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told him that my opinion of his integrity, patriotism, and zeal was unimpaired; that I was convinced of the purity of his motives to the step he had taken; but that I had thought it would have been better if he had, before taking that step, consulted his government.” 35 In his annual message of December, 1827, after telling of the disturbed relations with Brazil due to events growing out of the inadmissible practices of the Brazilian commanders in enforcing the blockade, Adams said the chargé had left in protest because his representations in behalf of United States citizens had been disregarded, and concluded his comment on the episode: “This movement, dictated by an honest zeal for the honor and interests of his country — motives which operated exclusively on the mind of the officer who resorted to it- has not been disapproved by me." To a senator from Pennsylvania who in January, 1828, went to Adams to solicit another appointment for Raguet, Adams declared that because he thought Raguet was sincere and his motives were good, no public censure had been passed either in the message to Congress or in the communications with Brazil. “But to replace in diplomatic service abroad a man of such a temper and want of judgment, who took blustering for bravery and insolence for energy, was too dangerous.” 37
WILLIAM R. MANNING.
35 Adams, C. F., Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, VII, 288, 289. Raguet to Clay, May 31, 1827, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, VI, 1068, or House Ex. Doc. No. 281, 20th Cong., 1st sess., 112.
36 Adams's annual message, December 4, 1827, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, VI, 627.
37 Adams, C. F., Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, VII, 401.
After Raguet's departure from Brazil, a statement was published in a paper of Rio de Janeiro charging that he had been bribed by agents of Buenos Aires to break off the relations between the United States and Brazil. In a communication to the House of Representatives of February 15, 1828, Raguet declared this to be an unfounded libel, and asked for an investigation. On March 25 the Committee on Foreign Affairs reported that, while they sympathized with Mr. Raguet's feeling of indignation, they thought an unavowed newspaper attack on a foreign agent not sufficient ground for the House to take action. They considered the statement of the President to Congress at the opening of the session sufficient vindication. American State Papers. gn Relation 64, 865.
THE HELLENIC CRISIS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The third part of the essay on the Hellenic Crisis, which has happily received a satisfactory solution, will deal with the incidents which are connected with the law of nations and inquire as to how far the European belligerents in their dealings with Greece, and the Greek Government in its relations with them, adhered to the tenets and usages of international law.
The points to be here discussed are of a manifold character.
First, it will be examined whether the serious charge made by the Entente Powers against Constantine, the ex-King of the Hellenes, that he violated the obligations arising out of the Treaty of Alliance between Greece and Serbia, by which the two states bound themselves to assist each other for the defense of their respective territories in case of attack by a third Power, and particularly by Bulgaria, is well founded according to the letter and spirit of the instrument of alliance.
Secondly, whether the military occupation of portions of the territory of the Hellenic Kingdom by both sets of belligerents, the . seizure of its war material and other public property, and particularly the coercive measures employed by the Entente Powers against the Government and people of Greece and their forcible intervention in the internal affairs of that country, can be justified either by reason of treaty stipulations or on account of the unneutral conduct of the then King and his government towards the Entente Allies. The first point to be examined is the obligation arising out of the treaty of alliance between Greece and Serbia.
1 See Parts I and II in this JOURNAL for January and April, 1917.
The word "King" embodied, then, the government, because the two words during the short reign of that potentate - with the exception of the interval of the Venizelos Cabinet — were synonymous. See ibid., Parts I and II.
THE GRECO-SERBIAN TREATY OF ALLIANCE
After the first Balkan War of 1912–1913 Greece and Serbia, being apprehensive lest their then ally Bulgaria, flushed with victory against the Turks and laboring under the dream of hegemony in the Balkan peninsula, should attack them in order to settle by the sword, on one hand, her territorial differences with Serbia, and on the other to snatch from the hands of Greece the much coveted city of Salonika 3 — the pearl of Macedonia – concluded in June, 1913, a defensive alliance in order to ward off the then impending Bulgarian aggression.
The Greco-Serbian Alliance had, strictly speaking, a double object: The first aim of the contracting parties was to protect themselves against the expected attack of their ally Bulgaria. The second, which particularly concerned Serbia, was to forestall another danger from another Power than Bulgaria, namely, Austria-Hungary, and in such contingency to rely on Greece if attacked simultaneously by the army of Tsar Ferdinand. It also concerned Greece, in order to insure the assistance of Serbia, in case, being attacked by Turkey, she had to face also a Bulgarian aggression.
In both cases the cardinal object of Greece and Serbia was the preservation and consolidation of their territorial acquisitions made in consequence of the war with Turkey which were then in their actual possession or military occupation. The dual alliance is embodied in two diplomatic instruments, namely, the Treaty of Alliance proper and the Military Convention, both bearing the date of May 19, 1913 (Old Style), namely, June 1, 1913.
The preamble of the Treaty of Alliance sets forth in an abstract manner the reason which actuated the contracting parties to conclude an alliance, namely, that they consider it "a duty to look after
• This apprehension became a conviction after the sudden attack in the beginning of May, 1913, of the Bulgarians against the Greek troops stationed at Mount Panghaion in eastern Macedonia.
See Greek White Book, Document No. 5. English translation in Supplement to this JOURNAL, p. 101.
• English translation of texts, Greek White Book, Docs. Nos. 2 and 4, in Supplement to this JOURNAL, pp. 89, 96.
the security of their people and the tranquillity of their kingdoms" and furthermore a “firm desire to preserve a permanent peace in the Balkan peninsula.” The two allies distinctly declare that their agreement is of a purely defensive character and therefore promise each other never to give to it "an offensive character."
After this preliminary explanation, the two contracting parties agree to guarantee "mutually their possessions" and to afford assistance to each other with all their armed forces in case one of them is "attacked without any provocation on its part.” Furthermore, in anticipation of trouble with Bulgaria as to the division of the territories conquered from Turkey, the two contracting parties agree "not to come to a separate understanding with Bulgaria," "to afford each other a constant assistance," and to "act always together supporting mutually their territorial claims."
One of the most important provisions of the treaty is that dealing with the determination of the two parties to have a common boundary line, an arrangement objectionable both to Austria and to Bulgaria. After these declarations, the boundary lines which were to separate the three states, namely, Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, are minutely fixed “on the basis of the principle of actual possession and the equilibrium between the three states."
By the fifth article, the contracting parties, after providing for reference to mediation or arbitration of their contingent differences with Bulgaria in regard to the delimitation of their respective boundaries, agree that in case “Bulgaria should refuse to accept this manner of peaceful settlement" and "assume a menacing attitude against one of the two Kingdoms " or "attempt to impose her claims by force," the two allies bind themselves solemnly to afford assistance to each other with all their forces. They further agree by Article 6 to conclude a military convention "for the preparation and securing of the military measures of defense" of the two countries.
After referring to some other features of the treaty, with which we are not here concerned, the contracting parties agree that the instrument will have binding force for ten years, and according to the terms provided for in Article 10, it can not be denounced before the expiration of this period.
The second instrument, namely, the Military Convention, deals specifically with the contingencies in which the casus foederis of the alliance would arise, the number of troops to be furnished in such a case by each contracting party, the manner in which the military operations should be conducted by the allied armies, and furthermore refers to the benevolent neutrality to be maintained by one of the parties in case the other declares war against Bulgaria or another Power. By a special provision (Article 7), a delimitation of their respective boundaries is made, assigning to each party certain territories, and by other clauses various other questions pertaining to military operations, armistice, revictualing, commandeering, the war booty, sanitary and other matters, are dealt with in some detail (Articles 8–11). It is further stipulated that the duration of the Military Convention depends upon that of the Treaty of Alliance and that therefore the former shall continue to be in force "as long as the alliance between Greece and Serbia, of which it forms a complement, remains in force." (Article 12.)
The first aim of the alliance, namely, that regarding the warding off of the implied Bulgarian attack, is covered by the general provisions of Article 1 of the Treaty of Alliance, and specifically by Articles 1 and 4 of the Military Convention. In fact while Article 1 of the treaty deals with the obligation of the contracting parties to afford each other military assistance in case one of them is attacked without provocation on its part, Articles 1 and 4 of the convention mention distinctly Bulgaria. Thus, by Article 1 of the latter instrument, "in case of a sudden attack by considerable forces — at least two divisions of the Bulgarian army against the Hellenic or Serbian army,” the contracting parties “promise to each other mutual military support, Greece with all her land and sea forces, and Serbia with all her land forces.” But Article 4 also of the convention is not less explicit when it foresees the contingency of an attack by Bulgaria, while one of the two allies is "found in the necessity of defending" itself “against an attack of a Power other than Bulgaria."
English translation of texts, Greek White Book, Doc. No. 4, Supplement,