, VI, 212.

later by news of the President's message, causes of complaint multiplied rapidly. Many vessels had been detained and few had been either condemned or released. Judicial procedure was unaccountably and, he thought, inexcusably and intentionally delayed. To review the cases of the individual ships and individual seamen which called for protests and reclamations by him and the commanders of the United States naval vessels, and furnished occasions for numerous lengthy replies, explanations, and defenses by Brazilian ministers and admirals would require scores of pages. It is surprising to see the breadth of the knowledge of international law and the wide familiarity with the classic authorities and great judicial decisions in that interesting field of study displayed on both sides of the wordy controversies.19 Raguet's impatience got the better of his judgment. To one of the Brazilian Foreign Minister's polite but unsatisfactory replies to Raguet's vigorous denunciations, the former appended a regret at the acrimonious language of the latter and expressed a hope that in the future he would use more moderation.20 On the same day Raguet wrote Clay that his patience was exhausted and that he hardly considered the Brazilians a civilized people. He said they had taken great offense at his communications and he would not be surprised if they should refuse to receive them. In such an event he would leave the country.21

An entirely new weapon had been employed by the Brazilian authorities to prevent neutral vessels from running the blockade. So many had obtained clearances from Brazilian ports and then gone to Buenos Aires and carried supplies, sometimes of Brazilian origin, that the local authorities of Montevideo had adopted the practice of requiring all merchant ships clearing from that port, whatever their destination might be, to give bond equal to the value of the ship and cargo not to visit any of the ports of the Buenos Airean Republic.

19 See numerous documents in American State Papers, Foreign Relations, VI, 289–293 and 1026-1078, or House Ex. Doc. No. 281, 20th Cong., 1st sess., 18-137.

20 Minister of Foreign Affairs to Raguet, October 31, 1826, ibid., 63, or American State Papers, Foreign Affairs, VI, 1046.

21 Raguet to Clay, October 31, 1826, ibid., 1042, or House Ex. Doc. No. 281, 20th Cong., 1st sess., 53.