challenges that view and his Counsel require me to express an independent opinion on the point. I do so with the greatest diffiuence and reluctance in view of the weight carried by even the dicta of such experienced and distinguished Judges as Justice Scrutton and Justice Bailhache. I feel bound to express my view not upon a question of business convenience but upon the strict law of the matter. I assume that this document (which is not stamped) was given under a floating policy issued by the Insurance Company to D. A. Horan. Now the certificate is not a policy. It does not purport to be a policy. This is conceded by Mr. Hastings in his able argument for the sellers. It is a certificate that a policy was, issued to D. A. Horan, and it incorporates the terms of that policy. Those terms I do not know, nor is there anything before me to indicate that the buyers knew them. The certificate does not show whether that policy was in a recognized or usual form or not. The certificate does therefore contain all the terms of the insurance. Those terms have to be sought for in two documents, namely, the original policy and the certificate. But even if this document is not a policy yet the sellers say it is "equivalent to a policy." In connection with that phrase it is well to quote from another part of the Judgment of Justice Bailhache in the Wilson Holgate Case, 1920 2 King's Bench at page 9. He there says: "He, the buyer, cannot be com"pelled to take a document which is something like that which he has "agreed to take. He is entitled to have a document of the very kind "which he has agreed to take or at least one which does not differ from “it in any material respect.” This leads me to ask whether the document before me differs in any material respect from a policy of insurance. To begin with, I do not see how the buyer here could know whether the document he got was of a proper character (one he was bound to accept) unless he saw the original policy, and examined its conditions, whether usual or otherwise. In the next place I feel that a certificate of insurance falls within a legal classification, if any, different to that of a policy of insurance. The latter is a well known document with clearly defined features. It comes within definite, established and statutory legal rights. A certificate, however, is an ambiguous thing; it is unclassified and undefined by law; it is not even mentioned in Arnould. No rules have been laid down upon it. Would the buyer sue upon the certificate or upon the original policy plus the certificate? If he sued simply on the certificate he could put in a part only of the contract, for the other terms of the contract, namely, the conditions of the actual policy, would be contained in a document not in his control and to the possession of which he is not entitled. Thirdly, I point out that before the buyer could sue at all he would have to show that he was the assignee of the certificate. See Arnould, section 175-177. In what way can he become the assignee? It is vital to remember the provisions of the Marine Insurance Act, 1906. Now the relevant statutory provision is Section 50 (3), which says: "A marine policy may be assigned by endorsement thereon or in any other customary manner." This sub-section, however, only applies, so far as I can see, to that which is an actual marine policy. Section 90, the interpretation clause says: "In "this Act unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires 'policy'

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"means a marine 'policy.' The Act contains no reference, express, or implied, to a certificate of insurance. Section 22 says: "Subject to the pro"visions of any Statute a contract of marine insurance is inadmissible in "evidence unless it is embodied in a marine policy in accordance with this "Act." If, as is admitted, this document be a certificate only and not a policy it therefore seems not even to be admissible in evidence before me. If the certificate does not fall within the Marine Insurance Act it appears to be only assignable by writing in accordance with the provisions of the Judicature Act, 1873, Section 25 (6). The certificate may have less legal effect than a slip, as to which see Arnould, paragraph 34, and Section 21 of the Marine Insurance Act.

I mention these considerations briefly. Time does not permit to discuss them further or to develop their significacne or to emphasize the points arising under Sections 91 to 95 of the Stamps Act, 1891. In my view the Act of 1906 deals with marine policies only. It does not, I think, cover other documents, although they may be said to be the business equivalent of policies. I do not think that the Act of 1906 covers the document now before me. In my humble view a document of insurance is not a good tender in England under an ordinary c.i.f. contract unless it be an actual policy and unless it falls within the provisions of the Marine Insurance Act, 1906, as to assignment and otherwise. I must therefore hold that the buyers were entitled to reject the documents upon the ground that no proper bill of lading and no proper policy of insurance were tendered by the sellers in conformity with the c.i.f. contract. I abstain from amplifying this Judgment by the citation of other authority or the mention of further reasons in support of the conclusions I have deemed it my duty to state. It may well be that this decision is disturbing to business men. It is my duty, however, to state my view of the law without regard to mere questions of convenience. I desire to add four remarks: (1) That there is no finding or evidence before me of any course of dealing between the parties; (2) That there is no finding or evidence before me of any custom or general usage which modifies the long and clearly established legal rights of a buyer under a c.i.f. contract. If any such custom or usage be asserted then the point can be dealt with in some future action in the Commercial Court. Whether such an assertion can be proved may well be a question of doubt in view of the matters appearing in the Manlie case, 1919, 1 King's Bench at page 206. See, too, the Wilson Holgate case, 1920, 2 King's Bench at page 8, where Justice Bailhache said: "I am not "satisfied that since Ireland vs Livingstone was decided any custom has "arisen which obviates the necessity for a tender by the seller of a policy "of insurance if the buyer requires it." (3) It may well be that legislation is needed to enlarge the operation of the Bills of Lading Act, 1855, and the Marine Insurance Act, 1906. (4) That the difficulties indicated in this Judgment can be easily, promptly and effectively met by the insertion of appropriate clauses in c.i.f. contracts.

For the reasons given I find in favor of the buyers with the results stated in the Award. The sellers must pay the costs of the proceedings

before me.