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The fifth deals with the knotty problem of “Claims Against the Nation” by foreigners, which has given so much trouble to Venezuela and to most of the other Latin American states, because of the effort of foreigners to hold the governments responsible for losses occasioned not only by the public authorities, for which liability is conceded, but also for losses caused by armed rebellion and other acts of violence which the officials were unable to prevent, and for which, he contends, they can not properly be held responsible. For such losses, he says, foreigners, as well as nationals, ought to depend on the courts, and not appeal to the diplomatic agents of the countries of their origin. The sixth chapter, on “Nationality," tells the various ways in which nationality in Venezuela may be acquired, - by naturalization, by marriage, by birth in Venezuela, the parents being foreign, and by the naturalization of parents. "International Penal Law” is the subject of the seventh chapter. It is a study of crimes committed outside of the territorial limits but punishable in Venezuela. The extradition of criminals is included under this head. Chapter eight, “Foreign Ships,” studies the status, rights, privileges, and duties of foreign vessels, merchant and naval, in Venezuelan ports. The ninth, and last, chapter defines the “Immunities and Privileges of Foreign Diplomatic and Consular Agents.”
For a book on a highly technical subject the style is pleasing. There seem to be needless repetitions of the same ideas, with only slightly changed constructions and relations. Many of these, however, occur in quotations; and others doubtless are a result of the operation of the legal mind in its effort to heap up arguments, precedents, and opinions to support its contentions. The book will undoubtedly be very useful to foreigners in Venezuela and also to many who are not and never will be in the country but who may have commercial relations with or merely an intellectual interest in that republic.
WILLIAM R. MANNING.
Teoria Crítica de las Bases del Derecho Internacional Privado. Ву
Señor Doctor Don Orangel Rodriguez. Caracas: 1917. pp. x + 466.
This work is divided into three books. The first treats of what private international law is comprised. It contains an interesting discussion of the first cause of private international law and a com
parison between public and private international law. It also discusses the considerations which Lorimer makes in the classification of international law, and the opinion of Surville on the differences between public and private international law. The author then cites concrete cases in application of what he has stated, among which are the case of the Orinoco Steamship Company, Ltd., between the United States and Venezuela, one of the claims between Mexico and Venezuela, and the Rudloff case.
The first chapter of his first book deals with fundamental notions. He states that while man is generally subject to the laws of his native country, he often resides or is domiciled in another state, or travels beyond the jurisdiction of the laws of his own state, and comes under foreign control. He points out that public international law, equally with private international law, has for the reason of its existence the change of abode and of relations between men of different states, which supposes relations of a public character as much as those of a private character. The first is found in relations of general interest between the states, while the second is supported in the relations which are of private interest, or which include that interest.
The author shows that it is not disputable that relations strictly civil enter in the sphere of private international law. But the same does not happen with reference to mercantile relations. It can be pretended that commercial law is of a different nature from civil law. He states consequently the affinity between public international and private international law, which is constituted by the circumstance that both suppose relations between states and is to be understood solely in the limited form that the principles of the first determine the original foundation of the extra-territoriality applications which serve as the object for the second.
The second book treats of the sources of private international law and the connection between jurisprudence, customs and treaties. The conflicts of jurisprudence and of treaties are given considerable thought. To find the fountain of international private law various origins have been proposed, such as custom, jurisprudence, international treaties, and the doctrines of jurisconsults. The author believes that states ought not to legislate over foreign rights.
In his third book the author discusses the judicial reasons for the extra-territoriality of laws, the absolute sovereignty of nations, and the theory of strict law. He states that extra-territoriality of laws
is due above all to international convention. He shows that, according to Savigny, a system of universal justice is considered as the foundation of the extra-territoriality of laws, but that his theory lacks scientific value. His conclusion is that extra-territoriality is not founded on the principles of justice.
This work shows a large amount of study and research. The standing of the distinguished writer justifies its careful study in order that those who are interested in international law may profit by the views he offers and by the examples he sets forth. The book is among the notable contributions of South American internationalists during the past year.
WALTER S. PENFIELD.
Éléments d'Introduction générale à l'Étude des Sciences juridiques. I:
La Définition du Droit. By Henri Lévy-Ullmann. Paris:
The remark of Kant that jurists still are attempting to discover an acceptable definition of law is as true today as it was when the Critique of Pure Reason was first printed. There are only a handful of sciences which can successfully construct definitions — mathematics, pure mechanics, logic. The rest, which do not deal with an arbitrary subject-matter, never arrive at more than provisional, utilitarian, and hypothetical definitions. Would it not be more useful if the effort had been made, not to attempt another hypothetical definition to be added to an already considerable list of ventures in this direction, but to investigate the bases of legal definitions, the considerations which may or do enter into the construction of such definitions? No thoroughgoing effort of this kind seems to be recorded. That at least would be a novelty, which the search for a definition of law is not. Among such considerations (some of which are discussed by the author in a criticism of previous definitions) are the various metaphysical and practical points of view, the genetic, historical, comparative, and dogmatic approaches, causal and teleological methods, sources, forms of expression, forms of application, sustaining factors, etc.
There are two general types of definitions, the material (of which the sociological definitions are examples, e.g., Jhering, Duguit) and the formal (of which the author notes the definition of Zachariæ as an example). The author takes a middle ground by departing from the method of Jhering to arrive at a new formal method. Juridical
definition, says the author, has a double task, that of precision or the disengaging from the idea to be defined of the specific characteristics which distinguish it from other notions of the same kind, and that of evocation, which exhibits its relations. His provisional formula of precision is that “law is the delimitation of what may be done or may not be done without incurring [the risk of] a judgment, attachment, or a special use of force.” With the aid of evocation, his definition reads: "law is the delimitation of what man and human groups have the liberty of doing or not doing without incurring [the risk of ] a judgment, an attachment, or a special use of force."
The author has consciously made a definition broad enough to transpose international practice from the field of morals or deportment to the realm of law.
The Grotius Society. Problems of the War. Papers Read before the
Society in the Year 1916. London: Sweet and Maxwell, Limited. 1917. pp. xxv + 178. 6 s. net.
This volume contains an introduction by Professor H. Goudy, Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford, Vice President of the Grotius Society (founded in 1915), and the following papers: “The Treatment of Enemy Aliens,” by Sir Ernest Satow, “The Appam,” by Hugh H. L. Bellot, “The Principles Underlying the Doctrine of Contraband and Blockade,” by J. E. G. de Montmorency, “War Crimes: Their Prevention and Punishment," by Hugh H. L. Bellot, "The Nationality and Domicil of Trading Corporations,” by Ernest J. Schuster, “Neutrals and Belligerents in Territorial Waters,” by Sanford D. Cole, “De la Belligerance dans ses Rapports avec la Violation de la Neutralité," by Professor Ch. de Visscher, “The Effect of the War on International Law,” by Rev. T. J. Lawrence, “International Leagues,” by W. R. Bisschop, “The Enforcement of the Hague Conventions," by W. Evans Darby, “The Treatment of Civilians in Occupied Territories,” by Sir Alfred Hopkins, “War Treason,” by Professor J. H. Morgan, “Destruction of Merchantmen by a Belligerent," by Sir Walter G. F. Phillimore, Bart.
It is impossible to summarize the papers here presented, but suffice it to say that they are practical discussions of questions relating immediately to the war, in which there is interwoven historical matter of technical value relating to the origin and progress of the legal doc
trines considered. Although the writers represent an avowedly British society, their viewpoint is international. Their moral tone is severe, as is evidenced by their condemnation of Germany's extension of the law of military necessity, but it is high, and while there is justification of reprisals, there is no vengeful insistence upon retaliation. Throughout the volume there is manifested a desire for reform that will appeal to men of good heart everywhere, although they may not accede to all the suggestions offered. At the end of some of the papers is a questionnaire as to points raised in the text which encourages the reader to investigate them for himself. Of speculation as to reorganization for permanent peace after the war, in which Americans are apt to be especially interested, there is very little, but there is a realization of the difficulties in the way, which we often overlook, and a critical analysis of the plan of the League to Enforce Peace.
Looking forward to improvements in the laws of war and neutrality, Dr. de Montmorency favors putting upon neutrals the burden of restraining their citizens in the export of munitions rather than imposing it upon belligerents. In his opinion their enforcement of the law of contraband is but a form of self-help, which is a crude stage of the law; and he believes that if, in 1793, the United States had forbidden traffic in duly notified lists of contraband and put a ban on running cargoes through adequately blockaded areas, instead of justifying trade in arms, this country would have conferred a lasting benefit on mankind. Mr. Cole, following a tendency in the other writers to exalt international public opinion above force as a sanction, proposes that laws regulating the rights and obligations of belligerents in neutral territorial waters should not be referred as formerly to the physical force that one nation, the offended neutral, can exercise, but should be based on the sanction of the general opinion of civilized people, in whose interest international law should be made. He proposes strengthening the position of neutrals and restricting the facilities allowed to belligerents. Voicing the popular demand for the punishment of war crimes, Dr. Bellot suggests that during the war the Allies should notify the Central Empires that not only the authors and instigators of outrages upon humanity, but also the actual perpetrators of all violations of the laws and usages of war, whether the offenders are acting under orders or not, will be held as war criminals. He proposes an after-the-war conference of the Powers for the revision of the rules of war in the light of present experience, and suggests