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be within the territory of the other state, are void, unless confirmed by the latter state; and such confirmation can not affect the titles of the same lands previously granted by the latter state itself.” Numerous cases of a similar nature, which it seems hardly necessary to cite, may be found in the books, all deciding that the receiving state is under no obligation to recognize grants made by the ceding state which were void at their inception.

Perhaps the most interesting group of these cases are grants made flagrante bello. Where the whole or a portion of a state declares its independence, grants made within that state during the ensuing war of independence by the sovereign state which fails will be considered by the other as void. In Harcourt v. Gaillard, 12 Wheaton 523, the United States Supreme Court refused to regard as valid a grant to American land made by the British governor of Florida after the declaration of American independence. In much quoted language the court there lays it down that “War is a suit prosecuted by the sword: and where the question to be decided is one of original claim to territory, grants of soil made flagrante bello by the party that fails, can only derive validity from treaty stipulations." The rule of Harcourt o. Gaillard, however, is only applicable in a war in which two states are disputing the title to a given territory, and each claiming it legally as its own. “Where the title of the sovereign in possession is admitted, and the war is waged to compel him to cede his title or relinquish it, the rule is different, and such sovereign may convey his property during the war so long as he prevents his adversary from securing possession thereof, and the conveyance is made in good faith and not for the purpose of preventing his adversary from securing said property."

2 In the Treaty of Peace of 1783 Great Britain did not grant to the United States its independence, but recognized as valid the Declaration of Independence of 1776, and the consequent sovereignty of the American States as dating from that event. A situation such as this has a very different effect upon the validity of land titles granted during the war from cases where by the treaty of peace the ceding state grants or cedes the territory in question to the receiving state. A case of the latter kind occurred in 1898, when Spain by the definitive treaty of peace with the United States ceded to the latter the Philippine Islands. Here, although Spain failed to win the war, up to the time of the signing of the peace treaty grants of land in the Philippine Islands made by the proper Spanish authorities where no fraud appeared, would be prima facie valid, and those made by the United States

VII. CONCLUSION

It will be evident from the foregoing discussion that the courts of the United States have worked out a fairly consistent body of law concerning the effect of change of sovereignty upon the private ownership of land. There can be no question that United States courts will not allow a mere cession of territory to the United States to injure or abrogate vested rights of land ownership, legal or equitable, held by individuals at the time of cession. It is equally clear that United States courts will feel free to disregard mere expectant rights which could not have been enforced as of right in the courts of the ceding state. Grants which were unenforceable before cession either because of unperformed conditions, or because of the indefiniteness of the grant, or because of the want of power in the granting officer or imperfection in the grant itself, will clearly not be upheld by United States courts.

This body of law seems so reasonable and so equitable that it is gratifying to note that the principles upon which it is founded are not confined to this side of the Atlantic. In England the courts have repeatedly quoted the Percheman case and approved the rule of law which it expresses. The rule is cited with approval by Calvo, and seems to be generally accepted as a correct rule of international law.27

occupying forces would be prima facie void. The military occupant is deemed to acquire only a usufruct” in immovables owned by the invaded state, and should safeguard the capital and administer such property“ in accordance with the rules of usufruct.” See 1907 Hague Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Regulation No. 55.

37 Calvo in his Droit International (5th ed.), Vol. 4, p. 399, secs. 2478, 2479 says: “La conquête, nous l'avons déjà démontré, change les droits politiques des habitants du territoire et transfère au nouveau souverain la propriété du domaine public de son cédant.

“Il n'en est pas de même de la propriété privée, qui demeure incommutable entre les mains de ses légitimes possesseurs. Ce serait violer un usage qui a acquis force de lois entre les nations modernes,' dit le juge Marshall à propos de la translation d'un pays d'une souveraineté à une autre, ce serait outrager ce sentiment de justice et de droit reconnu par tous les peuples civilisés que d'ériger en règle générale la confiscation de la propriété privée et d'annuler les droits particuliers. Le sol voit se rompre et changer les liens qui l'unissaient à l'ancien souverain; mais les relations mutuelles des citoyens et leurs droits de propriété subsistent intacts.'

“Ce principe de droit international et de haute équité a été sanctionné par tous

6

In France it is similarly approved.28 The German law is built upon the same general principle.29 It is likewise found in the Italian

les tribunaux qui ont été appelés à en faire l'application. C'est qu'en effet la base en est essentiellement rationelle et logique. La conquête définitive du territoire met fin à la situation créée par la guerre pour y substituer les relations de paix et de bonne harmonie; et dès que l'administration militaire a achevé son rôle, l'autorité et le gouvernement civil reprennent le premier rang pour faire prévaloir de nouveau les règles du droit commun. Où l'État puiserait-il donc le pouvoir de confisquer la propriété de ses nouveaux sujets, que le fait d'avoir été des ennemis ne peut rendre indéfiniment punissables? Le conquérant n'a pas seulement le devoir strict de respecter les droits acquis; il est encore moralement tenu de chercher par tous les moyens en son pouvoir à en garantir le maintien et à en améliorer ou à en faciliter l'exercice.

“Le jurisconsulte américain Marshall, en traitant cette question spéciale, fait remarquer avec raison que par le mot propriété privée il faut entendre une possession reposant sur un titre entouré de toutes les garanties légales, complètement valide; sanctionnant des droits acquis et des obligations ayant force de loi."

28 Gidel, in his Des Effets de l'annexion sur les concessions, page 90, says: “La jurisprudence américaine, qui a consacré ce principe de l'inviolabilité de la propriété privée dans une foule de décisions, s'est distinguée par la manière particulièrement large dont elle l'a entendu. 'Ce serait violer un usage qui a acquis force de loi entre les nations modernes, dit le juge Marshall en des termes qui se trouvent reproduits dans tous les arrêts ultérieurs de la Cour suprême des États-Unis relatifs à la matière, ce serait outrager ce sentiment de justice et d'équité reconnu par tous les peuples civilisés que d'ériger en règle générale la confiscation de la propriété privée et d'annuler les droits des particuliers. L'allégeance des sujets se trouve modifiée: leurs rapports avec leur ancien Souverain se trouvent rompus; mais les relations respectives des citoyens entre eux et leurs droits de propriété subsistent intacts.' Telle fut la doctrine appliquée sans interruption par la Cour suprême à propos des annexions de la Louisiane, de la Floride, de la Californie, du Texas, c'està-dire au moment du grand développement territorial de la République américaine. ... Les obligations dérivant de la seule équité devaient être protégées par le droit international autant que celles que dérivaient de titres strictement légaux. ... La Cour de cassation française a, elle aussi, entendu dans un sens très libéral l'application de ce principe de l'inviolabilité de la propriété privée. Elle n'a pas sanctionné seulement les droits de propriété naissant au profit de particuliers de contrats passés entre eux. Elle a formellement reconnu et protégé les droits acquis par des individus sur le domaine public de l'État annexé. Mais les aliénations antérieures à l'annexion, que le Souverain avait le droit de consentir sous la loi alors en vigueur, doivent être respectées après l'annexion. Et les tribunaux doivent respecter les droits acquis sur ce domaine par les particuliers avant l'annexion.” See also an article by Pierre Descamps in 15 R. G. D. I. P., 385, where the above passages are cited and commented upon.

29 The law of Germany is set forth by Huber in his excellent treatise on Staatensuccession: "Ist es unbestritten dass die subjektiven Privatrechte, soweit sie wohler

law.30 It seems fair to assume, therefore, that the general principles underlying the decisions of the United States land cases are not of purely local extent, but are principles of international recognition and validity.

FRANCIS B. SAYRE.

worbene Rechte sind, von dem Wechsel der Staatsgewalt nicht betroffen werden" (p. 57). See also references there cited.

30 See Fiore, Droit International (transl. by Antoine), p. 150, sec. 154: “L'État cessionnaire sera tenu de respecter les droits acquis par les particuliers relativement au territoire cédé et aussi les droits acquis par les fonctionnaires publics en vertu de l'exercice de leurs fonctions sur le territoire cédé.

Cette règle est applicable aux droits qui peuvent être considérés comme acquis d'après les principes du droit commun, mais non aux expectatives, ni aux actes de jouissance basés sur l'abus ou sur le consentement implicite de l'État cédant.”

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE PROBLEM OF A

SOCIETY OF NATIONS

A THOUSAND peace proposals doubtless could be accounted for in the last five hundred years. Some of them for one reason or another are famous. Dubois, Crucé, Podebrad, Henry IV, Rousseau, Kant, Bentham, Penn, Ladd, are names in this connection quickly recalled to memory.

Now why did all these proposals fail to be heeded by war-weary humanity? Two reasons may be given: first, for the most part they were paper proposals; there was not sufficient driving power behind them; they were written out, the ink dried, and the task was done. No more can a peace proposal organize itself on paper than can a corporation manufacture steel billets with a red-ribboned charter. There must be responsible and powerful initiative, and this initiative must come from a state. Of course, every paper proposal helps to fertilize the ground against the time when nature in its blind way is ready with a favorable wind to implant the germinal substance of a harvest, be it only of thistles or ragweed.

A romantic view of life has it that law grows, that it can not be created. Another similarly romantic allied notion is that man is a product of the earth like a plant. We would not deny the element of truth in these views which flourish or have flourished in the shadow of great names. But is not there something of one-sidedness in this; is not there some exaggeration? Does not destiny hold out some encouragement in the achievement of metaphysical purpose, of final ends, to the use of man's creative intelligence as a part of the process? It is fortunate for these reflections that on this philosophical joustingground, the beliefs, the practices, habits, and experiences of most men are often

or seem to be - favorable to effort. A second reason why these proposals have failed is that they were all clearly impossible, as unreal as ghosts for the man of sound nerves.

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