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neutrality decrees, or declaring war.129 In a message to Congress of May 22, 1917, the President of Brazil stated:
Today, in consideration of the fact that the United States is an integral part of the American Union; in consideration, also, of the traditional policy of Brazil, which has always been governed by a complete unity of view with the United States; and, finally, in consideration of the sympathies of a great majority of the Brazilian nation, the administration invited Congress to revoke the decree of neutrality.186
Coöperation of the states of the Western Hemisphere to protect their independence and system of government seems to have proved a necessary development of the Monroe Doctrine. If this is true, general international coöperation "to make the world safe for democracy” is not a departure from past policies so much as an enlargement justified by new technical conditions of commerce and communication. Nor would such an enlargement necessarily imply an abandonment of the territorial propinquity phase of the doctrine. An individual under ordinary circumstances is more concerned with his family than with his nation, and with his nation than with humanity; so a state may be expected to take a more intense interest in the integrity of neighboring states than in those of a remote quarter of the globe. The United States will probably continue, under ordinary circumstances, to be more interested in Canada, Cuba and the Caribbean than in Chile, and in Pan America than beyond the seas; but without implying an absence of responsibility for the larger order.
A review of the foregoing pronouncements shows that territorial propinquity has furnished a legal justification for the acquisition of territory, but only in regions unoccupied or occupied only by savages. Geographical position has been given some recognition as a justification for special economic privileges, which, however, have been fre
129 Naval War College, International Law Documents, 1917, pp. 60, 65, 77, 197, 198, 249; American Year Book, 1917, p. 50 et seq.
130 Message, President of Brazil, May 22, 1917. This recommendation was acted upon, May 29, 1917, and followed by a declaration of war, October 27, 1917; American Year Book, 1917, p. 53.
quently a prelude to political incorporation. Propinquity to the enemy has been referred to by belligerents as a justification for subjecting neutrals to special economic restrictions; and the proximity of disorder to their frontiers has been often cited by states as a justification for the exercise of jurisdiction in foreign territory, but this justification has usually been accepted only where the case is covered by a special convention, where there is an instant and overwhelming necessity of defense, or where there is a marked difference in the civilization of the two states. As a doctrine applicable between states of equal standing, territorial propinquity would seem to be recognized only as a justification for special interests of mutual protection and coöperation.
The scope of the most recent illustration of the doctrine of territorial propinquity must await for the verdict of history. Does the Lansing-Ishii agreement give Japan a free hand to expand territorially in China? Her delay in fulfilling the promise to return Kiau Chau seems to raise that presumption.131 Does it permit her to gain a privileged economic situation in that country? Her position in Manchuria suggests that interpretation.182 Does it concede her the right to enjoy certain jurisdictional rights in China? Such might be inferred from some of the demands presented to that country in 1915 and 1916.133
Yet the notes themselves 134 specifically provide against any impairment of the "territorial sovereignty of China" and the principle of the “open door,” or “the acquisition by any government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of
131 American Year Book, 1914, p. 99. See also Chinese supplementary proposal to Group I, of the demands of January 18, 1915, ibid., 110.
182 Groups II and III of demands of January 18, 1915, American Year Book, 1915, p. 111.
133 Group V of demands of January 18, 1915, American Year Book, 1915, p. 112. Resulting agreement, May 25, 1915, this JOURNAL, Supp. 10: 5. See, also, eight demands made after the Cheng Chia Tun incident, September 2, 1916, this JOURNAL, Supp., 11: 113; American Year Book, 1916, p. 100.
184 This JOURNAL, Supp. 12: 1; World Court Magazine, 3: 594 (Dec. 1917); American Year Book, 1917, p. 61.
any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.”
Secretary Lansing interprets the agreement as 185 "openly proclaiming that the policy of Japan is not one of aggression, and by declaring that there is no intention to take advantage commercially or industrially of the special relations to China created by geographical position.” And shortly prior to the conclusion of the agreement, Viscount Ishii spoke of the Japanese policy as follows:
There is this fundamental difference between the Monroe Doctrine of the United States as to Central and South America and the enunciation of Japan's attitude toward China. In the first there is on the part of the United States no engagement or promise, while in the other Japan voluntarily announces that Japan will herself engage not to violate the political or territorial integrity of her neighbor, and to observe the principle of the open door and equal opportunity, asking at the same time other nations to respect these principles.136
From the words of the notes and the expressions used in connection with them, it may be inferred that protection of China from interference by foreign states is the only special interest Japan has in China. The doctrine would then be not unlike the Monroe Doctrine in its simplest form. If this is its true intent, it is to be hoped that, as in recent interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine, coöperation will be recognized as an essential feature of the doctrine and that in the determination of action to be taken under it, China will have an equal voice.
135 This JOURNAL, 12: 154; World Court Magazine, 3: 595.
136 The Imperial Japanese Mission, 1917, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Intercourse and Education, Publication No. 15, Washington, 1918, pp. 103-104. World Court Magazine, 3: 520 (November, 1917). The Chinese attitude toward the agreement is indicated by the declaration of the Chinese Legation in the United States, November 12, 1917, immediately after publication of the exchange of notes: “The Chinese Government will not allow herself to be bound by any agreement entered into by other nations." This JOURNAL, Supp., 12: 3; World Court Magazine, 3: 599 (December, 1917).
THE HELLENIC CRISIS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
PART IV 1
HAVING examined the question of the casus foederis of the Treaty of Alliance between Greece and Serbia, we shall now inquire whether the use of Greek territory by the Entente Powers for the purpose of carrying on military and naval operations against their enemies and the other forcible measures resorted to against Greece were justified either by reason of rights resulting from treaties, or on account of unneutral acts or omissions of the Government of Constantine.
Before discussing the points at issue, it will be necessary to summarize seriatim the facts connected with each.
It should be remembered that from the very beginning of the present war the Entente Powers have utilized the territorial waters of some islands in the Ægean Sea which were either under the military occupation of Greece or form part of her territory, and which the Allies subsequently occupied in order to further their military enterprises against Turkey. Thus, during the autumn of the year 1914, shortly after the entrance (November 5th) of the latter Power into the war as an ally of Germany and Austria, the fleets of the Entente Powers utilized the harbors and territory of some of the islands in the vicinity of the Straits of the Dardanelles as bases for their naval and, subsequently, military operations. The islands thus used for the prosecution of the war were Tenedos, Imbros, and Lemnos, and particularly the latter, on account of its convenient and safe harbor.
The two former islands were not then under the sovereignty of Greece, but were under Greek military occupation as a result of the first Balkan War, while the latter, namely, Lemnos, was incorporated
1 Continued from previous issues as follows: January and April, 1917, and April, 1918.
into the Hellenic Kingdom by the diplomatic arrangements of the six great Powers at the London Conference of 1913. In fact, these European Powers, after having previously obtained the consent of Turkey as to the disposition of this and other islands of the Ægean Sea, had decided that Lemnos should pass from the Turkish sovereignty to that of Greece, while Tenedos and Imbros and another small island called Castellorizo, situated on the southern coast of Asia Minor, should continue under the dominion of the Ottoman Porte.la These dispositions were purely and simply the application of the principle of nationalities. Greece, on its side, relinquished its right of sovereignty over the islet of Sasson (Sasseno) — a former dependency of the Ionian Islands situated in the Gulf of Avlona - in favor of the so-called state of Albania, but practically in favor of Italy.
The question, therefore, may be asked, by what right the Entente Powers utilized these islands and treated them, so to speak, as res nullius?
In a semi-official communication issued at the time by the British Government, it was stated that the Allies had the right to occupy Tenedos and Imbros because these islands — although under the military occupation of Greece – continued to be part of the insular possessions of Turkey, and that further they had also the same right in regard to Lemnos, because, as they alleged, the Sultan had not ratified the decision of the London Conference of 1913.2 Neither of the two arguments can stand a legal test, inasmuch as, in the first place, the invasion or taking possession of territory under the military occupation of a friendly and neutral power is no less a breach of neutrality than applying the same measure to territory under the sovereignty of such a neutral state. The same reasons apply with more force to the second argument. An impartial observer could not absolve the Allied Powers from a breach of Greek neutrality were it not for the fact that the then Greek Cabinet, presided over by Mr. Venizelos, tacitly acquiesced in these actions, because it was contemplating to
12 See text of collective notes of February 14 and 15, 1914, to Greece and Turkey in Le Temps, February 15 and 16, 1914.
London Times, March 30, 1915. See also semi-official statement of the French Government in Le Temps, January 23, 1916.