specified rates of duty collected upon each of the articles enumerated. Thus it appears that by the offer of concessions in these carefully selected and unimportant articles we were to try to buy openings for our commodities abroad, and inasmuch as it would be practically hopeless for us to expect to secure modifications of European tariffs on our cereals-so far as any existed-by the offer of such minute concessions, it was apparent, on the face of things, that the openings hoped for were to be for our manufactures.

But the most interesting part of the Dingley provisions was found in the third kind of reciprocity of which mention has already been made. It will have been observed that in the cases already cited the discretion of deciding when to place the goods already mentioned on the free list was left to the President without further action by Congress. But in the provision for the third kind of reciprocity, it was specified that all arrangements were to be made by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The agreements negotiated were to provide for the admission of the goods, wares and merchandise of the United States to foreign countries upon as favorable terms as possible. In return therefor the President was authorized to provide for the reduction, during a period not exceeding five years, of twenty per cent. in the Dingley duties upon such goods and merchandise of the countries with which the treaties were negotiated as might be agreed upon. In any case, a ratification by the Senate was necessary. Thus a large field for the profitable exercise of a reciprocity policy was suggested, subject to the condition that Congress would prove sufficiently pliable to meet the wishes of the President who had negotiated the treaties in question. The Dingley Act must therefore be looked at from two distinct points of view. So far as it actually took measures toward the establishment of reciprocity, it must be ranked far behind the McKinley Act. On the other hand, in its provisions for potential reciprocity it marked out a field far more extensive

than anything contemplated in the McKinley Act. It was a double-faced measure. It did little, but it promised a great deal.

In the debates of Congress on the Dingley bill, the confusion of mind which has characterized the two principal political parties with reference to reciprocity is clearly apparent. Before beginning an analysis of the debate, it is, therefore, desirable to sketch in outline the political considerations which suggest themselves as the result of the period of discussion upon reciprocity which opened with the act of 1890. As we have already seen, the tariff debate of 1890 did not wholly clarify the political situation and leave the two parties with a clear consciousness as to their exact attitude on the question. We have seen that the reciprocity of the McKinley bill was, in a sense, the result of Mr. Blaine's intervention. Shortly after the passage of that act it became apparent that the reciprocity principle, if carried far enough, might easily result in a very general reduction of tariff duties. Whether such a reduction would have been destructive to the industries of the country from a protective point of view or not, need not be here discussed. It is certain that reciprocity, if widely extended, might conceivably bring about a state of affairs similar to that prevailing in Germany under the general and conventional tariff system, or in France under the maximum and minimum tariff, as the case might be. That such an outcome would be highly distasteful to those who clung fondly to a highly protective policy goes without saying. Only, therefore, as the new plan was to be kept within bounds and limited to trade in certain specified directions could it be held to harmonize with the avowed principles of the protective system.

On the other hand, it was also very far from clear to those who advocated tariff revision that reciprocity would result in much improvement from their standpoint. We have already seen how reciprocity was regarded by so thorough-going a reformer as Mr. William L. Wilson. Yet there were many

in the Democratic party who accepted a different view. Not a few persons believed that the Democrats should hold themselves in readiness to accept any reduction of duty (of whatever kind) that could be obtained. According to the ideas of these reasoners, it did not so much matter whether the reductions of duty proposed in any particular case were such as necessitated hardship to certain classes of producers who relatively to others, would be injured by the proposed cut in duty for the sake of buying foreign markets abroad for certain other producers, or for the purpose of aiding domestic consumers by enabling them to get their commodities more cheaply. Regarding the whole protective system as essentially evil, they naturally maintained that reformers should not look too minutely into the effect of any changes in the schedules. They should be content to assist in securing such reductions as circumstances offered, and should bend every effort toward puncturing the protective system at as many points as practicable.

Opposed to this opinion was that of the group of Democrats who regarded reciprocity as merely a plan to defeat the free trade movement by quieting the fears of some manufacturers, and furnishing them ground for greater contentment with the conditions under which they were living by making them feel that their own interests at least had been safeguarded. Those who occupied this position felt that reciprocity was actually a dangerous proposal because it seemed like reform although only a hypocritical pretence, and they were inclined to consider it indefensible, even from a protectionist standpoint, because it implied a process of bartering away one man's protection for the extension of another man's market.

Within the Republican party, on the other hand, two distinct and opposing groups had early been developed. One group, as we have seen, consisted of the uncompromising hightariff men and bitterly opposed every change, however insignificant, looking to lower duties. The other included more

moderate persons who saw plainly enough that protectionism could be carried too far, and that if too extreme a policy were accepted, it would inevitably result in alienating some interests which otherwise might be saved to the protectionist ranks. It was practically necessary that the result of such conflicting forces, both within and without the dominant party, should be a compromise on the subject of reciprocity. The Wilson tariff had the effect of deepening the fear of anything approaching the doctrine of free raw materials as applied to staple articles, like sugar, hides, etc. Therefore, there was a practical certainty that in any legislation to be adopted, it would be more than ever sought to avoid this danger as far as possible, and to place the reciprocity plan upon a basis which would be acceptable to as many interests, and obnoxious to as few, as possible.

On the Democratic side of the struggle, it appeared that interest in the tariff question had been almost wholly lost. The frenzied outcry for silver, originated by Mr. Bryan, seemed to have captivated the imaginations of a large majority of the Democrats, and the protests of the conservative tariff reformers were drowned in the "silver chorus."

As originally introduced, the bill provided for reciprocity in the following words:3

"SEC. 3. That for the purpose of equalizing the trade of the United States with foreign countries, and their colonies, producing and exporting to this country the following articles: Argols, or crude tartar, or wine lees, crude; chicle; brandies, manufactured or distilled from grain or other materials and not specially provided for in this act; champagne and all other sparkling wines; still wines, including ginger wine or ginger cordial and vermuth; laces made of silk or of which silk is the component material of chief value; all mineral waters, and all imitations of natural mineral waters, and all artificial mineral waters, not specially provided for in this act; paintings and statuary; sugar, molasses, and other articles provided for in paragarph 208 of Schedule E of this act, or any of them, the President be, and he is hereby,

3 Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 1st session, Vol. 30, pp. 242-3.

authorized, as soon as may be after the passage of this act, and from time to time thereafter, to enter into negotiations with the governments of those countries exporting to the United States the above-mentioned articles, or any of them, with a view to the arrangement of commercial agreements in which reciprocal and equivalent concessions may be secured in favor of the products and manufactures of the United States; and whenever the government of any country, or colony, producing and exporting to the United States the above-mentioned articles, or any of them, shall enter into a commercial agreement with the United States, or make concessions in favor of the products on manufactures thereof, which, in the judgment of the President, shall be reciprocal and equivalent, he shall be, and is hereby authorized and empowered to suspend, during the time of such agreement or concession, by proclamation to that effect, the imposition and collection of the duties mentioned in this act, on such article or articles so exported to the United States from such country or colony, and thereupon and thereafter the duties levied, collected and paid upon such article or articles, shall be as follows, namely:

"Argols, or crude tartar, or wine lees, crude, one cent per pound. "Chicle, seven cents per pound.

"Brandies, manufactured or distilled from grain or other materials and not specially provided for in this act, two dollars per proof gallon. "Champagne, and all other sparkling wines, in bottles containing not more than one quart and more than one pint, six dollars per dozen; containing not more than one pint each and more than one-half pint, three dollars per dozen; containing one-half pint each, or less, one dollar and fifty cents per dozen; in bottles or other vessels containing more than one quart each, in addition to six dollars per dozen bottles on the quantities in excess of one quart, at the rate of one dollar and ninety cents per gallon.

"Still wines, including ginger, wine or ginger, cordial and vermuth, in casks, fifty cents per gallon; in bottles or jugs, per case of one dozen bottles or jugs containing each not more than one quart and more than one pint, or twenty-four bottles or jugs containing each not more than one pint, one dollar and sixty cents per case, and any excess beyond these quantities found in such bottles or jugs shall be subject to a duty of five cents per pint or fractional part thereof, but no separate or additional duty shall be assessed upon the bottles or jugs.

"Laces made of silk or of which silk is the component material of chief value, fifty-five per cent. ad valorem.

"All mineral waters, and all imitations of natural mineral waters, and all artificial mineral waters, not specially provided for in this act,