Sir Walter points out that the Declaration of London of 1909 had for its general object to favor neutrals and reduce the power of belligerents; that it was never ratified, and, "by an irony of fate, its effect, so far as it has gone, has been disastrous to neutrals during the present war." He describes its conclusions as to the destruction of neutral prizes as "lame and impotent" and says "this war has shown the mischief of them. No door ought to be open for such outrages upon neutrals and upon noncombatant subjects of a belligerent state when traveling on neutral vessels, as the construction put upon these articles by Germany and Austria-Hungary has enabled them to commit." The Declaration, however, is so extensively repudiated and discredited that it hardly requires discussion. He says of the doctrine that neutral ships may be sunk in case of necessity: "The old doctrine as to captures at sea has been thought in times past to press hardly enough upon neutrals. This Russo-German extension makes the position of neutrals almost more intolerable than that of belligerents."

A brief chapter shows How Treaties are Brought to an End, and the work closes with a chapter of thirty-seven pages entitled Conclusions. This is written on the theory of a victory of the Allies sufficient to enable them to enforce moderate and reasonable demands. To summarize its results, he finds no hope in neutralized states, since Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Congo State have been involved in the present war, and no better hope in a chain of buffer states between France and Germany. He has some hope in the restoration of the balance of power, a principle held in mind ever since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. He finds the entry of our country into the war in this respect invaluable and quotes Canning's famous phrase that the New World has been called in "to redress the balance of the old." He quite naturally and probably justly thinks the preponderance in power of Great Britain a less danger than that of the Central Powers, since they are compact, and she scattered and with diverse interests. "She has become a confederation," he says, "and confederations, as has been said, seldom fight." He is against "inconclusive treaties of peace," which he thinks but truces. Annexation of unwilling territory and peoples he condemns as without safety or repose. "Cession and retrocession," he says, "should be, if possible, absolute, not encumbered with conditions or stipulations as to the future." Protectorates may be sometimes necessary but are to be avoided. Guarantees are idle things. He demands "the restoration of Belgium, Serbia and Monte

negro, with the compensations due to them." He says, "Luxemburg is entitled to her freedom," but asks whether she prefers to remain "the most vulnerable of the small states of Europe." As to Roumania, France, and Russia he demands a restoration to the status quo. He thinks Japan, Australia, and New Zealand will wish no German foothold left in the Pacific. As to Alsace and Lorraine he thinks the population should be consulted and that France should have pecuniary indemnities. Great Britain will have given as much in blood and more in treasure than any. Her main reward will be the safety of India and her colonies. He suggests that she keep Cyprus and that Heligoland be returned to Denmark, to remove a German menace to England. He sees great difficulty in retrocession of the German colonies, and thinks perhaps the Allies will conclude that Germany can not be trusted with any power over subject races (a conclusion amply supported by experience). He finds many difficulties and inconsistencies in a Polish state. He protests with all his might against any forcible dissolution of the German Empire, believing her union has been the result of the thought, toil, and self-sacrifice of her finest spirits for generations, and that its dissolution would be the reversal of the "respect for nationalities" of which the Allies speak, and create a lasting sore. As to Turkey, he anticipates independence for the Sultans of Egypt and Mecca, and for Albania; that the freedom of the Black Sea and her connections with the Mediterranean will be assured. He suggests that Russia and Great Britain retain their conquests in Turkey, a course already adopted by Russia with ghastly consequences; that France reassert her protectorate of the tribes of Lebanon; that Constantinople and the neighboring shores be ruled by a small protected state; that the remnant of Turkey form a new state under control of the four great Allied Powers of Europe, and that she be not allowed to continue under German influence or dominion.

He thinks there should be such exceptions in the amnesties that war crimes may be punished by court-martial, even by death, though the criminal be general, admiral, minister, or sovereign. There must be such occupation of enemy territory as will secure payment of indemnity. Sir Walter advocates a general amendment of the laws of war, such as prohibiting the use of civilians as a screen against the fire of the enemy as well as brutality to women; despoliation of the civil population; the sinking of a merchant ship, belligerent as well as neutral, not seeking to escape or to resist, unsummoned, and without making those on board safe. A command to commit a war crime, he contends,

should be unlawful, and obedience should not be due nor should such order be held a justification or defense. If this were established, the lot of a common sailor, or soldier, or subaltern passing on the validity of his commander's orders would prove a hard one.

For the enforcement of these rules, Sir Walter thinks the treaty should provide that each state or party to it contracts with every other a party to it to observe the rules and that a breach may be treated as an offense against all states parties thereto; that any party to the treaty may remonstrate at any breach, and if not heeded, may proceed to acts of retortion and even to war.

The writer of this must earnestly differ with his honored friend, Sir Walter, as to the efficiency and wisdom of these provisions. He realizes the difficulty and the need that it be met, but he believes the method suggested could not be made effective, and if adhered to, would merely tend to make belligerency as catching as typhus. He urges that the delimitation and confinement of war ought rather to be sought. The vastly increased savagery and suffering of a world-wide war, with no powerful neutrals whose favor must be sought by some semblance of humanity and justice, and whose supplies lessen want, are at present forced on the attention of all men.

Sir Walter finds limitations of armament seductive as proposals, impracticable in fact. He commends arbitration, but he considers standing tribunals necessary to which any state may apply as of right.

There is appended a chronological list of treaties from 1582 to 1913, and that rare desideratum, a full and extended index covering 40 pages in a book of 184 pages. The work as a broad, scholarly but condensed revue of the peace treaties of three centuries has undoubted interest and value. The sturdy loyalty to the interest of his own country in the time of her danger is natural and not unengaging, but it takes off from the convincing character of the views expressed and conclusions reached at least for all of other nationality. The suggestions for the solution of the present difficulties at the close of the war are marked by great moderation so far as the demands of England are concerned, and are entitled to a respectful perusal. The problems are too intricate and the contest too heated and too far from finality to make them clear and controlling. Victory must be won first. Crystallization is far more perfect and orderly in a fluid not seriously agitated. We must still conclude Our business in the field of fight

Is not to question, but to prove our might.

CHARLES NOBLE GREGORY.

Die Gestaltung des Völkerrechts nach dem Weltkrieg. By Otfried Nippold. Zürich: Art. Institut Orell Füssli. 1917. pp. 285.

The author of this work is widely and favorably known as a distinguished Swiss publicist on international law. His first important book entitled Der völkerrechtliche Vertrag was published in 1894. In 1907 there appeared Die Fortbildung des Verfahrens in völkerrechtlichen Streitigkeiten. This was followed in 1911 by a scholarly study on Die zweite Friedenskonferenz. Nippold was also one of the first writers to collect evidence demonstrating the chauvinistic tendencies of modern Germany. This he did in a small book entitled Der deutsche Chauvinismus first published in 1913 and republished in 1917.

Die Gestaltung des Völkerrechts nach dem Weltkrieg is certainly deserving of the most careful consideration. It was originally intended to form the closing chapter of a larger work on international law during the present war. But, owing to the great interest in the subject at this time, the author wisely decided to publish this part as a separate volume.

It deals particularly with the international law problems of the future which have arisen as a consequence of the present gigantic struggle. The most important of these problems, as Nippold sees them, are related to the fundamental principles which should govern the future development of international law.

In the first place, Nippold makes a distinction between international law proper and the law of war (Kriegsrecht) which must be regarded as very questionable. The latter is governed by the law of military necessity and must therefore be regarded as a negation of law which is not subject to regulation by juridical rules. "Render unto war that which belongs to war, and unto international law that which belongs to international law."

That such a liberal and enlightened mind as Nippold's should take this position furnishes a sad illustration of the harm to the human spirit done by Germany through her methods of conducting this war. To take this position means, of course, a surrender to the German point of view; and its acceptance would involve the triumph of the ideas voiced by Clausewitz and his school. It would imply a complete break with the historical development of international law in the past, and an abandonment of many centuries of effort to set bounds to the

application of force on the part of those in control of a powerful military machine. That the main military machine in existence in the dim and distant future may be the product of a world or international organization and be directed by those in control of a so-called League of Nations only increases the menace of such potential power.

However, with our author's belief that the conception of a purely military war is impossible and that, in the future perhaps even more than in the past, belligerents must needs resort to commercial as well as military means and methods of warfare, we have no quarrel. Nor do we disagree with the view that the first condition for future improvement is to get rid of the "military mentality" as well as the military system which possesses modern Germany.

In his discussion of the new postulates for the future improvement of international law proper (or what we have been wont to call the law of peace), Nippold emphasizes as of first importance the development of procedure for the settlement of international disputes. This we believe to be sound doctrine, though we should not forget that there is something which is of even greater importance, namely, the prevention of international controversies by the establishment of justice in international dealings and the discovery and removal of the many deep and often complex causes of modern war, whether these be racial, psychological, economic, or political in their nature. Such problems lie, however, beyond the province of international law proper or of the international jurist as such, and must be left mainly in the hands of statesmen, politicians, journalists, and diplomatists.

It is interesting to note that Nippold has substantially changed his former views with regard to the future improvement in procedure for the settlement of international disputes. Whereas he, in common with most authorities on the subject, had apparently believed in the rule of unanimity or quasi-unanimity in international conferences, he now seems to favor the principle of majority rule in international as in ordinary political relations.

Our author has also become an advocate of the idea of a League of Nations and is now convinced of the necessity of real sanctions or guarantees to secure the actual observance of international regulations. He sees the inadequacy of mere paper pledges or so-called moral guarantees. However, he would not restrict the enforcement of these sanctions or guarantees to mere military methods. He justly characterizes that mentality which sees nothing but military means or methods as nothing