EXCEPTION.

1. When an instruction to the jury embodies several propositions of law,
to some of which there are no objections, the party objecting must
point out specifically to the trial court the part to which he objects,
in order to avail himself of the objection. Baltimore & Potomac Rail-
road Co. v. Mackey, 72.

2. The record showed that plaintiff asked six instructions, of which the
court gave two, declined to give one, and declined to give the other
three except as covered by the general charge. The whole charge
was contained in the bill of exceptions, which thus concluded: "To
which refusal and charge of the court and the exclusion of evidence
offered, and to the action of the court in refusing a new trial, plain-
tiff excepted and tendered this bill of exceptions, which was signed
and sealed by the court and ordered to be made a part of the record
in this cause." Held, that this exception was insufficient. Jones v.
East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railroad Co., 682.

FINDINGS OF FACT.

Findings of fact in such cases, even when no statute provides for making
them, are a declaration by the court of the matter which it deter-
mines, aud are conclusive as to it in subsequent controversies between
the parties. Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining Co., 683.

GENERAL AVERAGE.

1. The scuttling of a ship by the municipal authorities of a port, without
the direction of her master or other commanding officer, to extinguish
a fire in her hold, is not a general average loss. Ralli v. Troop, 386.
2. If the cargo in the hold of a ship moored in a port takes fire, and the
port authorities come on board with fire-engines, take charge of her,
pump steam and water into the hold, and move her and put her
aground without any objection by the master; and the master suc-
cessfully removes part of the cargo, and desires, and believes it to be
prudent and feasible, to remove more; but the port authorities forbid
and prevent his doing so, because of the danger of increasing the fire,
and themselves extinguish the fire by scuttling the ship, whereby she
becomes a wreck, not worth repairing; the loss of the ship is not a
subject of contribution in general average against the owners of the
cargo, although the court is of opinion that the measures taken by the
port authorities were the best available to save the cargo from greater
loss. lb.

GUARDIAN AND WARD.

1. A guardian of an infant, appointed in one State, cannot maintain a
suit in the Circuit Court of the United States held within another

State, to set aside the appointment or to compel an account of a
guardian previously appointed in the latter State, except so far as
authorized to do so by its laws. Morgan v. Potter, 195.

2. In a suit by an infant, by his next friend, the infant, and not the next
friend, must be made the plaintiff. Ib.

HABEAS CORPUS.

1. The refusal by the state court to grant a writ of error to a person con-
victed of murder, or to stay the execution of a sentence, will not war-
rant a court of the United States in interfering in his behalf by writ
of habeas corpus. Bergemann v. Backer, 655.

2. When a state court has jurisdiction of the offence and the accused under
an indictment found under statutes of the State not void under the
Constitution of the United States, and proceeds to judgment under
such statutes, a Circuit Court of the United States has no authority to
interfere with the execution of the sentence by means of a writ of
habeas corpus. Ib.

INCOME TAX.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7;

JURISDICTION, B, 9.

INDICTMENT.

1. In an indictment against the president and the assistant cashier of a
national bank for making a false entry in a report, under Rev. Stat.
§ 5209, the report need not be described with technical accuracy; nor
is it necessary to allege that the report in which the false entry was
made was verified by the oath or affirmation of the president or cashier,
or attested by the signature of the directors. Cochran and Sayre v.
United States, 286.

2. In such an indictment the true test is, not whether it might possibly
have been made more certain, but whether it contains every element
of the offence intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the
defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and, in case any other
proceedings are taken against him for a similar offence, whether the
record shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former
acquittal or conviction.

lb.

See CRIMINAL LAW.

INSOLVENT DEBTOR.

See CORPORATION.

JUDGMENT.

1. When the jurisdiction of a controversy by a court is unquestioned, and
the cause proceeds to final judgment, and no review is sought for, the
judgment is conclusive upon the parties to the suit as to the matter
decided, but not as to matters which might have been decided, but
Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining Co., 683.

were not.

2. A judgment by default is just as conclusive an adjudication between
the parties of whatever is essential to support the judgment, as one
rendered after answer and contest; and in such case facts are not
open to further controversy if they are necessarily at variance with
the judgment on the pleadings. 1b.

See MINERAL LAND, 2.

JURISDICTION.

A. GENERALLY.

A question of jurisdiction cannot be waived. Mexican National Railroad
Co. v. Davidson, 201.

B. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

1. The court below, in its order granting the appeal, said: "This appeal
is granted solely upon, the question of jurisdiction" and made further
provisions for determining what parts of the record should be certified
to this court under the appeal, under which it subsequently directed
the portions of the record to be certified to this court, and the record
was prepared accordingly. Held, that this was a sufficient certificate
of a question of jurisdiction under the provisions of the Judiciary
Act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826, 827. Shields v. Coleman,
168.

2. This court has no original jurisdiction of a suit between a State on the
one side, and citizens of another State and citizens of the same State
on the other side. California v. Southern Pacific Company, 229.
3. When an original cause is pending in this court, to be disposed of here
in the first instance and in the exercise of an exceptional jurisdiction,
it, does not comport with the gravity and the finality which should
characterize such an adjudication, to proceed in the absence of parties
whose rights would be in effect determined, even though they might
not be technically bound in subsequent litigations in some other
tribunal. Ib.

4. The city of Oakland and the Oakland Water Front Company are so
situated in respect of this litigation, that the court ought not to pro-
ceed in their absence; and as, if they were brought in, the case would
then be between the State of California, on the one hand, and a citizen
of another State and citizens of California on the other, this court
cannot, under such circumstances, take original jurisdiction of it. Ib.
5. The finding of the Maryland Court of Appeals, that there was no fund
in the state treasury upon which the Comptroller could lawfully draw
his warrant, because there had been no appropriation made by the
state legislature for the payment of the commissions here claimed,
was decisive of this case, and involved no Federal question. Wailes
v. Smith, 271.

6. It being settled that by the joint resolution of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat.
1115, the jurisdiction of this court was preserved as to pending cases,

and cases wherein the writ of error on appeal should be sued out, or
taken before July 1, 1891, the court has jurisdiction of this case, the
writ of error having been allowed and sealed June 5, 1891. Gulf,
Colorado & Sante Fé Railway Co. v. Shane, 348.

7. Maynard v. Hecht, 151 U. S. 324, affirmed to the point that, "Where an
appeal or writ of error is taken from a District or a Circuit Court in
which the jurisdiction of the court alone is in issue, a certificate from
the court below of the question of jurisdiction to be decided is an
absolute prerequisite for the exercise of jurisdiction here; and if it
be wanting this court cannot take jurisdiction." Colvin v. Jackson-
ville, 368.

8. For the reasons stated in the opinion of the court it is held, (1) that
this court has no jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Circuit
Court in this case, and (2) that the writ of error was brought too
late. Lutcher v. United States, 427.

9. A court of equity has jurisdiction to prevent a threatened breach of
trust in the misapplication or diversion of the funds of a corporation
by illegal payments out of its capital or profits; and such a bill being
filed by a stockholder to prevent a trust company from voluntarily
making returns for the imposition and payment of a tax claimed to
be unconstitutional, and on the further ground of threatened multi-
plicity of suits and irreparable injury, and the objection of adequate
remedy at law not having been raised below or in this court, and the
question of jurisdiction having been waived by the United States, so
far as it was within its power to do so, and the relief sought being to
prevent the voluntary action of the trust company and not in respect
to the assessment and collection of the tax, this court will proceed to
judgment on the merits. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company,
429.

10. On the authority of Maynard v. Hecht, 151 U. S. 324, and Colvin v.
Jacksonville, 157 U. S. 368, this case is dismissed for want of a certifi-
cate from the Circuit Court certifying the question of its jurisdiction
for decision here. Davis & Rankin Building Co. v. Barber, 673.
11. The contention that petitioner cannot be made to pay the penalty
for the crime of which he was adjudged guilty, because he was not
executed at the time originally designated, was not sustained by the
chief justice of the State nor by the associate justice of its Supreme
Court, to whom, severally, he applied, and their action is not open to
review here. Lambert v. Barrett, 697.

12. An appeal will not lie from an order of a Circuit Judge at chambers.
Ib.

C. OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

1. Under § 2 of the act of March 3, 1887, c. 373, 24 Stat. 552, as corrected
by the act of August 13, 1888, c. 886, 25 Stat. 433, the jurisdiction of a
Circuit Court of the United States, on removal by the defendant of an
action from a state court, is limited to such suits as might have been

brought in that court under the first section. Mexican National Rail-
road Co. v. Davidson, 201.

2. Although section 3186 of the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin may have
enlarged the ordinary equitable action to quiet title and remove a
cloud, the Circuit Court of the United States, sitting in that District,
may take jurisdiction of a bill properly brought under its provisions.
Bardon v. Land and River Improvement Company, 327.

3. A person in possession, claiming under a tax deed, under which he had
obtained title, may institute such a suit. Ib.

4. The jurisdiction of a suit so instituted is not affected by the provision
in section 1197 of the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin of 1878 confer-
ring for three years a right of action by the grantee in a tax deed
against the owner to bar him and his grantees from claiming the land,
nor by the provisions of § 22, c. 138, of the Revised Statutes of 1858.
Ib.

JURY.

Under the act of May 2, 1890, c. 182, providing a temporary government
for the Territory of Oklahoma, the provisions of the statutes of Arkan-
sas, that if either party shall desire a panel, the court shall cause the
names of 24 competent jurors, written upon separate slips of paper, to
be placed in a box to be kept for that purpose, from which the names
of 18 shall be drawn and entered on a list in the order in which they
are drawn and numbered, and that each party shall be furnished with
a copy of that list, from which each may strike the names of three
jurors, and return the list so struck to the judge, who shall strike from
the original list the names so stricken from the copies, and the first
twelve names remaining in the original list shall constitute the jury,
are mandatory, and no rule or custom of the court can override them.
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fé Railway Co. v. Shane, 348.

In computing the time of service which entitles an officer in the army to
longevity pay, service in a volunteer regiment is not service" in the
army of the United States" within the meaning of the 15th section
of the act of July 5, 1838, c. 162, 5 Stat. 256. United States v. Sweeny,
281.

MINERAL LAND.

1. When the course of a mineral vein is across a claim, instead of in the
direction of its length, the side lines of the location of the claim