honour nor to his interest, and whenever religious hypocrisy has existed, it has been practised with a view to the one or the other, or to both. The frequency of this abominable vice will always be in proportion to the esteem in which religious principle is held. It will prevail most in times when religion, true or erroneous, has the greatest power over the hearts of men; and least, when it is less regarded. Nothing, it is true, is so conducive as hypocrisy to destroy the power of the reality which it affects to resemble. For, the prevalence of this vice superinduces a suspicion of religious profession, and, instead of contributing to its honour, exposes it to contempt or hatred, even when rational and sincere. Thus, like other vices, hypocrisy tends, at last, to defeat its own purposes, and, by prostituting religion, renders its semblance less imposing.

From these observations it is evident that this vice is not only destructive of the best interests of mankind, by exposing genuine piety to their contempt, but also betrays ultimately its own folly.

Religious imposture renders subservient to its purposes all the other forms of false religion already considered. But of these superstition is its fittest engine. Here fraud and craft have their widest scope; for, superstitious times are also the most credulous. The purposes of religious imposture are of two classes; publicly political, and privately selfish. The latter comprises the

reputation and interest of the individual; the former, the advancement or maintenance of a peculiar species of state policy. Many a hypocrite pursues only his own particular emolument or advancement by assuming a religious garb; and the less he believes, the more flaming will be his profession. But the most prominent and extensive display of hypocrisy is when religion is used as a political engine. That it was so employed by the heathen priests, statesmen, and philosophers, cannot be doubted. Cato said that he could not conceive how, when two augurs met, they could abstain from laughing in each other's faces. The absurdities of pagan superstition were so obvious to every intelligent mind, that they could not be entirely believed and practised by any person of reflection; and every priest to whom this character belonged must have been conscious of their folly and wickedness, even when he was performing the public offices of religion. The wiser statesmen, and almost all the ancient philosophers, viewed their religious ceremonies merely as means for inspiring the people with awe and retaining them in obedience to the established government, and as closely incorporated with the frame and administration of the state. While other impostures were punished, the most abominable of all was considered as highly meritorious and laudable by those who affected the widest range

of wisdom. During the dark ages, when every corrupt form of Christianity was predominant in Europe, pious fraud and imposture almost set no limits to their practices, and under the tuition of the Romish hierarchy enjoyed astonishing success. It is difficult to determine whether the impudence of imposition or the facility of belief was greatest. It is, however, a happy reflection that there is a boundary which corruption cannot pass, and that when this is reached, its direful effects, which have long been experienced, lead to its detection and its remedy. Some things are too gross for human stupidity to admit, and too grievous for human patience to endure. Divine providence, which purifies the atmosphere by tempests and hurricanes, also defecates human corruption by its excesses; and it is in the nature of corruption, long predominant, to run to every species of excess. Unexpected light often breaks on the night of ignorance, and new vigour is infused into lethargic submission. This was gloriously exemplified by the blessed Reformation of religion, which shook the papal throne, dissolved the magical bonds of priestcraft, and restored to spiritual freedom so considerable a portion of Europe. The only wonder is, that so large a part of Christendom should, considering the general diffusion of knowledge, still remain under the most degrading and demoralizing of all thraldoms.

But hypocrisy is as ready to conform to a fanatical as to a superstitious spirit, when its purposes can be served by it. Mohammed and Cromwell were such hypocrites, and fanaticism was the engine which they chiefly employed to advance their schemes. This is, however, to the religious impostor, a more dangerous experiment than the other. For, he frequently runs great risk of catching the contagion which he approaches, in order to direct it to his policy or interest. He who has secretly laughed at the fanatical spirit which he only affected, has often been seized by it, and hurried into the wildest raptures. It is evident that Mohammed and Cromwell were occasionally influenced by the delusion which the former hypocritically excited, and the latter artfully pretended to approve and encourage. The fact is, that no man can on all occasions act a hypocritical part. This is repugnant to the whole system of the human mind, and particularly to the dictates of conscience, which never can be entirely suppressed. Sympathy is also one of the strongest principles of our nature. Association, therefore, with others who are under the influence of strong affections, those especially of a more exalted kind, as all religious affections are, in some shape or other, will soon communicate them to the breast even of the person who at first holds them in contempt.

Nor is the hypocrite less scrupulous in assuming the appearance of bigotry, than that of any other perversion of religion. The only question with him is, how far any form can serve his selfish or political views. Orthodoxy or heterodoxy is equally indifferent to him as a disguise; but whichsoever of them he assumes, he will be unrelenting in support of it, as long as its profession can be conducive to the object which engrosses his attention and his pursuit.

Every religious hypocrite must at bottom be an atheist, or, at least, not far removed from that character. If he believes in a Deity, and has any just conception of his nature, he cannot suppose that a compliance with gross superstition, or wild fanaticism, or intolerant bigotry, all known to be such when the appearance of them is assumed, must not be an object of the vengeance of a pure and all-perfect Being, in whose hands his present and eternal condition are placed. Convinced, therefore, of the existence of God, and entertaining just notions of his character, he must be placed in a state of absolute despair. To deliver himself from this, he will probably be driven to atheism. He may, indeed, endeavour to find some salvo for his conscience, or to make some absurd compensation to the offended Deity. He may say, with the Syrian courtier Naaman, who wished, in order to avoid his master's displeasure, to join the service of the one true God