Dissenting Opinion: Brown, J. distillers in this State as elsewhere. As this restriction is practically no restriction at all, and only incorporates in the statute exactly what the law would imply without it, I see no valid objection to it. But even if it were conceded that this particular provision of the law were inoperative, and might be so declared in a case properly raising that question, it is not of the essence of the law, but a mere incident to the power of the commissioner, and surely should not have the sweeping effect of rendering the whole law unconstitutional and void. The main object of the act is to preserve the health and morals of the people by securing to them pure liquors, prohibiting individual dealings in such liquors, and requiring all such traffic to be carried on through the agencies of the State. Such methods of dealing with this traffic are by no means unknown abroad. Indeed, I understand the act to be but the reproduction in this country of what is known as the Gothenberg system. It is entirely well settled that the unconstitutionality of a particular provision will not invalidate an entire statute, unless such provision embodies the main purpose of the statute, or is so connected with such purpose that it is inseparable from it, or, unless the court can see that the legislature would not have passed the act without such provision. This doctrine has been repeatedly affirmed by this court. Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley, 2 Pet. 492; Austin v. The Aldermen, 7 Wall. 694; Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80. Indeed, in Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 123, this court held an act of the legislature of Texas, taxing intoxicating liquors, to be inoperative only so far as it discriminated against imported wines or beers; and that as defendant was also engaged in selling other liquors, an injunction was properly refused. That the provision that the commissioner in purchasing the liquors shall give preference to those of domestic manufacture is separable from the main purpose of the act seems to me too clear for argument. That the legislature would have passed the act without this provision is conclusively shown by the fact that, in a general amendment and reënactment of this law, made in 1896, this provision was omitted. ; Dissenting Opinion: Brown, J. While the power of courts to declare an act of legislation to be unconstitutional undoubtedly exists, it is one of great delicacy, particularly when brought to bear, upon the legislative acts of another sovereignty. In one of the early cases decided by this court, Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 128, it was said by Chief Justice Marshall: "But it is not on slight implication and vague conjecture that the legislature is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers, and its acts to be considered as void. The opposition between the Constitution and the law should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other." Still more explicit is the language of Chief Justice Waite in the Sinking Fund cases, 99 U. S. 700, 718: "It is our duty, when required in the regular course of judicial proceedings, to declare an act of Congress void if not within the legislative power of the United States; but this declaration should never be made except in a clear case. Every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute, and this continues until the contrary is shown beyond a rational doubt. One branch of the government cannot encroach on the domain of another without danger. The safety of our institutions depends in no small degree on a strict observance of this salutary rule.". . I regard these words as particularly applicable to the dealings by this court with the proceedings of a state legislature, and that their right to determine what-is for the best interests of their people should be carefully respected, except where it comes in manifest conflict with the dominant law. Especially should everything be avoided which carries the suggestion of a vexatious interference with state action. The manifest dangers to the future of the country, which lurk in the inflexibility of the Federal Constitution, can only be averted by carefully distinguishing between such laws as practically concern the inhabitants of a particular State only, and are intended bona fide for their welfare, and such as are a mere subterfuge for an unlawful discrimination, and cannot be carried into effect without doing palpable injustice to citizens of other States. It should not be overlooked in this connec Syllabus. tion that the complaints in this case emanate from a citizen of South Carolina, who seeks to defy the law of his own State, and puts forward as his excuse the injustice done the citizens of other States who make no complaint of her action in this particular. If a State cannot prohibit her own citizens from importing liquors, as well as buying them at home, the "Wilson bill" is set at nought, and the prohibitory laws of the several States rendered inoperative in a vital particular. The fact that these liquors were imported for complainant's own use and consumption, instead of for sale, raises no question under the Federal Constitution. Both are under the ban of the statute. I am unable to see wherein that section of the dispensary act of South Carolina, which authorized the seizure made in this case, conflicts in any particular with the Federal Constitution. MR. JUSTICE BREWER did not hear the argument and took no part in the decision of these cases. SCOTT v. DONALD. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA. No. 410. Argued October 21, 22, 1896. - Decided January 18, 1897. Where a suit is brought against defendants who claim to act as officers of a State, and, under color of an unconstitutional statute, commit acts of wrong and injury to the property of the plaintiff, to recover money or property in their hands unlawfully taken by them in behalf of the State; or for compensation for damages; or, in a proper case, for an injunction to prevent such wrong and injury; or for a mandamus in a like case to enforce the performance of a plain legal duty, purely ministerial; such suit is not, within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, an action against the State. Circuit Courts of the United States will restrain a state officer from executing an unconstitutional statute of the State when to execute it would be to violate rights and privileges of the complainant that had been guar Statement of the Case. anteed by the Constitution and would do irreparable damage and injury to him. In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, affirmed and followed on these points. It was alleged in the bill, and there was evidence to show, that the complainant intended to import for his own use, from time to time as he might need the same, ales, wines and liquors, the products of other · States, of the value exceeding two thousand dollars, which were threatened to be seized by the state constables, claiming to act under the dispensary law; and the agreed statement of facts contained the following statements: "Previous to filing of bill and temporary injunction granted in this case the state constables seized, intended and threatened to seize in future, all intoxicating liquors whatsoever coming into the State from other States and foreign countries, and to carry out in full all the provisions of the dispensary law of January 2, 1895; and the value of the right of importation of ales, wines and other liquors, products of other States and countries, is of the value of two thousand dollars and upwards; and the difference in the price to the consumer, like the plaintiff, of such liquor bought at the state dispensary of South Carolina and bought out of the State is about fifty to seventy-five per cent in favor of imported liquors." Held, that such statements sufficiently concede that the pecuniary value of plaintiff's rights in controversy exceed the value of two thousand do ars; and that it cannot be reasonably claimed that the plaintiff must postpone his application to the Circuit Court, as a court of equity, until his property to an amount exceeding in value two thousand dollars has been actually seized and confiscated, and when the preventive remedy by injunction would be of no avail. The interest that will allow parties to join in a bill of complaint, or that will enable the court to dispense with the presence of all the parties, when numerous, except a determinate number, is not only an interest in the question, but one in common in the subject-matter of the suit — a community of interest growing out of the nature and condition of the right in dispute. The decree is also objectionable because it enjoins persons not parties to the suit; as this is not a case where the defendants named represent those not named; and there is not alleged any conspiracy between the parties defendant and other unknown parties; but the acts complained of are tortious, and do not grow out of any common action or agreement between constables and sheriffs of the State of South Carolina. IN the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of South Carolina, on April 25, 1895, James Donald, a citizen of the United States and of the State of South Carolina, in his own behalf and on behalf of all other persons in the State of South Carolina, as importers for their own use and consumers of the wines, ales and spirituous liquors, the products of other States and foreign countries, filed a bill in equity against J. M. Scott, Statement of the Case. M. T. Holley, E. C. Beach and R. M. Gardner, claiming to act as constables of the State of South Carolina, and all other persons whomsoever claiming to act as such constables or as county sheriffs, municipal policemen or executive officers, or in any capacity whatever, under or by virtue of an act of the general assembly of the State of South Carolina, approved January 2, 1895, and generally known as the " dispensary law." The bill alleged that the defendants named had, on several occasions, seized and carried away packages of wines and liquors belonging to the plaintiff, being products of the States of New York, Maryland and California respectively, and imported by the plaintiff for his own use and consumption, and not intended for sale, barter or exchange by the plaintiff. within the State of South Carolina; and that the defendants claimed, in so doing; to act by virtue of the said act of January 2, 1895, which act was alleged by the plaintiff to be void and unconstitutional, and to furnish no protection to the said defendants in their said acts of trespass and seizure. The bill further alleged that the plaintiff had brought several actions at law against the said defendants in the Circuit Court of the United States for damages caused by the said unlawful acts, which said suits were still pending; that notwithstanding the bringing of said suits the said defendants, and others, constables of the State of South Carolina, have continued to seize and carry away ales, wines and spirituous liquors of the plaintiff and of other persons in the State of South Carolina, imported from other States and foreign countries, and threaten to continue so to do. The bill further alleges that protection of the plaintiff's rights by actions at law involved a multiplicity of suits against said constables, and that by said dispensary act the remedy of replevin was denied to the plaintiff in the courts of South Carolina; and that all said constables were wholly irresponsible financially and unable to respond in damages, and that the plaintiff's constitutional rights, privileges and immunities were now being and are threatened to be continually invaded and grossly violated without redress, and to his irreparable injury. The bill avers that the said |