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candid reader, when he reflects on this, will find an excuse for the omission of some things, which, perhaps, he might have wished to see recorded in our narrative, rather than under the head of State-Papers, and detached Occurrences; and also for the brevity with which some subjects are treated in order to make room for others of equal or greater importance.

We never expected nor desired that our work should be particularly palatable to any faction or party; but we confess our astonishment to understand, that any insinuations should have been made, that in our late volumes there is a leaning towards principles of democracy.

It is an odious thing for men to speak of themselves, but it sometimes becomes necessary. Is there a greater disposition manifested in the Annual Register to maintain the claims of human nature, than to display and forewarn mankind of the dreadful dangers of anarchy ? What is the inference which remains uppermost on the mind, on a perusal of the account given in the volume for 1794, of the series of circumstances that involved the revolution and disasters of Poland-and to which, though obvious, we deemed it even our duty in these times, particularly to call the attention of the reader? Is it not this-that the liberty and well-being of the people are intimately and essentially connected with a just degree of power in the hands of a monarch? With regard to the grand question, of peace or war, it is maintained, "That it would become the wisdom

of

of intelligent legislators, of all nations, to banish all ideas of attacks on one another, and to bend their united efforts against the common enemy of all: a spirit of innovation and plunder:" and "That that nation will shew the greatest wisdom, as well as magnanimity, which shall make the first advance towards universal pacification, on the principles of reason and justice." But it is also acknowledged, "that it would be very unsafe, and is not to be expected, that any one nation should throw aside its arms, and trust merely to the mantle of justice, while all or any of its neighbours should still wear the coat of mail and helmet."*

It does not appear to us to become the annalist, to place himself in a dictatorial chair, and indulge in reflections and exclamations, whether in accusation or defence of any party. If we are sometimes tempted to depart from this chasteness, it is, our readers will perceive and acknowledge, in favour of the great mass and lower classes of the people, whose interests, by all parties, at least when in the actual possession of power, are too apt to be neglected. The apparent indifference and coldness of our manner will not, certainly, be in unison with the heated imaginations of the more zealous of our contemporaries. A time, however, will come, and probably it is at no great distance, when naked truth will be more regarded than the heightened colourings of party zeal and the animosity of faction.

* See p. 15.

It must be admitted that the turn of mind, or bent, of the annalist, will, without any obtrusion of his own opinions, appear, even from his selection of certain facts and circumstances, in preference to others. to others. Whatever may be thought of our views in general, we do not, in the least, fear to be contradicted, when we say, that, in moderation of political sentiment, and an equal respect for the prerogatives of the crown and the interests and rights of the people, the last are not behind the first volumes of this annual production.

ness,

Our volume, for 1799, is in such a state of forwardas to promise, with certainty, publication in the course of January next, or very early in February. We are desirous, as much as possible, to unite the chronological order with that of cause and effect, rather than part the history of the year into different volumes, and under different periods of time, by resuming subjects often im perfectly developed and understood, when early publication is the principal object.

THE

THE

ANNUAL REGISTER,

For the YEAR 1798.

THE

HISTORY

OF

EUROPE.

CHAP. I.

Reflections on the Treaty of Campo Formio.--Notwithstanding the Suspension of Hostilities between France and Austria.---The Maritime Power of Great Britain confirmed and increased.The British Ministry, however, renew their Negociations for Peace.-An Official Note for this Purpose sent to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.-The Answer to this.Reply of the British Ministry to that Answer.-The Directory insist on a definitive and separate Treaty of Peace with England.--Ministers appointed for the Negociation, by the Directory, on the Part of France.Their Instructions.-Lord Malmesbury the Commissioner for Negociation on the Part of England, arrives at Lisle-His Proposals for Peace. Previous Requisitions of the French Commissioners--Declined by Lord Malmesbury-Farther and preremptory Demands of the French Commissioners.—IVhich, however, they endeavour to soften. -The British Plenipotentiary requires from the French the whole of their Plan for Pacification at once.-Application by the French Plenipotentiaries, for this Purpose, to the Directory.-Procrastination on the Part of the Directory. Charge of Insincerity and Procrastination against the British Ministry. -Remonstrances by Lord Malmesbury.-His Lordship authorized to treat only on the Principle of reciprocal Compensation.-Last Conference VOL. XL.

[B]

between

between Lord Malmesbury and the French Commissioners.-The Nego ciation broken off.-Lord Malmesbury returns to London.-Reflections.

THE

THE affairs of Europe, during the summer and autumn of 1797, from the Orkneys to the Straits of Gibraltar, and the Rhine, to the Mediterranean and Atlantic Ocean, moved in an ellipse, of which the two focuses were Lisle and Udina.

The armistice and subsequent negociation, between France and Austria, was naturally followed by a negociation also between France and Great Britain.

The principal ally of this country, whose co-operation was the most powerful, and generally the most to be depended on, had been compelled, by the irresistible urgency of circunstances, to detach himself from the connection be had formed, under the persuasion, that the union of England and Austria would, as in times past, prove an equipoize to the power of France. He would willingly, at the period that put a stop to hostilities between him and the French republic, have been able to include, in the subsequent negociations for peace, the only associate on whose fidelity he could place a solid reliance, and whose power had proved the fundamental support of the coalition while it lasted; but he was pressed by the necessity of coming to a speedy conclusion with a victorious enemy, whose policy it was, to treat separately with all the parts of the formidable confederacy, which he had, through fortunate concurrences been able to resist. Great Britain had no share, therefore, in that treaty, by which so many cessions were made to France; nor is it probable, that they would have been havebeen

made, could Great. Britain have. had that opportunity of interposing, which the French negociators were so careful to prevent.

By the suspension of hostilities with Austria, France was now at liberty to turn its attention entirely to the means of bringing Great Britain to its own terms; but, notwithstanding that itwasnow become the sole enemy remaining, of the many that had first entered into the coalition, experience daily proved that its enmity alone was more to be dreaded than that of all the other members. Its strength appeared to augment, instead of being diminished by the prodigious exertions and resources it had displayed in the course of this extensive war, sustained chiefly through its persevering spirit and immenseopulence. Both its navies and armies had been gradually on the increase; never had its marine been so formidable, nor the victories obtained by its fleets more conspicuous. The three great maritime powers of Europe, France, Spain, and Holland, had proved inferior to the contest; and the empire of the seas, which they had proposed, and strangely hoped, to wrest from Great Britain, seemed more firmly confirmed than ever, by the defeats they had met with, so much against their expectation, and what they had confidently deemed the chances in their favour.

The British ministry was, in the mean time, either desirouts, or what is more probable, as has since appeared, assumed only an appearance of being desirous, to put an end to a war, to which the public had

long

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