heard," he says, "of the death of the Archduke, the heir to the Austrian Throne. His Majesty expressed regret that his efforts to win the Archduke over to his ideas had thus been rendered vain." What these views were, the Ambassador evidently did not know.

Going to Berlin, he found von Bethmann-Hollweg, then Imperial Chancellor, much troubled at the outlook, and he complained of Russian armaments. The distrust and dislike of Russia appeared to pervade the Foreign Office. Dr. Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, stated that Russia was about to raise nine hundred thousand fresh troops, and "his words showed an unmistakable animosity against Russia, who, he said, was everywhere in our way."

The Prince refers to the Potsdam council on July 5, 1914, of which he was not informed at the time, and about which he contents himself with saying: "Subsequently I learned that at the decisive conversation at Potsdam on July 5 the inquiry addressed to us by Vienna found absolute assent among all the personages in authority; indeed, they added that there would be no harm if a war with Russia were to result." Apparently the die had been cast; Austria-Hungary was to take action against Serbia, and the attempt was to be made to localize the trouble. That is to say, the whole affair was to be looked upon as a bout between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, to which the European Powers might be spectators, but not participants. This is indicated. by the Prince, who says: "I then received instructions that I was to induce the English press to take up a friendly attitude if Austria gave the 'death-blow' to the Great Serbian movement, and as far as possible I was by my influence to prevent public opinion from opposing Austria."

The Prince believed that England could not be counted upon and he warned his government against the projected punitive expedition against the little country; indeed, he says that he gave a warning against the whole project, which he described as "adventurous and dangerous," and he advised that moderation be recommended to the Austrians because he did not believe in the localization of the conflict. To this warning Herr von Jagow is reported to have answered that Russia was not "ready," that there would doubtless be a certain amount of "bluster," but that the firmer Germany stood by Austria, "the more would Russia draw back." The Prince states that the then German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, had informed his government "that Russia would not move in any circumstance," and that these reports caused Germany to "stimulate" Austria-Hungary "to the greatest

possible energy." Sir Edward Grey's influence with Russia was the only hope of maintaining peace, and the Prince therefore begged him to urge moderation in Russia if Austria should demand satisfaction from Serbia. The Prince was not successful with the English press, which felt that exploitation of the assassination of the Austrian heir for political purposes could not be justified, and the English press urged moderation on Austria's part.

Upon the appearance of the ultimatum on July 24, giving Serbia twenty-four hours in which to accept the conditions, "the whole world," the Prince says, "except in Berlin and Vienna, understood that it meant war, and indeed world-war. The British fleet, which chanced to be assembled for a review, was not demobilized."

In order to prevent this catastrophe, the Prince apparently urged Sir Edward Grey to press for a conciliatory reply from Serbia, as the attitude of the Russian Government showed that the situation was very serious. Sir Edward Grey complied, and to quote the Prince's language, on the attitude of the British Government at this time, "the Serbian reply was in accordance with British efforts; M. Pashitch [the Serbian Premier] had actually accepted everything except two points, about which he declared his readiness to negotiate." The action of Sir Edward Grey and of Russia, which had already suggested modification, was indeed very important, so important that the Prince felt himself justified in saying: "If Russia and England wanted war, in order to fall upon us, a hint to Belgrade would have been sufficient, and the unheard-of note would have remained unanswered."

Sir Edward went over the Serbian reply with the German Ambassador, and they discussed Sir Edward's mediation proposal, "to arrange an interpretation of the two points acceptable to both parties." The French, the Italian, and the German Ambassadors were to have met under Sir Edward's presidency, and the whole difficulty could have been adjusted, the Prince saying, "It would have been easy to find an acceptable form for the disputed points which in the main concerned the participation of the Austrian officials in the investigation at Belgrade. Given good will, everything could have been settled in one or two sittings, and the mere acceptance of the British proposal would have relieved the tension and would have improved our relations to England." The Prince was so convinced of this that he urged it upon his government, saying that "otherwise a world-war was imminent, in which we had everything to lose and nothing to gain." The advice,

however, was rejected, as it was against the dignity of Austria, and Germany did not want to interfere in the Serbian affair which was the affair of its ally, and the Prince was directed to work for "localization of the conflict."

The Prince had no illusions as to the attitude of his government, or misgivings as to the result of Sir Edward's policy, for he says: "Of course it would only have needed a hint from Berlin to make Count Berchtold [Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs] satisfy himself with a diplomatic success and put up with the Serbian reply. But this hint was not given. On the contrary, we pressed for war."

Germany not only refused Sir Edward's proposal, but had none of its own to make. The impression, the Prince said, became stronger that his country desired war, and after calling attention to the Russian appeals and declarations of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Czar's humble telegrams, Sir Edward's repeated proposals, the warning of the Italian Foreign Minister, of the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, and his own urgent advice, the Prince concludes, "It was all of no use, for Berlin went on insisting that Serbia must be massacred."

"After that," the Prince says, "events moved rapidly. When Count Berchtold, who hitherto had played the strong man on instructions from Berlin, at last decided to change his course, we answered the Russian mobilization - after Russia had for a whole week negotiated and waited in vain — with our ultimatum and declaration of war."

With England's entry into the conflict the Prince's mission was at an end. "It was wrecked," he says, "not by the perfidy of the British, but by the perfidy of our policy."

Under the next section of the Memorandum the Prince has some reflections under the title of "Retrospect," written two years later, in which he ruefully comments that there was no place for him in a system which "tolerates only representatives who report what one wants to read," and he might have added in this connection what he says elsewhere, under a system which keeps an Ambassador uninformed of negotiations taking place elsewhere, and even has the counselor of the Embassy spy upon the Ambassador, report his conduct to the Foreign Office, and conduct negotiations behind his back.

After some observations that might be considered of a personal character, he says:

In spite of former aberrations, everything was still possible in July, 1914. Agreement with England had been reached. We should have had to send to Petersburg a representative who at any rate reached the average standard of political ability, and we should have had to give Russia the certainty that we desired neither to dominate the Straits nor to throttle the Serbs.

Germany, he insists, "needed neither alliances nor wars, but merely treaties which would protect us and others, and which would guarantee us an economic development for which there had been no precedent in history." The Prince even believes that his country could have taken up the question of the limitation of armaments, without needing to think of Austria, much less to follow whithersoever it cared to go, but, "I had to support in London a policy which I knew to be fallacious. I was punished for it, for it was a sin against the Holy Ghost."

There are passages from two sections which should be quoted in the Prince's own words, as the intervention of a third hand might convey the impression that they had been tampered with. They are the "Question of Guilt," and "The Enemy Point of View."

Under the first caption the Prince writes:

As appears from all official publications, without the facts being controverted by our own White Book, which, owing to its poverty and gaps, constitutes a grave self-accusation;

1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although no German interest was involved, and the danger of a world-war must have been known to us - whether we knew the text of the ultimatum is a question of complete indifference; 2. In the days between July 23 and July 30, 1914, when M. Sazonoff emphatically declared that Russia could not tolerate an attack upon Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole ultimatum, and although an agreement about the two points in question could easily have been reached, and Count Berchtold was even ready to satisfy himself with the Serbian reply;

3. On July 30, when Count Berchtold wanted to give way, we, without Austria having been attacked, replied to Russia's mere mobilization by sending an ultimatum to Petersburg, and on July 31 we declared war on the Russians, although the Tsar had pledged his word that as long as negotiations continued not a man should march so that we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a peaceful settlement. In view of these indisputable facts, it is not surprising that the whole civilized world outside Germany attributes to us the sole guilt for the world-war.

Under the second caption he says:

Is it not intelligible that our enemies declare that they will not rest until a system is destroyed which constitutes a permanent threatening of our neighbors? Must they not otherwise fear that in a few years they will again have to take up arms, and again see their provinces overrun and their towns and villages destroyed? Were

those people not right who declared that it was the spirit of Treitschke and Bernhardi which dominated the German people the spirit which glorifies war as an aim in itself and does not abhor it as an evil? Were those people not right who said that among us it is still the feudal knights and Junkers and the caste of warriors who rule and who fix our ideals and our values — not the civilian gentlemen? Were they not right who said that the love of duelling, which inspires our youth at the universities, lives on in those who guide the fortunes of the people? Had not the events at Zabern and the parliamentary debates on that case shown foreign countries how civil rights and freedoms are valued among us, when questions of military power are on the other side? . . .

That is what our enemies think, and that is what they are bound to think, when they see that, in spite of capitalistic industrialization, and in spite of socialistic organization, the living, as Friedrich Nietzsche says, are still governed by the dead. The principal war aim of our enemies, the democratization of Germany, will be achieved.

In the same issue of the London Times of March 28, 1918, from which this account of Lichnowsky's revelations have been summarized, there is a translation of a very interesting, and what the Times calls "astonishing memorandum" by one Dr. Wilhelm Mühlon, a Director of the Krupp Works at Essen at the time of the outbreak of the war, and for some time thereafter. Mühlon's memorandum figured in the debate in the Reichstag committee on March 16, and it is stated by the Times to have appeared in the Berliner Tageblatt, from which it is reproduced in translated form. It should be stated, before proceeding to the analysis of the memorandum, that Dr. Mühlon is now a resident of Switzerland. It is natural that this memorandum should be considered in connection with that of the late German Ambassador to Great Britain, as it confirms some of his statements and furnishes precious information hitherto withheld from the public, as it apparently was from the Imperial Ambassador at London. Dr. Mühlon records conversations which he had about the middle of July 1914, with Dr. Helfferich, then Director of the Deutsche Bank in Berlin, and later Vice-Chancellor of the Empire, and with Herr Krupp von Bohlen and Halbach, head of the Krupp firm, of which Dr. Mühlon was a Director.

The Krupp people were interested in some large transactions in Bulgaria and Turkey, and apparently Dr. Mühlon saw Helfferich in regard to them. The Deutsche Bank was evidently unwilling to meet Dr. Mühlon's advances. Dr. Helfferich stated the reasons in a peculiarly frank and interesting manner:

The political situation has become very menacing. The Deutsche Bank must in any case wait before entering into any further engagements abroad. The Aus