Imágenes de páginas

1911 Divided between T. M. C. Asser, Minister of State, member of the Council

of State of the Netherlands, and Alfred Hermann Fried, Director of

the Die Friedens-Warte. 1912 No award was made, but in 1913 the award of 1912 was made to Elihu

Root, member of the United States Senate, formerly Secretary of State,

President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1913 Henri La Fontaine, member of the Belgian Senate, president of the Per

manent International Peace Bureau at Bern. 1914 No award. 1915 No award. 1916 No award. 1917 The International Red Cross Committee of Geneva.

It will be observed that in 1912 the peace prize was not voted. This was in accordance with Section V of the By-Laws, which allows the Committee to postpone the award until the following year. In this instance the award was made in 1913 as of 1912. If, however, the members of the Committee should not make the award at the expiration of the year, the amount is added to the capital, unless the Committee, by a vote of three-fourths of its members, should decide to set it aside as a special fund. The income of the prize thus set aside may be employed otherwise than as a prize to advance the cause of international peace.

As no awards were made for 1914, 1915, and 1916, the amounts of the prizes for these years, each approximately forty thousand dollars, were added to the special fund of the Nobel Institute situated in Christiania, in accordance with Article V of the By-Laws, to be expended in the advancement of international peace.




In the earlier part of March extracts appeared in the German press of a Memorandum written by Prince Lichnowsky, Imperial German Ambassador to Great Britain at the outbreak of the war of 1914, and more of this Memorandum is said to have been published in the Stockholm Politiken. In the account given in the London Times for March 15, 1918, it is said that:

The Memorandum was written by Prince Lichnowsky about eighteen months ago, for the purpose of explaining and justifying his position to his personal friends,

and only half-a-dozen typewritten copies were made. One of these copies, through a betrayal, reached the Wilhelmstrasse, and caused a great scandal, and another was communicated to some members of the Minority Socialist Party; but how it happened that a copy got across the German frontier forms a mystery to which Politiken declines to give any clue. Internal evidence, however, leaves no doubt in regard to the authenticity of the document. It is entitled “My London Mission, 1912–1914," and is dated Kuchelna (Prince Lichnowsky's country seat), August, 1916.

The most casual reading of the Memorandum will disclose why the Prince's Memorandum has created a sensation in Germany, where the views expressed by the former Ambassador to Great Britain have not been avowed by the authorities. Naturally, they have been discussed in the Reichstag, and statements have appeared from time to time in the press that the Prince would be tried and punished for treason, or sedition, or for some other heinous offense.

As regards the Reichstag, the London Times, in its issue of March 21, 1918, says in a dispatch from Amsterdam, dated the 19th:

In the Main Committee of the Reichstag the subject of Prince Lichnowsky's Memorandum was discussed. Herr von Payer, the Vice-Chancellor, read a letter from the Prince, in which he stated that the Memorandum had been written with a view to his future justification. These notes were intended for the family archives. They have found their way into wider circles by an “unprecedented breach of confidence." The Prince expressed regret for the incident.

Herr von Payer stated that the Prince had tendered his resignation, which had been accepted, but as he had been simply guilty of imprudence, no further steps would be taken against him.

A few of the more significant passages of the Memorandum are quoted, with summaries of omitted portions.

The Prince arrived in London in November, 1912, and found that “people had quieted down about Morocco," as an agreement had been reached concerning this question between France and Germany. The Haldane Mission had, he said, failed because Germany insisted upon a promise of neutrality, instead of contenting itself with a treaty with Great Britain insuring it against attacks from that country. However, Sir Edward Grey, then British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had, to quote the Prince's exact language, “not given up the idea of reaching an understanding with us and he tried it first in colonial and economic matters." The purpose of Sir Edward Grey as stated by the German Ambassador was to settle outstanding controversies with France and Great Britain, and thereafter reach similar agreements with Germany, "not to isolate us,” to quote the Prince, “but as far as

possible to make us partners in the existing union. As British-French and British-Russian differences had been bridged over, he wished also the British-German differences to be settled as far as possible and to insure world peace by means of a network of treaties,” which the Prince said would probably have included an agreement on the naval question after an understanding had been reached obviating the dangers of war.

Such was Grey's program in his own words, the Prince says, apparently quoting Sir Edward Grey, upon which the Prince comments that it had “‘no aggressive aims, and involved in themselves for England no binding obligations, to reach a friendly rapprochement and understanding with Germany'. In short, to bring the two groups nearer together.”

Prince Lichnowsky's disclosures concerning the attitude on the Balkan situation of Austria-Hungary and Germany, on the one hand, and Great Britain, on the other, are of the utmost importance, as they show an agreement of the Central European Powers to exclude Russia from Balkan affairs, to substitute their own influence for that of Russia, and to make of those states dependencies instead of making them independent, inasmuch as the Prince shows that Russian influence had really ceased in each instance with the independence of each of the Balkan States.

It will be recalled that Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia, after having beaten Turkey in what is known as the First Balkan war, fell out about the distribution of the spoils of victory, and that in a conference by their plenipotentiaries held in London they failed to agree. The consequence was the Second Balkan war, of Greece, Montenegro and Serbia, in which Roumania joined, against Bulgaria, which had insisted upon the lion's share of the common victory. In this second war Bulgaria was badly beaten, and the Treaty of Bucharest was concluded in 1913. In these various negotiations, Austria was an interested party, insisting that the principality of Albania should be created out of the spoils claimed by Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, and that Serbia be denied an outlet to the seas. The attitude of the Central German Powers and of Great Britain is thus stated by Prince Lichnowsky, who was then German Ambassador to London:

Soon after my arrival in London, at the end of 1912, Sir Edward Grey suggested an informal conversation in order to prevent a European war developing out of the Balkan war.

The British statesman from the beginning took the stand that England had no interest in Albania on account of this question and was therefore not willing

to let it come to a war. He wished simply as an honest broker to mediate between the two groups and settle difficulties. He therefore by no means placed himself on the side of the members of the alliance, and during the negotiations, which lasted about eight months, he contributed not a little by his good will and effectual influence toward bringing about concord and agreement. Instead of assuming an attitude similar to that of the English, we without exception took the position prescribed to us from Vienna. Count Mensdorff represented the Triple Alliance in London. I was his second. My mission consisted in supporting his propositions.

So much for the attitude of the different Powers. Next as to the conduct of Sir Edward Grey and the consequences of the Balkan settlement conducted by Austria-Hungary and Germany. On these points the Prince said in his Memorandum:

Grey conducted the negotiations with circumspection, calmness, and tact. Whenever a question threatened to become complicated, he would draft a form of agreement which hit the matter right and always met approval. His personality enjoyed equal confidence from all members of the conference. We really again successfully stood one of the many tests of strength which characterize our politics. Russia had had to yield to us everywhere, so that she was never in a position to insure success of the Serbian wishes. Albania was created as an Austrian vassal state and Serbia was driven from the sea. The result of the conference was therefore a fresh humiliation for the Russian self-consciousness. As in 1878 and 1908, we had taken a stand against the Russian program without German interests being at stake. Bismarck knew how to mitigate the error of the Congress by secret treaty and by his attitude in the Battenberg question. The downward path again taken in the Bosnian question was continued in London, and when it led into the abyss it was not opportunely abandoned.

It is common knowledge that Austria-Hungary had picked Bulgaria as the winner in the Second Balkan war, and that its defeat was a blow to what it considered its prestige. The Prince calls attention to this in the following passage, and the absence of a specious pretext evidently was the reason in the Prince's mind, although he does not say so, for the outbreak of the war a year earlier than it actually occurred:

The idea of wiping it out by a campaign against Serbia seems soon to have gained ground in Vienna. The Italian revelations prove this and it is to be supposed that the Marquis San Giuliano, who very appropriately characterized the plan as a most dangerous adventure, preserved us from becoming involved in a world war as early as the summer of 1913.

But however interesting these passages may be, they are merely episodes in a memoir whose great value consists in the disclosure that before the outbreak of the war of 1914, Great Britain had not only, as is well known, settled its differences with France and Russia, but

also that Sir Edward Grey, representing Great Britain, had peaceably settled its controversies with Germany; that the terms of the treaty adjusting their conflicting claims to the satisfaction of Germany had not only been substantially agreed upon, but that the treaty itself had been drafted and initialed by Sir Edward Grey on behalf of Great Britain, and by Prince Lichnowsky on behalf of Germany.

It appears that the agreement between the two countries extended to colonial matters in Africa, as well as economic questions in Asia. In regard to the former, the Prince says, speaking of the treaty of 1898:

Thanks to the obliging attitude of the British Government, I succeeded in giving the new treaty a form which fully coincided with our wishes and interests. All of Angola up to the 20th degree of longitude was assigned to us, so that we reached the Congo region from the south; besides this there were the valuable islands of San Thome and Principe. . . . Furthermore we received the northern part of Mozambique. ...

"The British Government,” the Prince says again, “showed the greatest obligingness in behalf of our interests. Grey purposed proving to us his good will and also furthering our colonial development in general, as England hoped to divert German development of strength from the North Sea and from Europe to the ocean. 'We do not begrudge Germany her colonial development,' said a member of the Cabinet to me."

Of the Asiatic situation, and especially of the Bagdad Railway, the Prince has much to say, and the purpose of the two governments appears to have been to divide Asia Minor into two spheres of influence. The economic enterprises were adjusted essentially in accordance with the wishes of the German Bank, and the railroad itself was prolonged to Basra, so that Bagdad was no longer constituted the terminal point of the road. An international commission was to attend to the navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab. Germany was to have a part in the construction of the harbor at Basra, and obtain rights in the navigation of the Tigris.

The success of these negotiations and their consequences not merely to the contracting Powers, but to the world at large, are thus stated by the German negotiator:

Under this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia as far as Basra became our interest zone, without prejudice to more ancient British rights in the Tigris navigation and the Wilcox irrigation establishments. Furthermore, we received the whole territory of the Bagdad and Anatolian railroad.

« AnteriorContinuar »