THE GRECO-SERBIAN TREATY OF ALLIANCE

After the first Balkan War of 1912-1913 Greece and Serbia, being apprehensive lest their then ally Bulgaria, flushed with victory against the Turks and laboring under the dream of hegemony in the Balkan peninsula, should attack them in order to settle by the sword, on one hand, her territorial differences with Serbia, and on the other to snatch from the hands of Greece the much coveted city of Salonika 3 - the pearl of Macedonia - concluded in June, 1913, a defensive alliance in order to ward off the then impending Bulgarian aggression.

The Greco-Serbian Alliance had, strictly speaking, a double object: The first aim of the contracting parties was to protect themselves against the expected attack of their ally Bulgaria. The second, which particularly concerned Serbia, was to forestall another danger from another Power than Bulgaria, namely, Austria-Hungary, and in such contingency to rely on Greece if attacked simultaneously by the army of Tsar Ferdinand. It also concerned Greece, in order to insure the assistance of Serbia, in case, being attacked by Turkey, she had to face also a Bulgarian aggression.

In both cases the cardinal object of Greece and Serbia was the preservation and consolidation of their territorial acquisitions made in consequence of the war with Turkey which were then in their actual possession or military occupation. The dual alliance is embodied in two diplomatic instruments, namely, the Treaty of Alliance proper and the Military Convention, both bearing the date of May 19, 1913 (Old Style), namely, June 1, 1913.

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The preamble of the Treaty of Alliance sets forth in an abstract manner the reason which actuated the contracting parties to conclude an alliance, namely, that they consider it "a duty to look after

This apprehension became a conviction after the sudden attack in the beginning of May, 1913, of the Bulgarians against the Greek troops stationed at Mount Panghaion in eastern Macedonia.

See Greek White Book, Document No. 5. English translation in Supplement to this JOURNAL, p. 101.

• English translation of texts, Greek White Book, Docs. Nos. 2 and 4, in Supplement to this JOURNAL, pp. 89, 96.

the security of their people and the tranquillity of their kingdoms" and furthermore a "firm desire to preserve a permanent peace in the Balkan peninsula.' The two allies distinctly declare that their agreement is of a purely defensive character and therefore promise each other never to give to it "an offensive character."

After this preliminary explanation, the two contracting parties agree to guarantee "mutually their possessions" and to afford assistance to each other with all their armed forces in case one of them is "attacked without any provocation on its part." Furthermore, in anticipation of trouble with Bulgaria as to the division of the territories conquered from Turkey, the two contracting parties agree "not to come to a separate understanding with Bulgaria," "to afford each other a constant assistance," and to "act always together supporting mutually their territorial claims."

One of the most important provisions of the treaty is that dealing with the determination of the two parties to have a common boundary line, an arrangement objectionable both to Austria and to Bulgaria. After these declarations, the boundary lines which were to separate the three states, namely, Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, are minutely fixed "on the basis of the principle of actual possession and the equilibrium between the three states."

By the fifth article, the contracting parties, after providing for reference to mediation or arbitration of their contingent differences with Bulgaria in regard to the delimitation of their respective boundaries, agree that in case "Bulgaria should refuse to accept this manner of peaceful settlement" and "assume a menacing attitude against one of the two Kingdoms" or "attempt to impose her claims by force," the two allies bind themselves solemnly to afford assistance to each other with all their forces. They further agree by Article 6 to conclude a military convention "for the preparation and securing of the military measures of defense" of the two countries.

After referring to some other features of the treaty, with which we are not here concerned, the contracting parties agree that the instrument will have binding force for ten years, and according to the terms provided for in Article 10, it can not be denounced before the expiration of this period.

The second instrument, namely, the Military Convention, deals specifically with the contingencies in which the casus foederis of the alliance would arise, the number of troops to be furnished in such a case by each contracting party, the manner in which the military operations should be conducted by the allied armies, and furthermore refers to the benevolent neutrality to be maintained by one of the parties in case the other declares war against Bulgaria or another Power. By a special provision (Article 7), a delimitation of their respective boundaries is made, assigning to each party certain territories, and by other clauses various other questions pertaining to military operations, armistice, revictualing, commandeering, the war booty, sanitary and other matters, are dealt with in some detail (Articles 8-11). It is further stipulated that the duration of the Military Convention depends upon that of the Treaty of Alliance and that therefore the former shall continue to be in force "as long as the alliance between Greece and Serbia, of which it forms a complement, remains in force." (Article 12.)

The first aim of the alliance, namely, that regarding the warding off of the implied Bulgarian attack, is covered by the general provisions of Article 1 of the Treaty of Alliance, and specifically by Articles 1 and 4 of the Military Convention. In fact while Article 1 of the treaty deals with the obligation of the contracting parties to afford each other military assistance in case one of them is attacked without provocation on its part, Articles 1 and 4 of the convention mention distinctly Bulgaria. Thus, by Article 1 of the latter instrument, "in case of a sudden attack by considerable forces at least two divisions of the Bulgarian army against the Hellenic or Serbian army," the contracting parties "promise to each other mutual military support, Greece with all her land and sea forces, and Serbia with all her land forces." But Article 4 also of the convention is not less explicit when it foresees the contingency of an attack by Bulgaria, while one of the two allies is "found in the necessity of defending" itself "against an attack of a Power other than Bulgaria."

• English translation of texts, Greek White Book, Doc. No. 4, Supplement, p. 96.

The second aim sought by the alliance, namely, the protection from aggression of another Power than Bulgaria, is provided for by the general terms of Article 1 of the treaty, and is particularly dealt with in two articles of the Military Convention. Thus, Article 1 (of the convention) deals with the case of war "between one of the Allied States and a third Power" and Article 4 (of the same instrument) refers to the case of either contracting party defending itself against an attack of a Power other than Bulgaria. In both cases Greece and Serbia are under the obligation to afford military assistance to each other.

It should be noted that, although according to the letter of the Military Convention (Article 1) both parties are bound to assist each other if attacked by a third Power, still the tendency of the Greek Government has been to consider that the obligation of the mutual aid depended on the participation also of Bulgaria in such a conflict and taking the offensive against one of the contracting parties; that, therefore, either of them could remain neutral in the absence of the latter contingency."

That the object of these agreements between Greece and Serbia was the preservation of their territorial acquisitions during the war with Turkey, and generally their actual possessions, is evident from the express terms of Article 1 of the Treaty of Alliance, where it is distinctly stated that the "high contracting parties agree expressly to a mutual guarantee of their possessions." Besides, the general tenor and spirit of both instruments show that that was the predominant character of their agreements, the other obligations being a corollary or supplementary arrangement for the benefit of both or one of the parties. To the latter category belong the privileges granted by Greece to Serbia in regard to the export and import trade of Serbia through the port of Salonika and in some of the railway lines in Greek Macedonia.7

• Speech of Mr. Venizelos in the Boulé on October 4, 1915, in supplement to Patris, pp. 8, 9.

It should be noted that there was always a friendly feeling between the Serbians and Greeks (unlike that between the latter and the Bulgarians) long before the existence of the Serbian and Greek states, as is attested by the history

Such are the general terms of the Treaty of Alliance and the Military Convention concluded between Greece and Serbia in June, 1913, about a month previous to the outbreak of the second Balkan War of 1913.

The casus foederis arose for the first time when, on June 29, 1913, the Bulgarian army began simultaneously the invasion of the territories then under the military occupation of Greece and Serbia, ceded by Turkey to the three allies, namely to Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria, by the Treaty of Peace of London of May 30, 1913. The provisions both of the Treaty of Alliance and the Military Convention were then fully carried out by both contracting parties, resulting in the defeat of Bulgaria and the signature of the Treaty of Bucharest of August 10, 1913.

During the course of the present world war the interpretation or construction to be given to these diplomatic documents became the bone of contention between Constantine, the former "constitutional" King of the Hellenes, and Mr. Venizelos, the leader of the Liberal Party of Greece. The one, namely, the then King (and his nominees), contended that the words "third Power" contained in the Military Convention referred exclusively to a Balkan state and not to any other Power; and consequently that the alliance is of a restrictive character, having in view a Balkan and not a European

of both countries. As a matter of fact, had it not been for the murder of the Serbian hero, Kara George, in 1817, the ancestor of the present King Peter, the Serbian people at that time would have probably participated in the war against Turkey, during the war of Greek Independence, as an agreement had been reached at Bucharest between Kara George and the agents of the Greek revolutionary committee in that city. (I. Paparregopoulos, Istoria tou Hellenikou Ethnous, 1887, Vol. V. pp. 698-699.)

In 1867 an offensive and defensive alliance was concluded between Greece and Serbia with the view of waging war against Turkey in order to liberate from the Ottoman yoke some of the Turkish provinces inhabited by Serbians and Greeks, but the plan was not carried out on account of the military weakness of both states. (O. Popovic in New Europe, No. 22, March 15, 1917, p. 267.)

This friendly feeling was continued and maintained not only between the governments and people of Greece and Serbia proper, but also between the Serbians and Greeks in the Macedonian provinces of Turkey, where during all the troublesome times of that unhappy country, they lived in perfect amity and

peace.