the great war of 1914 he negotiated an agreement with Prince Lichnowsky conceding the rights that Germany claimed in Mesopotamia and in connection with the Bagdad Railway. During the course of the negotiations preceding the war, and indeed the very day before the fatal first of August, Sir Edward Grey, speaking in the first person to the British Ambassador at Berlin, wrote:

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it, His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences.1

And the day previous to this, Sir Edward Grey had sent this remarkable instruction to the British Ambassador at Berlin:

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe.

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately."

The desire of Great Britain, however, to preserve friendly relations with Germany, although it found decided expression in times of storm and stress, was not limited to them, but was evident in all its dealings with Germany and especially so after a crisis had been passed, as in the Moroccan dispute of 1911, in order to prevent a recurrence in the future. Of this desire no more striking example can be given than that of Lord Haldane's mission, undertaken, as stated, after the Moroccan incident, before the first of the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, and two years in advance of the European catastrophe.

The choice of Lord Haldane for this peaceful mission was as flattering to Germany as it was appropriate on the part of the Ministry, inasmuch as in position he was Secretary of War, by training, a student of Göttingen, and by predilection a philosopher in the German sense of the term, having to his credit, as joint translator, Schopenhauer's "World as Will and Idea" (3 volumes, 1883-1886). He was, there

1 British Blue Book (No. 1), Doc. No. 111.

2 Ibid.

fore, in one sense of the word "made in Germany," possessed of a knowledge of its history, of its literature, and of its language, which he spoke with ease, correctness, and elegance.

Lord Haldane proceeded to Berlin in 1912, and on February 8th of that year he states that he had an interview with the Imperial Chancellor, then von Bethmann-Hollweg, lasting an hour and a half, of which his lordship has preserved the following account: "I began by giving him the message of good wishes for the conversations and for the future of Anglo-German relations with which the King had intrusted me at the audience I had before leaving." This, of course, was the way of broaching matters in a monarchical country; but as Lord Haldane was intent on business of a really serious nature, he lost no time in stating the object of his mission, which he thereupon did: "I then said that perhaps it would be convenient if I defined the capacity in which I was in Berlin, and there to talk to him; and I defined it as above intimated."

In reply to the remark of the Imperial Chancellor that he did not care to make any observations and that he preferred Lord Haldane to continue, his lordship, in accordance with the instructions of Sir Edward Grey, thus proceeded:

I told him that I felt there had been a great deal of drifting away between Germany and England, and that it was important to ask what was the cause. To ascertain this, events of recent history had to be taken into account. Germany had built up, and was building up, magnificent armaments, and with the aid of the Triple Alliance she had become the center of a tremendous group. The natural consequence was that other Powers had tended to approximate. I was not questioning for a moment Germany's policy, but this was the natural and inevitable consequence in the interests of security. We used to have much the same situation with France when she was very powerful on the sea that we had with Germany While the fact to which I referred created a difficulty, the difficulty was not insuperable; for two groups of Powers might be on very friendly relations if there was only an increasing sense of mutual understanding and confidence. The present seemed to me to be a favorable moment for a new departure. The Morocco question was now out of the way, and we had no agreements with France or Russia except those that were in writing and published to the world.1

now.

Naturally, in a country given to secret alliances, the Chancellor was dubious on this point, and, interrupting Lord Haldane, asked if this were really so, to which his lordship replied that "I could give him the assurance that it was so without reserve, and that in the situation which now existed I saw no reason why it should not be possible for us to enter

1 New York Times, June 2, 1918, p. 4.

into a new and cordial friendship, carrying the two old ones into it, perhaps to the profit of Russia and France as well as Germany herself." This is not the policy of dividing in order to conquer, but of uniting in order to preserve peace. To this statement on the part of Lord Haldane, the Imperial Chancellor replied, as reported by his lordship, that "he had no reason to differ from this view."

In reply to an inquiry concerning the military preparations of the year before, in connection with the Morocco incident, Lord Haldane stated to the satisfaction of the Imperial Chancellor that "no preparations had been made which were other than those required to bring the capacity of the British army in point of mobilization to something approaching the standard which Germany had long ago reached"; and Lord Haldane apparently closed this particular part of the interview with the somewhat frank and curt statement that "we could not be caught unprepared." This explanation seemed to clear up the doubt in the Imperial Chancellor's mind, and he is reported as saying that he understood the position which Lord Haldane had indicated.

Taking advantage of the understanding thus reached, Lord Haldane used language which von Bethmann-Hollweg doubtless recalled, although he apparently disregarded it in the latter days of July and the first days of August, 1914, that "if Germany had really, which I did not at all suppose, intended to crush France and destroy her capacity to defend herself, we in England would have had such a direct interest in the result that we could not have sat by and seen this done."

Omitting the portions of Lord Haldane's diary dealing with the proposal of the Imperial Chancellor that neither Power should enter into combinations against the other, the gentlemen in conference came to the German fleet, as to which the Imperial Chancellor asked Lord Haldane whether he would like to make observations, to which his lordship, speaking in the first person, said he must.

On this point Lord Haldane spoke with the utmost frankness, saying: "What was the use of entering into a solemn agreement for concord and against attack if Germany at the same moment was going to increase her battle fleet as a precaution against us, and we had consequently to increase our battle fleet as a precaution against her?" To this question thus put, Lord Haldane himself answered that "This was vital from our point of view, because we were an island Power dependent for our food supplies on the power of protecting our commerce, and for this we needed the two-Power standard and a substantial

preponderance in battle fleets." By the expression "two-Power" battle fleet his lordship meant, and the Imperial Chancellor understood, that the British battle fleet should be equal in power to that of any two European nations.

The Imperial Chancellor, on his part, retorted that "it was absolutely essential to Germany to have a third squadron in full readiness for war," to which Lord Haldane replied that, admitting the right of each to do as it thought best, Great Britain would need to increase its fleet. Asked if that were necessary "if we had a friendly agreement," Lord Haldane stated that an agreement would be prejudiced if Germany carried out its program of a third ship every second year, inasmuch as Great Britain would feel itself obliged to lay down two for every German keel.

This remark of Lord Haldane had cut to the quick, and while promising that he would think the matter over, the Imperial Chancellor said that a third squadron was vital, that new ships were necessary for it, and asked if Lord Haldane could find a way out, as "my admirals,” to quote the Imperial Chancellor, "are very difficult," to which Lord Haldane replied in kind, "that was an experience which we sometimes found in England also."

This was a busy day and a not inauspicious beginning. On the day after the ninth- not only the Admiral of the Navy, von Tirpitz, but the Kaiser, himself, unannounced, made his appearance, and the entire situation was discussed by those in Germany having the final word in matters political and naval.

The tone of the interview was friendly; but Lord Haldane notes a feeling in his diary that he had come to the most difficult part of his task. The utmost he was able to get was, to quote his own words, "The Emperor was so disturbed at the idea that the world would not believe in the reality of the agreement unless the shipbuilding program was modified that he asked what I would suggest."

The crux of the matter was the unwillingness of the German authorities to change their law of naval construction, and seeing this, Lord Haldane said, in reply to the Emperor's query "what would he suggest," that "he might at least drop out a ship." To this the Admiral objected, and Haldane thereupon made the suggestion "to spread the tempo,' and thus reports the progress:

After much talking we got to this, that, as I insisted that they must not inaugurate the agreement by building an additional ship at once, they should put

off building the first ship till 1913, and then should not lay down another till three years after (1916), and not lay down the third till 1919.1

This was the German side of it. Next for the English.

Quite naturally, Admiral von Tirpitz wanted an understanding as to English shipbuilding, and quite naturally stated that the two-Power standard was "a hard one for Germany" and that "Germany could not make any admission about it." To this Lord Haldane replied, and because of its importance his exact language is quoted:

I said it was not a matter of admission. Germany must be free and we must be free, and we should probably lay down two keels to their one. In this case the initiative was not with us but with them. An idea occurred to all of us on this observation that we should try to avoid defining a standard proportion in the agreement, and that, indeed, we should say nothing at all about shipbuilding in the agreement, but if the political agreement was concluded the Emperor should at once announce to the German public that this entirely new fact modified his desire for the fleet law as originally conceived, and that it should be delayed and spread out to the extent we had discussed. For the rest, each of us would remain masters in our own houses as far as naval matters were concerned.2

The Kaiser was reported by Lord Haldane to have very properly said that the fact of the agreement was "the key to everything." It would need to be put into proper form, and the Kaiser said, according to Haldane, that "the Chancellor would propose to me this afternoon a formula which he had drafted." Therefore, Haldane was to see the Imperial Chancellor again, and to return home to report the results of his mission to his colleagues.

The question bristled with difficulties, and the Imperial Chancellor said, as quoted by Haldane, that "forces he had to contend with were almost insuperable. Public opinion in Germany expected a new law and the third squadron, and he must have these." Lord Haldane repeated what he had previously said, that he could not contest Germany's right, and asked, "but why not postpone the shipbuilding for longer and adapt the law accordingly?" In reply the Imperial Chancellor said that the new squadron and the new law were essential; that he would consult the experts as to retardation; and Lord Haldane promised to let him know privately, upon his return, the state of feeling in England about von Tirpitz's proposals.

It will be observed that the Kaiser and his advisers had definite

1 New York Times, June 2, 1918, p. 4.

Ibid.