opening foreign markets to our products. In this address, too, he reasserted that the treaties were within the lines of protection and contended that the agreement negotiated under the act of 1897 and proclaimed by the President had already clearly demonstrated the beneficial influence of the reciprocity policy. There was, however, a strong and distinct trend of thought, and much intelligent argument by publicists in support of the reciprocity treaties. The verdict of the independent and of the more rational Republican journals was for them. These things produced their effect on the minds of the less benighted politicians. President McKinley understood the situation. He had seen, of course, that there was little, if any, prospect of pushing the reciprocity treaties through the Senate without arousing a storm which, in the face of the approaching Presidential campaign, he did not deem it wise to meet. Mr. McKinley knew, however, that the idea of tariff reform was by no means dead. He had no intention whatever of abandoning the reciprocity policy until it should become very much more apparent that the sentiment of the people was opposed to it. He sought, therefore, to have it understood that his administration was still favorable to reciprocity, and in order that this might be done with good color of truthfulness, he secured an extension of those treaties whose time of ratification was shortly to expire. Thus Mr. McKinley was able to face the country with a record of several treaties actually made, proclaimed, and put into effect, and several more negotiated and only awaiting action on the part of the Senate and House of Representatives to become effective. To the people at large he could represent himself as a strong champion and ardent defender of reciprocity, while the party managers could say to the protected interests not only that they had, as a matter of fact, declined to listen to the reciprocity proposals of the administration, but that they would during future sessions continue to do so. That President McKinley would be renominated for a second term was, of course, a foregone conclusion; that he would be re-elected was less certain, but a re-election would still be the logical outcome of the existing situation. Things were practically in the President's hands and almost the only cloud on the political horizon was the fact that the cost of living was noticeably on the increase, and that the exportprice question was being brought home to the people as one result of the high tariff policy. Mr. McKinley was wise enough, and keen politician enough, to recognize the facts of the situation. A good many pieces of evidence, many of them unofficial in character, indicate strongly that prior to the opening of the campaign of 1900 he had come clearly to the conclusion that the tariff policy was being carried too for. A brilliant victory won at the polls in November almost seemed to warrant the President in supposing that he could act as he pleased with reference to public questions. His popularity seemed to be unbounded. The tariff had received much less attention than had been expected for it, and the free trade agitation was seemingly almost dead. Yet in his annual message to Congress at the opening of the session of 1900-1901 Mr. McKinley again endorsed reciprocity. "The policy of reciprocity so manifestly rests upon the principles of international equity, and has been so repeatedly approved by the people.of the United States that there ought to be no hesitation in either branch of the Congress in giving to it full effect." " Congress, however, took no action. It was scarcely to be expected that a problem certain to arouse the debate which would inevitably break out over the reciprocity proposal should be initiated during the limited time of a short session. Little or nothing was heard concerning reciprocity, and President McKinley felt himself obliged to recur to the subject once more in his inaugural address. On that occasion, March 4, 1897, he said: "In the revision of the tariff, especial attention should be given 17 President's Annual Message, December, 1900. to the re-enactment and extension of the reciprocity principle of the law of 1890, under which so great a stimulus was given to our foreign trade in new and advantageous markets for our surplus agricultural and manufactured products. The brief trial given this legislation amply justifies a further experiment and additional discretionary power in the making of commercial treaties, the end in view always to be the opening up of new markets for the products of our country, by granting concessions to the products of other lands that we need and cannot produce ourselves, and which do not involve any loss of labor to our own people, but tend to increase their employment.” 18 We have seen that the first of the reciprocity treaties had been submitted to the Senate at the opening of Congress in the Winter of 1899-1900, and that the session had slipped away without any action whatever. It had been supposed that certainly during this long session they would receive full consideration and would be acted upon in some way, and it had really been a considerable surprise to the public when it turned out to be impossible to spur the Senate to a realizing sense of what was expected. We have seen how vigorous were a few interests in their effort to prevent action upon certain of the treaties, and it seems to have been felt that it was of little use to ratify one unless all were ratified, inasmuch as such action might give offense to the countries whose treaties were rejected.19 The chief workers 18 Inaugural Address of President McKinley, March 4, 1897. Journal of the Senate, Special Session, March 4, 1897, p. 193. 19 One interesting feature of the negotiations under the Dingley act is found in our proposed treaty with Russia. Russia, during 1900-1901, manifested a strong disposition to discriminate against us and in the course of the tariff controversy which followed, it turned out that negotiations which had been undertaken with Russia had been broken off by our government. It seemed that the details of the agreement had been practically completed and that they concluded concessions of considerable value to our exports, both of manufactured and agricultural character. The lists had been approved by the government at St. Petersburg and the concessions asked for in return had been extremely moderate. Our government, however, had not thought it best to continue negotiations which would very probably be fruitless, judging from the recent experience with reciprocity treaties, and it therefore abruptly terminated the negotiation. Pursuant to section five of the Dingley act, providing for countervailing duties, Secretary Gage immediately after the negotiations had been concluded imposed a duty upon Russian sugar which was promptly met by a sharp increase on American steel and iron manufactures and a tariff war between the two countries was fairly open. (The Independent, Vol. 53, pp. 509-510. "The President's Treaties of Reciprocity.") It was no wonder that the countries of Europe felt considerably aggrieved at the Dingley tariff and that they regarded some problematical reciprocity treaties in addition to the very minute concessions made through the agreements negotiated who had prevented action during the long session, 1899-1900, had been a few Senators who felt that they must carry out the wishes of constituents who imagined themselves affected by the treaties. By judicious influence and by active stimulation of the fear of tariff revision among their associates, these men were able to hold back any action on the part even of the Committee of Foreign Affairs. Among those who had been most vigorous were, of course, the knit-goods and cheap jewelry interests, but there was also a loud outcry from the fruit-growers of California and from certain wool-growers in the West.20 These interests now renewed their efforts and the short session of 1900-1901 passed away, like its predecessor, without action. The persistent failure of the Senate to act with reference to the reciprocity treaties would have thrown all the agreements aside had it not been that steps were taken by the Executive for the purpose of extending the duration of the agreements. The Dingley Act had specified that the treaties were to be negotiated within two years after the passage of the act and under this clause in the law it might, therefore, have been impossible to negotiate new treaties. This made it very necessary that those which had already been arranged for should be maintained if any concessions in the direction of reciprocity were ever to be wrung from Congress. Toward the end of the time within which it was necessary to ratify and proclaimed by the President as an exceedingly small compensation for the trade they lost. Germany was particularly affected by the Dingley tariff. In 1897, German exports to this country had been $94,000,000, but in 1898 they declined to $77,000,000, a falling off of $17,000,000. In the face of the fact that Germany was necessary to us as a buyer of food, raw materials and certain manufactured goods, we dealt the exporting interests of that country a severe blow at a time when a tariff commission in that country was just on the point of devising and presenting new schedules for an enactment into law. It was a foregone conclusion that these schedules, unless we should ward off the threatening danger by a suitable reciprocity or other arrangements, would be highly unfavorable to us. (A review of our position with reference to Germany may be found in the Forum, Vol. 28 (December, 1899), pp. 493, 502, in an article on "The Commercial Relations of the United States and Germany," by J. H. Gore.) 20 A sketch of the situation in the Senate may be found in the New York Independent, Vol. 52, pp. 2897-99, in an article on "The Reciprocity Treaties and the Senate," by Hon. John W. Foster. In this article, the notion is advanced, that the demand for reciprocity arose out of the fact that over-production had occurred in consequence of protection, and that with this over-production had been devel oped a need for larger markets which could best be secured by the negotiation of reciprocity treaties. the agreements negotiated with Great Britain, steps were taken for the purpose of securing an extension. On March 6, 1900, Secretary of State Hay and Lord Pauncefote signed an article additional and amendatory to the commercial convention for British Guiana, Turks and Caicos Islands, Bermuda and Jamaica. By this article the period for the ratification of the several treaties was extended twelve months from March 16, 1900.21 About a year later (April 27, 1901,) an additional article to the convention with the British colony of Barbados (of June 16, 1899) was signed, whereby the period for ratification was extended twelve months from April 27, 1901, thus carrying it to April 27, 1902.22 On March 5, 1901, Secretary Hay and Lord Pauncefote extended the first group of treaties already spoken of twelve months from March 16, 1901, and by later supplementary conventions the period for the ratification of these treaties was extended to cover the short session of Congress, 1902-1903. After the death of Lord Pauncefote and the coming of Ambassador Herbert, in October, 1902, a supplementary convention extending the time of ratification of the treaty with Barbados by six months was also signed October 26, 1902. Thus all the British treaties were extended over the short session of Congress, 1902-1903. With the Argentine Republic a supplementary convention was signed May 6, 1901, by William P. Lord, Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States and the Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations, whereby the period of ratification of the commercial treaty with the country signed July 10, 1899, was extended eighteen months from May 6, 1901.23 A similar convention extending the period for the ratification of the treaty with Nicaragua of October 20, 1899, was signed on June 25, 1900, by Secretary Hay and the Minister Plenipotentiary of Nicaragua. By this document the period for the rati 21 57th Congress, 1st session, Senate Executive A, part 2. |