In Part II the author discusses the general scope of "executive power," and the conflicts arising from the possession of concurrent powers by different departments of the government. While the President may make treaties "with the advice and consent of the Senate," it lies entirely within his discretion whether he will ask or accept that advice during the period of negotiation, and even after the Senate has given its advice in the form of an amendment the President is free to ratify it or not as he pleases. Again, while Congress has the constitutional power to declare war, the President takes the initiative in formulating diplomatic policies and he may commit the country to a policy which will lead inevitably to war, although no President has ever gone this far without satisfying himself that he would be sustained by public opinion.

The author holds that, in the words of Jefferson, "the transaction of business with foreign nations is executive altogether," but that Congress is not to be prejudiced constitutionally in the exercise of its powers by what the Executive has already done in the exercise of his. "Judicially enforceable constitutional limitations," he says, "do not, generally speaking, obtain in the field of the diplomatic powers of the Government. The result is that the construction of these powers has fallen principally to those who wield them, and so has not erred on the side of strictness; and furthermore, that as between the organs of government sharing these powers, that organ which possesses unity and is capable of acting with greatest expedition, secrecy and fullest knowledge-in short, with greatest efficiency -has obtained the major participation. Nor can it be reasonably doubted that these results have proved beneficial. At the same time, they counsel the maintenance in full vigor of the political check on a power so little susceptible of legal control."

On page 80 the author makes a serious slip in stating that the resolution of 1898 demanding the withdrawal of Spain from Cuba recognized the so-called Republic of Cuba. The minority report of the Senate Committee did, it is true, favor this, and their recommendation was embodied in the Senate resolution, but the House resolution merely declared "that the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent." The Senate finally gave way and the House resolution prevailed.

In discussing the Senate's share in the exercise of the treatymaking power, the author fails to note the interesting fact that in

recent years, with the growing importance of the President's control of foreign relations, the Senate has grown more jealous of its powers of advice and consent and that very few treaties of importance have passed that body without amendment and a number have been wholly rejected. The Olney-Pauncefote arbitration treaty was rejected. The treaty of peace with Spain was ratified with difficulty, notwithstanding the fact that three of the five peace commissioners were influential members of the Senate. The first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was so amended that a new treaty had to be negotiated. The arbitration treaties negotiated by Hay in 1904 were so amended that President Roosevelt refused to refer them back to the other contracting parties. The Dominican treaty of 1905 was held up by the Senate for two years and finally agreed to in an amended form. The Taft arbitration treaties, the pending treaty with Colombia, and numerous other instances could be given.

While this volume is interesting and timely, it bears evidence of having been hastily put together and is hardly on a par with other work done by Professor Corwin in recent years.

JOHN H. LATANÉ.

Guia Práctica Para Los Diplomáticos Y Cónsules Peruanos. By Arturo García Salazar and Jorge Linch. Lima: Imp. Americana. 1918. 2 vols. pp. 647, 470.

The title of this book, Practical Guide for Peruvian Diplomats and Consuls, is not a misnomer; it gives a clear idea of the purposes that the authors, Messrs. Arturo García Salazar and Jorge Linch, had in view when preparing this very useful work. They are to be congratulated for having, within the compass of two volumes, gathered together in an orderly and systematic manner all that pertains to the practical side of the Peruvian diplomatic and consular careers. In truth, we know few books that deal with the subject of diplomatic and consular enactments and practices, be they published in Spanish or in English, that are better or more thoroughly well prepared and so useful in their nature.

There is no doubt that its publication will be most serviceable to those who intend to enter, or are already in, the diplomatic or consular service of Peru, and a similar publication might be profita

bly made by some enterprising house, if an author of reputation might be induced to prepare it, with regard to the American diplomatic and consular service.

The work which we have before us is comprised in two volumes, and there is scarcely anything relative to diplomats and consuls of Peru which is not dwelt upon. Especially interesting to Americans are the pages devoted in the first volume to Diplomatic Ceremonial, wherein full description is given of the visit of, and reception to, that great American statesman and jurist, Elihu Root, and to the American Atlantic and Pacific Naval Squadrons.

Let us say further that the authors of this work have very wisely devoted most of the pages of their publication to the practical side of the subjects discussed, and have given little space to elaborate the theories relative to matters pertaining to the diplomatic and consular service. Here they have shown how unfounded is the criticism made with regard to Latin-American authors, who are often accused of laying down theories and not viewing the subjects that they discuss from a practical or utilitarian point of view.

In conclusion, let us again congratulate Messrs. García Salazar and Linch for having written and published a most interesting and useful work.

José F. GODOY.

Le Tunnel sous la Manche et le Droit International. By C. J. Colombos. Paris: Arthur Rousseau. 1917. pp. 163. 6 fr.

The distance from Dover to Calais is so slight that it is surprising to learn how recent is the suggestion of a tunnel. Apparently the earliest assignable date is 1802. Dr. Colombos traces the history from that time to the present day, and shows that the failure to bring the scheme to pass has been due, not to engineering difficulties, but to fears of invasion and of the spiritual disasters which might result from the destruction of British insularity. Only to a slight extent does he deal with the interesting question whether the tunnel would have affected materially the present war. The principal part of his discussion covers problems of international law.

Have France and England the right to construct such a tunnel without the consent of other Powers? The treatment of this question

opens novel and interesting lines of thought. What would be the jurisdiction of the respective countries regarding the several parts of the tunnel? It is obvious that much of the tunnel will be outside the marine league, and that problems of birth, marriage, contracts, and criminal law are to be considered; and, besides, there is much to be said regarding a possible difference between jurisdiction over the sea, over the bottom of the sea, and over the earth below the bottom, and also regarding the possibility that some regions are res nullius or res extra commercium or res communis. In time of war should the tunnel be free from destruction by the warring countries? Something is to be said, obviously enough, regarding the interest of the whole world and regarding the various sorts of neutralization and of internationalization; and, further, there is much to be said regarding the use of the tunnel for transporting contraband of war in case a war should arise between Great Britain and some country other than France.

The topics just now mentioned consume the principal part of Dr. Colombos' book; and the discussion of them and of collateral matters must be recognized as ingenious and timely. Here is a book rendered peculiarly interesting by the current war, but in no way influenced by the enmities which have weakened the scientific value of many recent writings on international law.

EUGENE WAMBAUGH.

The War and the Bagdad Railway: The Story of Asia Minor and Its Relation to the Present Conflict. By Morris Jastrow. Philadelphia and London. J. B. Lippincott Co. $1.50. 1917. 2d impression, February, 1918. pp. 160, il. 14, map.

There is undoubtedly a widespread demand for a popular explanation of some of the less known factors that served as contributing causes to the Great War, such as the controversy over the Bagdad Railway. Dr. Morris Jastrow, Jr., who is professor of Semitic languages at the University of Pennsylvania, has given us in this little volume an excellent account of the Bagdad Railway episode, which answers all the requirements of a popular treatise. The book is written in an interesting manner; and its historical accuracy is guaranteed by the high scholastic reputation of the

author. The narrative is divided into four parts: "The War in the East,' "The Story of Asia Minor," "The Story of the Bagdad Railway," and "The Issue and the Outlook"; but the emphasis is laid chiefly upon the two middle chapters, to which the author devotes 91 pages, while giving only 38 to the other two. "The War in the East" is misleading as a title for the first chapter, for there is nothing in it concerning the military operations of the Great War in the Near East. Nor does the writer explain how Turkey was drawn into the conflict. This part of the volume is simply a brief statement of the significance of the highway across Asia Minor along which the Bagdad Railway has been built, with a few accompanying remarks about the attitude of Arabia and Islam to the war and the effect of the Bagdad Railway on the solidarity of the Ottoman Empire.

The second chapter on "The Story of Asia Minor," after a brief description of the physical features of the country, is devoted almost wholly to a history of Asia Minor from the days of the Hittites to 1878, with interesting references to the archæological researches in that region in recent times. This is enlightening since it shows how many different civilizations have been built on the soil of that country and how many different peoples have contended in times past for supremacy on the same territory. It is unfortunate, however, that the author does not tell something about the present-day inhabitants of and the political conditions in this remarkable land, and that he gives but two short pages of indifferent statements to the developments between 1878 and 1914. The third part, dealing with the "Story of the Bagdad Railway," is excellent. It gives a complete account of the whole affair in a fair and unbiassed fashion, giving Germany proper credit for having started the railway as a purely commercial enterprise, and calling attention to the political phase of the question as it developed later. And there is a discussion of the diplomatic moves, and the contest for colonies and spheres. of influence by European Powers in Africa and Asia, that created in the minds of German statesmen a desire to ear-mark Asia Minor for their own.

The last chapter on "The Issue and the Outlook" is taken up primarily with a discussion of how the War of 1914, inaugurated with certain selfish political aims, was transformed in 1917 into a contest for the preservation of democracy through Germany's con