of things which it would not be within the power of this government at any time to alter." Moreover, a very forcible argument was presented by Guatemala, whose representatives complained of the artificial stimulus which had been given to the cultivation of sugar in that country under the impression that the markets of the United States would remain open to its producers. Now that sugar was no longer free, the capital invested in such enterprises would, of course, be very much less in value than would otherwise have been the case. Guatemala also called attention to the injustice of admitting Hawaiian sugar free, in view of the alleged discrimination thereby imposed upon the sugars of all other countries. Like Brazil and Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and San Domingo filed protests against the change of policy toward the reciprocity treaties.

In a foregoing chapter the statistics of our import and export trade with the reciprocity countries have already been sufficiently set forth, and they need not be recapitulated at this point. Reference to the discussion there presented will show that, save in one or two special cases, to be discussed later on, and governed by exceptional circumstances, trade with these countries showed no general falling off under the Wilson Act.

One of the first acts of the Republicans, as they gradually regained power subsequent to the passage of the Wilson bill, was to announce their allegiance to reciprocity as a policy. A crop of bills and resolutions came up in Congress on the subject of reciprocity in the course of the first session of the 54th Congress, 1895-1896, and were referred to the Committee on Ways and Means. This was deemed a favorable opportunity for manufacturing a little political capital. The Committee undertook a labored investigation of the reciprocity policy and finally presented a bulky report 48 to Congress, in which it discussed the whole subject, paying especial attention to the

48 House Report, 2263, 54th Congress, 1st session, 1896, p. 643.

working of the McKinley treaties and the effects of their abrogation under the Wilson tariff. Needless to say, the report was a glowing tribute to McKinley reciprocity and a violent "arraignment" of the Democrats for their alleged action in restoring the sugar tariff and repealing the reciprocity section of the act of 1890. In the course of its inquiries, the Com- { mittee called before it sundry individuals, supposedly conversant with conditions in the business world, and it also sent out circulars of inquiry to chambers of commerce and industrial organizations, among which not a few political clubs were included. The questions contained in these circulars con

cerned:

(1) The effect of the reciprocity arrangements under the act of 1890;

(2) The results of their repeal by the tariff act of 1894; (3) The wisdom of re-enacting reciprocity legislation; and (4) The methods which might be pursued by our diplomatic representatives in extending the foreign trade of the United States.

Of the replies to this circular, most were favorable to reciprocity, regarding the treaties of 1890 as beneficial, the repeal of the reciprocity section under the Wilson tariff as injurious, and its restoration by fresh legislation a desirable change. A few were opposed to a reciprocity policy. There were, of course, all shades of opinion in the various replies received. Contradictory and often absurd interpretations of recent commercial statistics were offered, but there could be no doubt that the general verdict of the organizations consulted was strong and unequivocal in its support of the general idea of reciprocity. From Chicago, Minneapolis, Boston, Pittsburg, New York, Galveston, St. Louis, Cleveland, Los Angeles and a great number of other important commercial centers came clear and unmistakable declarations of approval for the policy embodied in the McKinley Act and of disapproval for the Wilson repeal. While a few persons and organizations

expressed the belief that changes in tariff methods and schedules were more injurious even than oppressive duties, the vast majority did not hesitate to give their approval to the idea of fresh reciprocity legislation.

A much more lengthy and detailed circular of inquiry was sent to manufacturers, and another to commission and export merchants. These circulars included all the questions which were comprised in the circular sent to commercial organizations, but they also included very many additional inquiries. They asked for the details concerning the capitalization and personnel of various plants, the changes in foreign tariffs, tending to affect the industries in question, the conditions of competition with foreign countries, as well as the changes in cost of production as compared with a date six years earlier, and made inquiries regarding the attitude of the person addressed in regard to reciprocity. Almost uniformly, the answers returned to these circulars, like those sent in reply to the earlier one, were favorable to the policy of the McKinley Tariff Act, so far as it related to reciprocity. The general impression produced by these replies is, that whereas the manufacturers who answered them were in nearly all cases "good protectionists," each of them was well assured that his own infant industry ought to be safeguarded from outside competition, and he was equally certain that our "foreign trade" (by which, in nearly all instances, he meant the openings for his own goods abroad) should be "encouraged." Very few went so far as to specify the exact line which this encouragement should pursue, but in all minds there was vaguely floating the idea that the way to encourage an "export trade" in the commodity in question was to open our markets to some other product than their own, exported by foreign countries and needed by our consumers. The manufacturers were perfectly willing to sacrifice each other's interests in payment for concessions to themselves, "the principle of protection" being adhered to because necessary to account for the protection which they themselves

enjoyed. In some instances, however, the answers were distinctly unfavorable to reciprocity under the McKinley Act. One New York firm, for example, stated decidedly that "the general effect of the reciprocity conventions in 1890 was in our opinion unfavorable to the trade of this country. While the exports to certain countries of favored products, such as breadstuffs, machinery, etc., may have increased, the reverse was the case with all other articles, the reason of this being the hostility engendered in many quarters and the necessity under which the treaty nations were of increasing the duties on products not favored, for it must be borne in mind that the Latin-American nations are almost wholly dependent on customs duties for revenue, and if deprived of these on such leading imports as breadstuffs they must make other products bear the burden. The treaties, we have reason to believe, were not generally popular. * * * No little feeling detrimental to our trade was also created by the apparent favor shown to such countries as Mexico, Argentina and others, which were not discriminated against, despite the fact that they declined to make treaties."

There were several such rifts as this within the lute, and it is certainly reasonable to suppose that had the list of manufacturers, to whom circulars were to be sent, been selected with less care a much larger proportion of them would have declared adversely to reciprocity.

CHAPTER IX

THE DINGLEY ACT

It will be impossible to discuss at length the political conditions which grew up after the passage of the Wilson bill. One after another certain adverse circumstances added each a set of conditions which rendered it less and less possible for the Democrats to regain power at the close of the term for which Mr. Cleveland had been elected in 1892. Yet, it is necessary to review in a general way the main outlines of the events which contributed to the defeat of the Democratic party. We have already spoken of the crisis of 1893 with its disastrous effects inherited from the legislation by which the Republicans had tried to temporize with the silver element in 1890. It was a political misfortune to his party that President Cleveland saw, and, in his characteristic way so readily accepted, the moral duty resting upon him to restore the credit of our country by the repeal of the Sherman silver act. Yet, this was a service for which he received at the time the thanks of but a small group of patriotic men. A great body of the people had for the moment been infected by the false philosophy of cheap money—a seed which fell upon the fertile soil prepared for it by the commercial disasters of 1893 and the succeeding years. Had the crisis lightened, and had prosperity returned, it might have been possible to avert the threatening political storm and to restore the mass of the voters to their senses. In that case, we might have continued upon the strait and narrow tariff reform path which had been mapped out by President Cleveland and William L. Wilson, for they had but made a beginning with their efforts at the restoration of a