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debt to Cuba. Urging this consideration Representative Tawney, of Minnesota, said that:

"A great many gentlemen around me are, together with myself, anxious to know how you interpret or how you conclude, that we have limited the sovereignty of Cuba by the Platt amendment, when they are entirely free under that amendment to enter into reciprocal trade agreements with any country in the world, and when we do nothing more than to prevent them from entering into a treaty to transfer that sovereignty to some other power."

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The claim thus advanced, that the Platt amendment had bound us to nothing, was strengthened by the further argument that we had already done all for Cuba that could possibly be expected of us. Mr. Weeks, of Michigan, exclaimed:

*

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"Where, under the broad canopy of the sky, arises our moral and legal obligation to Cuba? * These impecunious Cubans, who came with outstretched hand of beggary, nothing else, caught the idea because the President [McKinley] was so gracious and kind that they had obtained his promise. They went back and they exaggerated and misrepresented the matter and told the Cuban people that President McKinley had promised that he would do so and so. * * He had no authority to make such a promise, and if those Cubans had known anything about the structure of our Government and the powers of the different departments-the executive, the legislative, and the judicial departments of the government-they would have known that President McKinley not only did not, but could not make any such promise to them. Now, upon such a light foundation as that, this whole structure of moral and legal obligation is built up and advocated by dignified, learned and great statesmen on the floor of this House." 30

But the argument that we had already fulfilled our duty to Cuba and owed nothing to her was carried further in the claim that, even if it should be felt that something was due from us, the means suggested was inadequate to the purpose. By far the most favored argument of the beet sugar advocates was that the proposed reduction would result in benefiting no one but the so-called sugar trust, and would not at all

20 April 8, 1902. Ibid., p. 3860.

so Ibid., p. 3957

help the Cuban planter. This notion was most elaborately set forth by Mr. Morris, of Minnesota, on the 9th of April:

"It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the sugar trust can, if it will, absorb the whole of a twenty per cent. reduction made to Cuba, and it will, as it has done in the cases I have stated before, absorb a part of it at least. If it should take to itself onehalf of it, we will be making an annual present to that combination of more than two and a half millions. When we take this part out, and also that part which might go to absentee Spanish landlords, and to the Spanish usurer, and to those Americans, most of whom are more or less intimately associated with the sugar trust and its officers, and who instead of investing their money at home in America, are now exploiting Cuba for their own selfish purposes and crying out to the American people in the name of God and humanity, what will be left for the Cuban planter and laborer proper?” “

So, also, Mr. W. A. Smith, of Michigan, explicitly stated: "I am opposed to this policy because I believe that the principle beneficiary will be the American Sugar Refining Company, which does not need our sympathy.

"I am opposed to this measure because I believe that the people of the Island of Cuba will receive no benefit therefrom." "

Furthermore, it was urged that even granting that Cuba would be aided by the proposed reduction and that it was our duty to extend such aid on this occasion, it was not right to do it in the way proposed. Should this be done the result would be merely to put Cuba into an attitude of mendicancy, with the result that whenever economic needs should arise in the Island the inhabitants would seek to satisfy them by an appeal to the United States.

Realizing the weakness of their position, should it continue to lack the appearance of generosity which would be lent it by the offer of some substitute plan for Cuban relief, certain of the beet sugar representatives hastened to come forward in support of the so-called "rebate plan" already explained.

21 Ibid., p. 3908.

32 Ibid., p. 3898.

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Mr. W. A. Smith, of Michigan, pleaded strongly for this proposal:

"We bring you a rebate plan which has in it no threat to American industries. We bring to you a proposition which, if carried to its conclusion, will give a wider and better and far more reaching relief to the Cuban people than the proposition of the Committee on Ways and Means."

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Mr. Morris also set forth with great vehemence the advantages of the rebate plan.

"Under all these circumstances, is it not evident that this measure is un-Republican, unwise, and unpatriotic? And is not this conclusion strengthened when we consider that there is another method by which all that is sought to be accomplished by this measure can be accomplished and accomplished much more completely and effectively, and without the danger of evil consequences to which I have referred? "That method was proposed in the Republican conference. In the fewest possible words it is this: That we shall not reduce duties at all; that we shall continue to collect the full rate, and shall then, for such length of time as may be necessary, pay over to the Cuban government such portion of the amount collected as may be necessary to accomplish the ends sought; and that in consideration thereof we shall receive from Cuba such reciprocal concessions as she may be able to grant."

Other speakers followed the same line of argument.

The effort was likewise strongly made to show that the proposed reduction would mean serious injury to the beet sugar industry.

It was, of course, difficult from the showing made in the hearings before the Ways and Means Committee to substantiate the proposition that a twenty per cent. reduction would mean actual and immediate injury to beet sugar. It was necessary, therefore, to maintain the certainty that this injury would follow, by pointing out, first, that the production of sugar in the Island of Cuba would enormously increase under the spur of the twenty per cent. reduction, and second, that an infringement once having been made upon the "protective

34 Ibid., p. 3899.

principle" it might be expected that other inroads would speedily follow. If it could be shown that the production of Cuba was certain, or even likely to grow to an extent which would result in supplying us with the raw sugar we needed to import, the argument that the price of sugar would not be touched by Cuban reciprocity, because fixed in the world market, would effectually be disposed of. On this branch of the debate, therefore, considerable attention was concentrated. Mr. Mondell, of Wyoming, sounded a pitiful "note of warning" on the 9th of April:

* * *

"Remember that Cuba has never produced sugar under the most improved methods; that Hawaii produces more sugar to the acre, and produces it more cheaply, except where she irrigates, than Cuba has ever done; when they shall come to the Hawaiian system of planting every other crop they will produce sugar even more cheaply than they do now, and when that time comes, does anyone imagine that the beet sugar industry of America shall survive unless protected by a bounty?" as

This suggestion was followed and developed by other Representatives, and extravagant claims were made concerning the productive power of the Island and its probable ability to invade the American market and ultimately crush out the beet sugar industry.

But it was in connection with the "protective principle" that the fiercest battle raged. It was argued that the Dingley bill had constituted a pledge to the American sugar grower which it was not right to break by granting a reduction on Cuban sugar. Thus a debate arose over the question whether sugar was or was not a suitable subject for reciprocity. The extreme argument for the maintenance of the "Dingley pledge" was put by Mr. H. C. Smith, of Michigan, on the 16th of April:

"I know that $10,000,000 has been invested in the sugar beet business in Michigan, farms have been made more valuable, mortgages paid off, towns, villages and cities have prospered. And I believe

85 lbid., p. 3914

that this money was invested in the faith of the pledges and principles of the Republican party. And I believe that we are in honor bound to stand by those pledges, hurt Havemeyer, help Cuba, or come what may."

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This argument had, however, been met and anticipated by no less a person than Mr. Grosvenor, who, in a remarkable portion of his speech, had confessed the whole history of the relation between sugar and reciprocity. Mr. Grosvenor first recurred to the history of sugar under the McKinley bill:

* *

"I remember the discussion growing out of that bill [McKinley]," said Mr. Grosvenor. * ** "A great question arose, and strangely enough, it was, among other things, the sugar tariff which caused the great interest therein. It was the purpose of the Republicans in that body to place sugar on the free list. * The great question as to the sugar schedule of that day grew out of the difference of opinion between Mr. Blaine, who had been for a long time an advocate of reciprocity, and William McKinley who also, at that early day, was a disciple of Blaine reciprocity, but not committed to all the details of Blaine's position. It so happened that I myself heard in the State Department, an almost acrimonious discussion between Mr. McKinley and Mr. Blaine upon this question, one side favoring a tariff on sugar, hides, etc., all put into the schedule, and then left competent for the President of the United States in case of reciprocity, to take the tax off sugar. This was a question of law and administration. * * * Sugar was then an infant industry' and yet these two great champions of protection favored reciprocity in this article."

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On this background the speaker had proceeded to sketch the history of the Dingley Act, and it was in this connection that he made his most startling confession, admitting that the duty on sugar was made purposely high in that act for the very purpose of reciprocity:

"I esteem it an honor to have been a member of the committee over which he presided [Mr. Dingley], and to have been in the councils of the party when that bill was produced and carried to triumphant results; and I do not know a member here who was cognizant of what was going on but that knows that the enormously high rate of duty 37 Ibid., p. 3949.

se Ibid., p. 4279.

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