possible to make us partners in the existing union. As British-French and British-Russian differences had been bridged over, he wished also the British-German differences to be settled as far as possible and to insure world peace by means of a network of treaties," which the Prince said would probably have included an agreement on the naval question after an understanding had been reached obviating the dangers of war. Such was Grey's program in his own words, the Prince says, apparently quoting Sir Edward Grey, upon which the Prince comments that it had "no aggressive aims, and involved in themselves for England no binding obligations, to reach a friendly rapprochement and understanding with Germany'. In short, to bring the two groups nearer together."

Prince Lichnowsky's disclosures concerning the attitude on the Balkan situation of Austria-Hungary and Germany, on the one hand, and Great Britain, on the other, are of the utmost importance, as they show an agreement of the Central European Powers to exclude Russia from Balkan affairs, to substitute their own influence for that of Russia, and to make of those states dependencies instead of making them independent, inasmuch as the Prince shows that Russian influence had really ceased in each instance with the independence of each of the Balkan States.

It will be recalled that Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia, after having beaten Turkey in what is known as the First Balkan war, fell out about the distribution of the spoils of victory, and that in a conference by their plenipotentiaries held in London they failed to agree. The consequence was the Second Balkan war, of Greece, Montenegro and Serbia, in which Roumania joined, against Bulgaria, which had insisted upon the lion's share of the common victory. In this second war Bulgaria was badly beaten, and the Treaty of Bucharest was concluded in 1913. In these various negotiations, Austria was an interested party, insisting that the principality of Albania should be created out of the spoils claimed by Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, and that Serbia be denied an outlet to the seas. The attitude of the Central German Powers and of Great Britain is thus stated by Prince Lichnowsky, who was then German Ambassador to London:

Soon after my arrival in London, at the end of 1912, Sir Edward Grey suggested an informal conversation in order to prevent a European war developing out of the Balkan war. The British statesman from the beginning took the stand that England had no interest in Albania on account of this question and was therefore not willing

to let it come to a war. He wished simply as an honest broker to mediate between the two groups and settle difficulties. He therefore by no means placed himself on the side of the members of the alliance, and during the negotiations, which lasted about eight months, he contributed not a little by his good will and effectual influence toward bringing about concord and agreement. Instead of assuming an attitude similar to that of the English, we without exception took the position prescribed to us from Vienna. Count Mensdorff represented the Triple Alliance in London. I was his second. My mission consisted in supporting his propositions.

So much for the attitude of the different Powers. Next as to the conduct of Sir Edward Grey and the consequences of the Balkan settlement conducted by Austria-Hungary and Germany. On these points the Prince said in his Memorandum:

Grey conducted the negotiations with circumspection, calmness, and tact. Whenever a question threatened to become complicated, he would draft a form of agreement which hit the matter right and always met approval. His personality enjoyed equal confidence from all members of the conference. We really again successfully stood one of the many tests of strength which characterize our politics. Russia had had to yield to us everywhere, so that she was never in a position to insure success of the Serbian wishes. Albania was created as an Austrian vassal state and Serbia was driven from the sea. The result of the conference was therefore a fresh humiliation for the Russian self-consciousness. As in 1878 and 1908, we had taken a stand against the Russian program without German interests being at stake. Bismarck knew how to mitigate the error of the Congress by secret treaty and by his attitude in the Battenberg question. The downward path again taken in the Bosnian question was continued in London, and when it led into the abyss it was not opportunely abandoned.

It is common knowledge that Austria-Hungary had picked Bulgaria as the winner in the Second Balkan war, and that its defeat was a blow to what it considered its prestige. The Prince calls attention to this in the following passage, and the absence of a specious pretext evidently was the reason in the Prince's mind, although he does not say so, for the outbreak of the war a year earlier than it actually occurred:

The idea of wiping it out by a campaign against Serbia seems soon to have gained ground in Vienna. The Italian revelations prove this and it is to be supposed that the Marquis San Giuliano, who very appropriately characterized the plan as a most dangerous adventure, preserved us from becoming involved in a world war as early as the summer of 1913.

But however interesting these passages may be, they are merely episodes in a memoir whose great value consists in the disclosure that before the outbreak of the war of 1914, Great Britain had not only, as is well known, settled its differences with France and Russia, but

also that Sir Edward Grey, representing Great Britain, had peaceably settled its controversies with Germany; that the terms of the treaty adjusting their conflicting claims to the satisfaction of Germany had not only been substantially agreed upon, but that the treaty itself had been drafted and initialed by Sir Edward Grey on behalf of Great Britain, and by Prince Lichnowsky on behalf of Germany.

It appears that the agreement between the two countries extended to colonial matters in Africa, as well as economic questions in Asia. In regard to the former, the Prince says, speaking of the treaty of 1898:

Thanks to the obliging attitude of the British Government, I succeeded in giving the new treaty a form which fully coincided with our wishes and interests. All of Angola up to the 20th degree of longitude was assigned to us, so that we reached the Congo region from the south; besides this there were the valuable islands of San Thome and Principe. . . Furthermore we received the northern

part of Mozambique.

"The British Government," the Prince says again, "showed the greatest obligingness in behalf of our interests. Grey purposed proving to us his good will and also furthering our colonial development in general, as England hoped to divert German development of strength from the North Sea and from Europe to the ocean. 'We do not begrudge Germany her colonial development,' said a member of the Cabinet to me."

Of the Asiatic situation, and especially of the Bagdad Railway, the Prince has much to say, and the purpose of the two governments appears to have been to divide Asia Minor into two spheres of influence. The economic enterprises were adjusted essentially in accordance with the wishes of the German Bank, and the railroad itself was prolonged to Basra, so that Bagdad was no longer constituted the terminal point of the road. An international commission was to attend to the navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab. Germany was to have a part in the construction of the harbor at Basra, and obtain rights in the navigation of the Tigris.

The success of these negotiations and their consequences not merely to the contracting Powers, but to the world at large, are thus stated by the German negotiator:

Under this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia as far as Basra became our interest zone, without prejudice to more ancient British rights in the Tigris navigation and the Wilcox irrigation establishments. Furthermore, we received the whole territory of the Bagdad and Anatolian railroad.

The coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin railroad were considered as British economic territory, Syria as French, and Armenia as Russian. If both treaties had been concluded and published, an understanding would thereby have been reached with England which would 'forever have dispelled all doubts as to the possibility of an Anglo-German coöperation.

In connection with Prince Lichnowsky's Memorandum, the following three documents are to be considered.

The first is entitled "Terms of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1914," as corrected by Dr. Zimmermann, Under-Secretary at the outbreak of the war, and later Imperial German Secretary of State, and handed in 1916 to Mr. S. S. McClure. It is thus worded:

1. The Bagdad Railway from Constantinople to Basra is definitely left to German capital in coöperation with Turkey. In the territory of the Bagdad Railway German economical working will not be hindered by England.

2. Basra becomes a sea harbor in the building of which German capital is concerned with 60 per cent and English capital with 40 per cent. For the navigation from Basra to the Persian Gulf the independence of the open sea is agreed to.

3. Kuweit is excluded from the agreement between Germany and England. 4. In the navigation of the Tigris, English capital is interested with 50 per cent, German capital with 25 per cent, and Turkish with 25 per cent.

5. The oil-wells of the whole of Mesopotamia shall be developed by a British company, the capital of which shall be given at 50 per cent by England, at 25 per cent by the German Bank, at 25 per cent by the "Royal Dutch Company" (a company which is Dutch, but closely connected with England). For the irrigation works there had been intended a similar understanding. The rights of the AngloPersian Oil Company, in which, as is known, the English Government is concerned, remained unaffected. This society exercises south of Basra, on the Schatel-Arabia, as well as in all south and central Persia, a monopoly on the production and transport of oil.

6. A simultaneous German-French agreement leaves free hand to French capital for the construction of railways in southern Syria and Palestine.

Besides this, there is an agreement, already made before, between Germany and England, concerning Africa, with a repartition of their spheres of influence in Angola and Mozambique.

Finally there is to be mentioned the Morocco agreement, which established the political predominance of France in Morocco, but, on the other hand, stated the principle of "open door" to the trade of all nations.

The second is the dispatch of the Belgian Minister at Berlin to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated February 20, 1914, as officially published by the German Government in its collection of Belgian documents found in the Foreign Office at Brussels, upon the

1 Mr. S. S. McClure's Obstacles to Peace, 1917, pages 40-42.

occupation of that city by German troops.1 The material portion of this document, confirming Prince Lichnowsky's statements regarding the French agreement, is as follows:

The Franco-German agreement concerning Asia Minor, concluded very recently at Berlin after difficult negotiations and thanks to the personal intervention of the Chancellor, assures to France a large sphere of action and influence in Syria. She will be able to build a railway line starting from Beiroot along the valley of the Orontes, back of the Antilebanon as far as Aleppo, the point of junction with the German lines. Another French line, also starting from Beiroot, passing through Homs, will reach the Euphrates in the direction of the 35th parallel. M. Cambon showed me on the map these lines which are not yet known to the public. The coast of the Mediterranean between Alexandretta and Beiroot will be neutralized; no railway can be built there either by Germany, or by France, be it along the coast or across the Antilebanon. A line of this sort was not considered necessary. It would arouse the hostility of the fanatic tribes of the Antilebanon, who close their country to Europeans and carry the products of the soil, the chief one of which is tobacco, to the harbor of Latakia themselves. The difficulty of the negotiations consisted principally in the exact delimitation of the French and German zones of influence (60 kilometers on each side of the railway), so as to prevent them from overlapping. In addition to this, France retains the railway concessions which she obtained from Turkey in the rich mineral district of ancient Capadocia, along the Black Sea, and the very profitable railway of Smyrna and Cassaba.

The third document is entitled "The Baghdad Railway. Complete Anglo-German Agreement," and, as contained in the London Times for June 16, 1914, is as follows:

BERLIN, June 15. (Through Reuter's Agency.)

The Anglo-German Agreement regarding the Baghdad Railway and Mesopotamia has been initialed in London by Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador. A complete understanding has been reached on all questions at issue.

The agreement will not come into force until after the conclusion of the negotiations with Turkey, as on some material points the assent of the Porte will be necessary. The contents of the agreement can therefore not be divulged at present.

In another portion of the Memorandum the German Ambassador writes of the Serbian crisis that led to the war of 1914, and this section of his revelations is a damaging indictment of the policy which his country pursued. "On board the Meteor [the Kaiser's yacht], we

1 Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, February 20, 1914. - (Reports of the Belgian Representatives in Berlin, London and Paris to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Brussels, 1905-1914.) - Issued by the Imperial German Foreign Office, 1915, under the title "Belgian Diplomatists." No. 111, pages 131-132.