PART II.

Sect. 1. Of the Means by which these Dangers may be averted.

THESE painful anticipations would be worse than useless, if the sad fate which seems to be impending over the country, were such as no possible efforts could prevent.

I see not the wisdom of propagating alarm without any ulterior, object; or for the sake merely of discrediting the measures of a former government. But if the public be, as I conceive it in general is, unconscious of the true extent and dreadful character, of those calamities with which we are menaced; and if the most arduous exertions, animated by a spirit of unbounded devotion to the cause of our country, can alone preserve us from destruction; a more important service to the state cannot be rendered, than to awaken the people to their danger.

By a fatality which seems like the mysterious work of a chastising Providence, the nations successively subdued by France, have had no adequate conceptions of the sad destiny which awaited them, till they have actually felt the yoke. Some of them have wilfully assisted her in forging their own chains; and all have been wanting in that resolution and ardour, with which so dreadful a foe ought to have been resisted. Their governments, perhaps, may have been chiefly in fault, but, except in the useless struggles of the brave Calabrians and Tyrolese, we have no where seen a popular energy equal to the occasion; but rather a torpor and indifference hard to be explained.

It would seem as if their and our deadly enemy possessed, like the rattlesnake, whose destructive malignity and contortive progress he imitates, the power of fascination. This pernicious reptile, being encumbered with a rattle, which, like the despotism of Napoleon, gives a wholesome alarm to all around him, would rarely be able to destroy the animals who are his ordinary victims, if it were not for a

strange stupifying influence which he is able to exert upon them, as soon as his fiery eyes have arrested theirs, and marked them for destruction. From that moment, instead of frustrating, they favour, his murderous purpose. Far from exerting their sure powers of resistance or escape, they await motionless his approach; or even by an unconscious suicide, rush upon his fatal fangs. The horrible tortures which ensue, can alone awaken them from the charm. Travellers confidently assure us, that not only the squirrel, the raccoon, and still larger animals, but even man himself, is the victim of this strange fascination. It is added, that birds on the wing are arrested in their flight, the moment their eye meets that of the rattlesnake on the earth below them; and that renouncing the security of an element in which this deadly enemy cannot reach them, they drop from the air into his voracious jaws. Of this last particulár I should, I own, be incredulous, but for the recollection that there are Englishmen, who would, by making peace at this juncture, lay open the sea to France.

If governments have been elsewhere blameable, for not informing the mind, and exciting in due time the active courage of the people, the prodigy is not lessened, but only altered in its form. It is true, that under despotic governments, the popular spirit can have few spontaneous movements; but kings and ministers, at least, have been fascinated by Buonaparte; and their superior means of information, add greatly to the wonder.

In England, however, the government and the people mutually and strongly act upon each other. It is just therefore to say, that a want of energy in preparing for our defence, must be the fault of both; and with the voice of an independent, but loyal Englishman, I will endeavour to point out duties which each has hitherto neglected.

But before I proceed to suggest the public measures, which appear to me essential to the salvation of the country, let me briefly, but firmly, protest against one, which would greatly aggravate its dangers.

Sect. 2. Ought we to make Peace with France?

We lately endeavoured to find a palliation for the evils of the times, by an immediate termination of the war; and happy is it for England, perhaps, that the experiment did not succeed.

Events have since occurred, which seem to remove all danger of the same attempt being speedily resumed; and yet there are per

sons, who, by a strange inversion of what appears to me right reasoning, regard the ruin of the continent, and the extreme aggrandizement of France, as arguments for a maritime peace. It may not be wholly useless, therefore, to condemn the late abortive attempt; though I trust, that Auerstadt, and the fall of Prussia, have now evinced the danger of a line of policy, which Austerlitz, and the peace of Presburgh, might have sufficed to preclude.

To censure a great political measure of the present able and enlightened cabinet, is perhaps presumptuous in a private individual; and is a work which I perform with regret. I am conscious that the awful considerations which may weigh in the choice between a pacific or warlike system, cannot be perfectly known to the public at large; and the distinguished talents now united in the ministry, certainly challenge the strongest general confidence in the wisdom: of our counsels. Yet I dare not suppress, at this awful conjuncture, a very sincere, though perhaps erroneous opinion, that a peace with France, if accomplished by the late negociations, would have been fatal to the security of the country.

Unfortunately, from the nature of our constitution, ministers are not always at liberty to follow that path of policy which they may deem the best in itself. Interior difficulties, arising from parliamentary opposition, or from the popular voice, may drive them out of that course which they would otherwise think it prudent to steer; and in this instance, it seems to have been imagined, that the public voice began to declare for peace.

At the same time, I find it difficult to conjecture whence that impression arose; unless from a natural source of mistake to which great men, whether in or out of office, are unavoidably exposed. There is nothing on which it is safer to hazard an opinion in private, than the inclination of the popular voice; and a statesman is not likely to hear any information, hostile to opinions, which are understood to be his own. In this case it certainly was very generally understood that the new administration, especially Mr. Fox, and his friends, were decidedly bent upon peace.

But whatever might be the source of this impression, I am confidently of opinion that it was erroneous; that the nation at large was never more generally disposed for the prosecution of war; and that the burst of joy with which the rupture of the late negociation was received at the Exchange, would have been echoed from the remotest parts of the kingdom, if its sound, and its occasion, could have been heard so far. Not that the people love, or do not deplore the war; but that they wisely despair of any real or abiding peace; and dread the

consequences of any treaty that can be made with France at this period.

That there was not more reason to apprehend opposition to a determined war system in parliament, I dare not affirm; and feeling how much party spirit is now to be deprecated, I venture to censure the negociation the more freely, because if it was wrong to negociate with France, it was an error which the present opposition does not, and cannot arraign. The leading members of that body, some of whom well deserve the esteem of their country, had not indeed expressly declared for a pacific system; but language was held by them which plainly implied an opinion, that peace might not improperly be negociated for at that disastrous æra, on what they called "honourable terms."

The true objections to the measure then, as well as at the present more awful crisis, apply to the unavoidable nature and effects of any treaty that could be proposed; not to its particular terms; yet we heard of" a good peace," and "an honourable peace," as proper to be treated for with France. For my part, if the possibility of a safe peace can be shewn, I will heartily admit, be its articles what they may, that it is good for my country in these evil times; and not dishonourable to her, but glorious to those who may make it. But while no such peace is to be hoped for, I would not treat; because I would not lead the people of England into the dangerous error of supposing, that peace with France, in her present attitude, is compatible with their safety; nor would I lead the people of Europe and America to believe that England is of that opinion.

The great and insuperable objections to a treaty of peace with Buonaparte in the existing state of Europe, are first, that it will enable him to prepare new means for our destruction; secondly, that it cannot abate his inclination to use them; and thirdly, that it can bring us no pledge or security whatever against his pursuing the most hostile and treacherous conduct.

We have heard much lately of the uti possidetis; but this basis, from the offer of which the enemy receded in respect of the shore, he cannot be expected to extend to the sea. If he would apply it to the relative situations of the British and French navies, allowing us to keep the exclusive possession of the ocean, and engaging neither to increase his marine, nor send his fleets out of port, nor prepare seamen to man them hereafter, the true spirit of the uti possidetis might apply to the present new and extraordinary case; in which, as Napoleon himself admits, the dominion of the sea is in our possessión; and is an advantage which forms our only counterpoise to his

tremendous continental power. But since this application of the principle cannot be hoped for or proposed, the specious basis for which we so eagerly contended, would in truth be fallacious and unequal. It would leave to France all her present means of annoyance; and soon deprive us of that extreme ascendency at sea, which is our chief mean of defence. It is like the equality of proposing to a man that has a shorter sword than his enemy, that each shall keep his pistols, provided he will come out of the house in which he has taken shelter, or let the door be open to both.

Napoleon, however, thought even this bad bargain too good for us, when he found us ready to accept it: or rather, as we were disposed to leave him possessed of every usurpation in Europe, he postponed the agreement, till he should have usurped a still larger share of the continent; and thrown down every remaining outwork by which we might hope to be in any degree covered, when no longer irresistible on the ocean. I doubt not, that when his continental enemies shall have been brought to acquiescence in a new manufactory of kingdoms, out of the ruins of their power, he will again offer to us the uti possidetis.

In yielding to us the sovereignty of new colonies and settlements beyond the Atlantic, or in the extremity of Africa, he well knows that he shall give us no means of future security against his arms; but on the contrary, increase those fatal drains which exhaust our defensive energies. What can a man who wishes to conquer England, desire better, than to give her new colonies to garrison, in the sickly swamps of Guiana; and new civil and military establishments to maintain, at the Cape of Good Hope? He professes indeed to place a great value on colonies; and perhaps, considering the situation of France, might reasonably do so; but new distant territory to Great Britain, is like new projections from the upper floors of a building which already overhangs its base.

If, however, Buonaparte were short sighted enough not to perceive that we should be enfeebled by such acquisitions, he knows at least that the free use of the sea, is worth to him a hundred such colonial cessions, as the uti possidetis would give us. We should in effect pay him a large compensation for the spoils of his allies in the colonies; while he would retain the enormous spoils of our allies in Europe, without paying for them any compenstion at all. I cannot think therefore that he has receded from this offered basis, except for a short interval, and with a view to finish his usurpations on the continent, before he accepts our comprehensive sanction of them in a new treaty of peace.

H