be pursued as a policy must not merely depend upon the stipulation of a treaty agreement, but also upon the nature of our commercial relations with the country in question. For example, it would be possible for us to conclude a treaty of reciprocity with such a country as Germany, whereby we should provide for the free entry of both manufactured and agricultural products into this country in exchange for similar treatment of our goods by our competitor. Yet, in this case, it would not be reasonable to expect that we should import cereals from Germany. We should continue to send them our grain and they would continue to send us their manufactures. Reciprocity, in other words, cannot, as was seen, ordinarily change the course of international trade save in very limited respects; it can at most only promote its progress along the lines which it has marked out for itself. In our experience with Canada, we had tried to see what could be done in the exchange of products of similar kinds on similar terms between two areas of substantially the same general character. In our experiment with Hawaii we had shown what could be done toward stimulating the export both of agricultural and manufactured products to a country needing both and sending us in exchange tropical products of a kind raised only to a limited extent within the borders of the United States. The gain to be secured in the latter trade accrued in a degree both to the agriculturist and the manufacturer, though in a larger measure to the latter. The consumers' interests were not at all considered. In the Canadian treaty the main benefit had come to the consumer, being transferred to him by a competitive process. As in the history of most cases of protection and of new experiments in the control of international trade, the first step away from the interest of the consumer was very speedily taken. The Hawaiian treaty, as just shown, had concerned itself primarily with the interests of the producing class. But the struggle over the benefits of reciprocal trade could not stop at this point. It necessarily passed with little delay to

another stage and developed into a contest between different classes of producers. There were, of course, not many countries in which the peculiar conditions characteristic of the Hawaiian Islands could be found to exist, and no careful student of reciprocity as a policy could have failed to see that in future efforts to extend our trade through this means there would inevitably come a time when the interests of some must be sacrificed in order to promote those of others. Only in the case of the most limited kind of industry, only in the case of countries possessing no variety of occupation, could it be possible to maintain a reciprocity policy which would be injurious to none, which would benefit all producers alike, and which would not injure the consumer.

That this problem was early realized there seems to be no reasonable doubt. In fact, the expansion of our foreign commerce had beforehand determined, in effect, the outcome of the controversy. Not only was the manufacturer stronger than the agriculturist politically, but he was weaker commercially, so that both from a theoretical and from a practical standpoint it was to be expected that a difference of interest between these two classes of producers would terminate to the disadvantage of the latter. Our agriculturists were, of course, enjoying an enormous and apparently limitless export trade. In the early eighties they felt little need of protection against foreign products, for the European market, not yet attacked by the competing wheat fields of Russia and South America, offered a practically unimpeded field of operations to the American farmer. They suffered somewhat from foreign tariffs and most severely from our own. Our manufacturers, on the other hand, were just beginning to appreciate the possibility of manufacturing expansion. Exports were growing in volume and, while they were not able to compete with foreign goods on their own ground, it might be possible for them to secure control of competitive markets, could the markets in question be fenced off by some differential advan

tage for Americans. It was almost a foregone conclusion, therefore, that in seeking for a field within which to secure trade concessions our statesmen should look with interest to countries which would offer a free field for our factory output, and which would perhaps take from us some partly manufactured goods like flour, salt meats, canned packing house products and others of the same general nature. Once the policy of fostering manufactures even at the expense of certain kinds of agricultural production had thus been contemplated, it was not surprising that we should be willing to go a step further and grant concessions at the expense of our own agricultural producers, while shaping them in such a way as at the same time to promote the interests of manufacturers. The demand for free raw materials was already growing very strong. If these could be admitted to our country in such a way as to provide manufacturers with what they needed in the effort to produce cheaply and thus conquer ever more and more markets, a double result would have been gained--we should have found an opening for the output of our factories abroad and we should have enabled our producers to take a position of advantage from which they would be able to invade other markets in competition with foreigners. It was true that this step, if taken at all, must be taken at the expense of the domestic producer of raw materials. Yet, as we have seen, it was felt by many that the latter already had a sufficiently strong hold; while it was no more than a logical outcome of protectionism that that system should develop along selfish lines in such a way as to foster more and more particularly the interests of a specialized class.

In treating of reciprocity heretofore we have seen that as a determinate policy it had obtained no great hold upon the public mind. Its principal supporters had advocated it merely in isolated instances in which it was desired, for one reason or another, to improve our relations with foreign countries. This was the case with Canada, where, as has been shown, reci

procity was advocated only partly on the ground of the advantages which would accrue from it to the consumer. In the case of Hawaii, reciprocity had been supported confessedly upon the chief ground that it would tend to strengthen the political influence which we were striving to build up in the Islands. The advent of a conscious reciprocity policy was postponed until after 1880. Its appearance at that time was partly attributable to the fact that the tariff was now definitely before the public as an issue and that in view of the industrial situation already outlined, the Republicans scarcely dared to go to the polls with a policy of unmodified protection, in the face of their promises ever since the Civil War to remove duties imposed upon manufactured goods chiefly because of military necessities.

In the search for some countries which could be induced to go into reciprocity negotiations in a way which would produce the desired results in the United States, it was manifestly impossible to place much reliance upon Europe. As has been shown, the European free-trade movement had already terminated, and in its place there had come an era of discriminating tariffs and a war of duties. Eastern trade had not then developed to a considerable extent. The effort to get into better commercial relations with Canada had been. looked upon with disfavor ever since the close of our earlier reciprocity treaty. In short, the only part of the world which seemed thoroughly available as a place in which to develop markets was the continent to the south of us. We had long sought to get a greater control in South America than had actually fallen to our share, and some persons in the United States had been disappointed that our vigorous enunciation of the Monroe doctrine had failed not only to wean the South American countries from their allegiance to the European nations with which they were most closely allied by blood, but also draw them to our side, both commercially and politically. It is not to be doubted that during the period from

1880 to 1885 the idea that we might succeed in using reciprocity very much as it had been used in the case of Hawaii was very popular with some statesmen. This point of view was manifested in the discussions over the renewal of the Hawaiian treaty as well as in many public utterances of the time. President Cleveland himself, while strongly antagonizing reciprocity as a whole, nevertheless felt called upon to concede to it a certain success in the case of Hawaii, and this later led him to favor the renewal of the Hawaiian treaty even in the face of his own declarations on the general policy therein involved. It is easy to see how men, who were not imbued with Mr. Cleveland's general notions on free trade, or with his general opposition to all efforts after foreign dominion, should have readily grasped at reciprocity, not merely as a means of promoting commercial expansion, but also as a scheme for gaining a foothold in foreign countries.

The nature of the movement which was thus actively making in favor of reciprocity may be understood from a study of our efforts to secure reciprocity with Spain in regard to certain of her possessions. These efforts came to a head in 1884 when a treaty was finally negotiated providing for the grant of concessions to us in Cuba and Porto Rico in return for similar concessions to the inhabitants of those Islands trading with the United States. There were some features involved in this treaty besides those which related merely to commercial concessions. It was desired to supplement the old treaty of 1795 (with Spain) by some more modern provisions as to commercial freedom, the protection of the rights of persons and property, and the "most favored nation clause," which were not to be found in that document. The main object was, however, to extend our trade to the Islands and to obtain such mutual arrangements in regard to shipping as would stimulate our commerce. In the treaty, as actually negotiated, American vessels were granted the same privileges as Spanish vessels in trade between Cuba and Porto Rico and the United States, this