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tations of illustrative matter not only in French, which might easily be excused in a work on diplomacy, but also in German, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian. In a work which will be chiefly used by English and American readers it would seem better, if there was any need to include a note or a document in its original language, to preserve any nice distinction of meaning, that a translation should have been given by the author, who could thus present the exact conception intended to be conveyed by the writer of the document. In the large majority of these cases, however, the discussion in English is sufficiently lucid and connected to enable the reader to minimize the loss of any matter which he may have difficulty in accurately translating for himself, but this will probably not relieve him of some sense of irritation for the needless pains he has been put to. Perhaps, also, in some places, more historical and reminiscent matter has been introduced than is strictly necessary in a technical work; but to many this feature will add to the interest of the volumes as it is often of the nature of "case" material. For any work of this scope, however, to give a “chapter" of only a brief section less than a single page to the great subject of arbitration, particularly in this modern era of the expansion of the modes of diplomacy and the growth of doctrines of conciliation and arbitral procedure dispensing with the need for diplomacy, seems inexplicable except on the grounds of a very strict and narrow concept of diplomacy and its definition. Something could have been included to show the relation of arbitration to the old conservative and technical modes of international action in strict diplomacy without at all entering upon a discussion of the details and methods of arbitral procedure in action.
Sir Ernest is by no means a pessimist, though his work has been done during a war in which Germany has made such serious but foolish attempts to destroy the whole fabric of international rights and procedure. With a faith based on experience and knowledge, he sees the expansion of international law from the local thing that it was at the time of the Thirty Years' War, and since in its limitation to the so-called “Christian” nations of Europe, to all embracing rules of international conduct for all the states of the world, the recognized "public law of the civilized universe," as he puts it. He did not foresee the part that America was to take in internationalism by the application of both its diplomatic and military force, but he realizes the beneficial influence and prominence of diplomacy in cre
ating this system, and the enlarged importance of the function of the diplomatist, whose office at home and abroad is in American theory and practice, and as he conceives it, “to promote the welfare and happiness of other nations as well as his own, and to keep the honor of his country άσπιλος και αμώμητος."
The make-up and the mechanical execution of the work by the publishers is all that could be desired.
JAMES CURTIS BALLAGH.
The President's Control of Foreign Relations. By Edward S. Cor
win, Ph.D. Princeton: University Press. 1917. pp. vi, 216. $1.50.
This volume is a collection of historical incidents and discussions bearing on the powers of the President in the conduct of foreign relations, about three-fourths of the text being made up of quotations. There is a brief introduction in which the author quotes the sections of the Constitution pertinent to the subject. He points out that, although these grants of power do not by any means cover the whole field, the power of the national government in the control of foreign relations is both plenary and exclusive. This plenary control is, however, shared by three branches of the government: Congress, the President and the Senate.
The body of the book is divided into three parts. Part I is devoted to the controversy on the relative powers of the President and Congress that took place early in our history between “Pacificus" (Hamilton) and “Helvidius” (Madison). Hamilton held that the conduct of foreign relations was in its nature an executive function, and that the possession by Congress of the power to declare war, and similar powers, did not diminish the discretion of the President in the exercise of the powers constitutionally belonging to him. Madison was inclined to underrate the claims of the "executive power” and to give greater prominence to the war powers of Congress. A somewhat similar debate between Senator Bacon of Georgia and Senator Spooner of Wisconsin took place early in 1906 as the result of Roosevelt's interpretation of the treaty-making power in the negotiation of the “agreement” with the Dominican Republic, and this debate is reproduced at length in Part III.
In Part II the author discusses the general scope of “executive power," and the conflicts arising from the possession of concurrent powers by different departments of the government. While the President may make treaties “with the advice and consent of the Senate," it lies entirely within his discretion whether he will ask or accept that advice during the period of negotiation, and even after the Senate has given its advice in the form of an amendment the President is free to ratify it or not as he pleases. Again, while Congress has the constitutional power to declare war, the President takes the initiative in formulating diplomatic policies and he may commit the country to a policy which will lead inevitably to war, although no President has ever gone this far without satisfying himself that he would be sustained by public opinion.
The author holds that, in the words of Jefferson, “the transaction of business with foreign nations is executive altogether," but that Congress is not to be prejudiced constitutionally in the exercise of its powers by what the Executive has already done in the exercise of his. "Judicially enforceable constitutional limitations," he says, “do not, generally speaking, obtain in the field of the diplomatic powers of the Government. The result is that the construction of these powers has fallen principally to those who wield them, and so has not erred on the side of strictness; and furthermore, that as between the organs of government sharing these powers, that organ which possesses unity and is capable of acting with greatest expedition, secrecy and fullest knowledge-in short, with greatest efficiency -has obtained the major participation. Nor can it be reasonably doubted that these results have proved beneficial. At the same time, they counsel the maintenance in full vigor of the political check on a power so little susceptible of legal control.”
On page 80 the author makes a serious slip in stating that the resolution of 1898 demanding the withdrawal of Spain from Cuba recognized the so-called Republic of Cuba. The minority report of the Senate Committee did, it is true, favor this, and their recommendation was embodied in the Senate resolution, but the House resolution merely declared that the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent." The Senate finally gave way and the House resolution prevailed.
In discussing the Senate's share in the exercise of the treatymaking power, the author fails to note the interesting fact that in
recent years, with the growing importance of the President's control of foreign relations, the Senate has grown more jealous of its powers of advice and consent and that very few treaties of importance have passed that body without amendment and a number have been wholly rejected. The Olney-Pauncefote arbitration treaty was rejected. The treaty of peace with Spain was ratified with difficulty, notwithstanding the fact that three of the five peace commissioners were influential members of the Senate. The first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was so amended that a new treaty had to be negotiated. The arbitration treaties negotiated by Hay in 1904 were so amended that President Roosevelt refused to refer them back to the other contracting parties. The Dominican treaty of 1905 was held up by the Senate for two years and finally agreed to in an amended form. The Taft arbitration treaties, the pending treaty with Colombia, and numerous other instances could be given.
While this volume is interesting and timely, it bears evidence of having been hastily put together and is hardly on a par with other work done by Professor Corwin in recent years.
JOHN H. LATANÉ.
Guia Práctica Para Los Diplomáticos Y Cónsules Peruanos. By
Arturo García Salazar and Jorge Linch. Lima: Imp. Americana. 1918. 2 vols. pp. 647, 470.
The title of this book, Practical Guide for Peruvian Diplomats and Consuls, is not a misnomer; it gives a clear idea of the purposes that the authors, Messrs. Arturo García Salazar and Jorge Linch, had in view when preparing this very useful work. They are to be congratulated for having, within the compass of two volumes, gathered together in an orderly and systematic manner all that pertains to the practical side of the Peruvian diplomatic and consular careers.
In truth, we know few books that deal with the subject of diplomatic and consular enactments and practices, be they published in Spanish or in English, that are better or more thoroughly well prepared and so useful in their nature.
There is no doubt that its publication will be most serviceable to those who intend to enter, or are already in, the diplomatic or consular service of Peru, and a similar publication might be profita
bly made by some enterprising house, if an author of reputation might be induced to prepare it, with regard to the American diplomatic and consular service.
The work which we have before us is comprised in two volumes, and there is scarcely anything relative to diplomats and consuls of Peru which is not dwelt upon. Especially interesting to Americans are the pages devoted in the first volume to Diplomatic Ceremonial, wherein full description is given of the visit of, and reception to, that great American statesman and jurist, Elihu Root, and to the American Atlantic and Pacific Naval Squadrons.
Let us say further that the authors of this work have very wisely devoted most of the pages of their publication to the practical side of the subjects discussed, and have given little space to elaborate the theories relative to matters pertaining to the diplomatic and consular service. Here they have shown how unfounded is the criticism made with regard to Latin-American authors, who are often accused of laying down theories and not viewing the subjects that they discuss from a practical or utilitarian point of view.
In conclusion, let us again congratulate Messrs. García Salazar and Linch for having written and published a most interesting and useful work.
José F. GODOY.
Le Tunnel sous la Manche et le Droit International. By C. J. Co
lombos. Paris: Arthur Rousseau. 1917. Pp. 163. 6 fr.
The distance from Dover to Calais is so slight that it is surprising to learn how recent is the suggestion of a tunnel. Apparently the earliest assignable date is 1802. Dr. Colombos traces the history from that time to the present day, and shows that the failure to bring the scheme to pass has been due, not to engineering difficulties, but to fears of invasion and of the spiritual disasters which might result from the destruction of British insularity. Only to a slight extent does he deal with the interesting question whether the tunnel would have affected materially the present war. The principal part of his discussion covers problems of international law.
Have France and England the right to construct such a tunnel without the consent of other Powers? The treatment of this question