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the Empire. This provided that if any party to such an arbitration did not accept the decision as final, it might appeal to a standing Imperial Chamber of Justice (Reichskammergericht), composed of seventeen judges, proceeding according to the principles of the Roman law; but that the judgments of the Chamber were only to be executed as and when an Imperial Council (Reichsregiment) might determine. A few years later this function was confided to “circles" of neighboring states, and the Imperial Council soon gave way to the Aulic Council, a mere mouthpiece of the Emperor.
Hamilton, in the Federalist (No. LXXX), in urging the necessity of securing the peace of the United States by a judicial determination of controversies between the States of the Union, spoke of the institution of this Imperial Chamber of Justice, in 1495, as a wise and successful measure.
Under any such plan (whether a previous resort to arbitration should be required, or not) the body which was to speak first as a regular court of justice would naturally be composed of jurists and publicists, for their office would be to settle rights. The other body would be largely concerned with functions of policy and expediency. It might be of opinion that the case was governed by the principle, Summum jus, summa injuria, and so refuse to issue an execution. It might believe the judgment to be right on all points and yet decline to take any action. A council with authority to act in such a manner would be mainly executive in character. Its members, therefore, would naturally be men of affairs rather than of books.
There are those who would exclude from a share in framing a world tribunal for promoting permanent peace any state which is in a marked degree inferior to most of the other Powers as respects the education and general cultivation of its people. Such a test is one difficult to apply and invidious in its nature. It might result in a discrimination that would bar out Powers of large population and extensive trade, though they have political leaders of the highest rank for learning, wisdom, and character. A body to promote the peace of the world can not safely be founded on principles of inequality and exclusion.
SIMEON E. BALDWIN. 3 Robertson, History of Charles V, I, 359; Hallam, Middle Ages, 306; Snow, Report of the Am. Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes for 1916, 47.
THE NEUTRALITY OF SWITZERLAND
GENEVA, THE PAYS DE GEX, AND HAUTE-SAVOIE The conception of a permanent neutrality for Switzerland sharply differentiates itself from the various phases of neutralization created chiefly after the Congress of Vienna in Europe and elsewhere in the important respect that in the case of Switzerland the Powers did no more than attempt to crystallize in diplomatic and lasting form a political condition which had, as we have heretofore seen, characterized the country during nearly three centuries. The Powers, consequently, merely recognized an existing status and one deemed essential as well to the peace of Europe as to the welfare of Switzerland itself. But at Vienna it was clearly seen that recognition would prove valueless were it not supported by an international guarantee, and one, moreover, which would not only necessarily take the shape of an international protection of Switzerland against outside aggression, but also conserve a unitary and harmonious federal administration within the Swiss boundaries. We are not surprised, accordingly, to find the conception of such a guarantee appearing in the various diplomatic documents heretofore noted which create or attest Swiss neutrality, as in the Treaty of Lunéville, February 9, 1801, and the identical treaties concluded at Paris, May 30, 1814, known as the First Peace of Paris (noted in Part I of this series, April, 1918, JOURNAL, p. 241, at p. 246), in which Swiss independence and self-government are expressly recognized: “La Suisse, indépendante, continuera de se gouverner par elle-même." (Art. VI)
Before the Vienna Congress, then, there lay the problem of not merely declaring the fact of Swiss neutrality, independence, and selfgovernment, but of providing, further, such practical means as lay within the power of the envoys toward assuring a lasting maintenance
in the new Swiss commonwealth of these international and constitutional safeguards.
If we glance at a map of Switzerland and its borders as they existed in 1814, we shall find that the results of Napoleonic conquest as well as previously existing territorial alignments had combined to withhold an adequate military frontier from any union which the existing Cantons could reasonably expect to form. Along the northwestern fringes of the country an extensive territory, formerly in the possession of the Prince-Bishop of Basel-Pruntrut and comprising, in the long ranges of the Jura highlands, a series of natural defenses of great strength, had been annexed to France, while along the southeasterly Swiss border the deep valley of the Rhone (Valais) with its lofty Alpine walls had been seized also and placed within French jurisdiction as the Department of Simplon; similarly the geographically detached city of Geneva, an ally of Bern and Freiburg, and so of the Swiss federal system, had been taken over as well as the neighboring province of Savoy, now separated from Sardinian jurisdiction to form a province of Napoleon's Alpine possessions, and divided into the new departments of Léman and Mont Blanc, which roughly corresponded to the former HauteSavoie and Savoie (Sabaudia).
Thus Switzerland's natural mountain defenses had been practically taken from her. Geneva, too, even if restored by the Allies to its former territorial condition, lay quite apart from actual contact with the true Swiss borders, since the city controlled but a tiny area of land in its immediate vicinity, the balance of the Canton being scattered on either side of the lake and to the south of the city itself in a series of exclaves, five in number, with which communication could be had only over French or Savoyard country. Accordingly, while the Committee of the Allies on Swiss affairs at Vienna determined upon the restoration of Savoy to its rightful sovereign, the King of Sardinia, they also admitted the necessity of obtaining from both Sardinia and France such territorial concessions as would convert the practically dismembered Canton of Geneva into a unified territory, and secure also direct communication between Geneva and the rest of Switzerland on the northerly side of the lake by bringing the Genevan frontier up to the borders of Canton Vaud a few miles to the northwest of the
city, from which it was effectually separated by the ancient French district of Gex. Such a scheme, nevertheless, would still leave the eastern and southern borders of Canton Geneva in Sardinian possession, while the Rhone valley, or Canton Valais, would be separated from the southwest extremity of the new proposed Swiss federal system by the Sardinian provinces of Chablais and Faucigny.
These territorial conditions carried with them the menace, too, of economic disaster to Geneva, which largely depended for food supplies on France and Savoy. Thus it was that in a notable interview granted by the Emperor Alexander of Russia to the Genevan envoys De Rochemont and D'Invernois, October 23, 1814, De Rochemont said to the Emperor that without a territorial addition on the west, Geneva must remain at the mercy of France with respect to the obtaining of supplies from the rest of Switzerland as well as from France itself. Remedial territorial concessions, it appeared, had been in fact admitted by all the Powers save France at the first Congress of Paris in May, 1814, but Talleyrand's opposition proved fatal. De Rochemont, indeed, candidly avowed his belief that the Allies should also obtain for Geneva the entire Savoy territory south and east of the city, and comprising the districts of Faucigny and Chablais with part of Genevois, since the magnificent Simplon road as then lately reconstructed and extended by Napoleon afforded an open route from the French frontiers south of Geneva along the southerly side of the lake and over the high Alps of Canton Valais to Italy, thus offering a military highway likely to prove formidable to Swiss interests. A similar though less important yet splendid road ran along the northerly side of the lake from Geneva connecting French territory with northwestern Switzerland, and known as the Route de Versoix, taking its name from the little town of Versoix lying on the lake a short distance above Geneva and notable as having been fixed upon by De Choiseul under the ancien régime as a point which might readily be developed in importance and made a successful rival of Geneva, – a plan openly encouraged by Voltaire, whose home at Ferney lay but a few miles away.
While at the First Peace of Paris, as has been stated, Geneva failed to secure the actual cession of any French territory, it did obtain, in Article IV of the identical treaty between Austria and France, signed
on May 30, 1814, the right to use in common with France this Versoix roadway. And a year later at Vienna, in a declaration touching Swiss affairs, signed by the Powers March 20, 1815, Geneva secured (in Article V) an agreement on the part of France to place its customs line on the west of the Versoix highway so that the road itself would now become practically a free means of intercommunication between Geneva and Switzerland. A few days later, on March 29th, the Sardinian envoy, Saint-Marsan, signed a protocol agreeing to the désenclavement of some of the separated Genevan districts (exclaves) which had been effectually locked up within Savoyard territory; the intervening Savoy country was to be assigned to Geneva, together with a freedom of transit over the Simplon road similar in character to that granted by France over the Route de Versoix. Furthermore the far-outlying Genevan exclave of Jussy to the northeast in Haute-Savoie was granted free route-communication with Geneva, as was Peney on the northwest. The final cession of the territory separating Geneva from Jussy was accomplished in Article I of the treaty between Sardinia and Switzerland, signed at Turin, March 16, 1816, and which, taken together with the procès-verbal de limites executed on June 15th following, carefully marks out the new Swiss-Savoyard boundaries.
The free right of passage on both the northerly and southerly sides of the lake, together with the neutralization of those portions of Savoy which adjoin Geneva on the south and east, appeared to be all that could be reasonably hoped for from the Congress of Vienna, whose slowly-moving proceedings are accurately reflected in the but recently published journal of Jean-Gabriel Eynard, who accompanied his uncle, De Rochement, as private secretary and whose picture of Swiss efforts at the Congress is the best that we have. Eynard, who was at this time in his thirty-ninth year and who lived until 1863, was one of Geneva's foremost citizens. His memory is preserved in the fine building known as l'Athénée near the Botanic Gardens.
The event, however, proved more favorable to Geneva and Switzerland, for not only was a free right of passage ultimately secured along the Versoix and Simplon highways, but at the Second Congress of Paris, November 20, 1815, when Victor Emmanuel recovered the balance of his ancestral territory, France was further compelled to