could not be brought to accept our terms, the administration would find itself in a strange position, after its expressed sympathy for the sufferings of the Island. In order to obviate any such disagreeable outcome, Major Tasker H. Bliss was ordered, about the middle of November, to proceed to Cuba in order to investigate the situation there prevailing and to promote a general feeling of solidarity with the United States.

The tendency of Cuba to “drift” was not the only alarming feature of the reciprocity situation. Very early in the campaign, there had appeared a strong disposition in certain parts of the country to demand either extensive tariff revision, or else greatly extended reciprocity. In Iowa, a platform was adopted by the Republican convention of that State which declared against a permanent maintenance of the existing tariff, when it appeared that the schedules were sheltering and promoting monopoly. So heavy a blow was this to earnest Republicans of the strong protectionist type that Speaker Henderson felt himself compelled to resign from his candidacy for re-election to Congress in his Iowa district. Secretary Shaw actively took the stump, and by his interpretation showed very clearly that the Iowa platform meant nothing at all, or if it meant anything was favorable to the protective idea. Secretary Wilson also stood firmly for protection in speeches and in more direct political work. It seemed, however, that "the Iowa idea" had thoroughly infected large sections of the West. A year earlier, Congressman Babcock, of Wisconsin, had introduced into Congress a bill designed to take the tariff off from heavy products of the furnace, in steel and iron, and though he had been temporarily cowed by Chairman Payne, of the Ways and Means Committee, with the threat that if Mr. Babcock persisted they would "go up into Wisconsin and take the tariff off lumber," he had seemed to stick firmly to his favorite measure. A disavowal of the principles embodied in this bill was made by Mr. Babcock during the campaign of 1902; but the free trade and anti-trust leaven was doing its

work among the Wisconsin Republicans. Elsewhere in the West the same tendency was observable.

Nor was the liberal movement confined to the West. In New England there grew up a vigorous demand for free raw materials, including hides. A strong demand for reciprocity with Canada was also felt. Secretary Hay concluded a fishing treaty with the province of Newfoundland (on the same basis as the one previously negotiated by Secretary Blaine), for presentation to Congress. The discussion of Canadian reciprocity assumed a prominence throughout the Congressional campaign in New England, although Senator Lodge made efforts to obscure the issue by claiming that the real obstacle in the way of Canadian reciprocity was the unfriendly attitude of Canada on the Alaskan boundary question. The success of certain candidates at the polls showed that these ideas were vigorously at work. Moreover, Representative Lovering, of Massachusetts, had introduced in Congress during the Winter of 1901-1902 a bill for the liberalization of our customs drawback legislation. In this measure it was sought to render it easy for manufacturers to import foreign raw materials into this country, manufacture and re-export them without being subjected, on such applications, to the embarrassing delays arising from technicalities enforced by the Treasury. This, of course, was merely another symptom of the demand among manufacturers for better tariff conditions. All over the United States, in fact, there rose an outcry for tariff reform. Probably nothing but the popularity acquired by President Roosevelt in settling, for the time being, a troublesome and dangerous coal strike in the autumn of 1902, gave the Republicans a victory. President Roosevelt himself understood how public opinion was going. He had very early made a definite statement, conveyed through Cabinet officers, to the effect that he had no intention whatever of curbing the trust evil by a reduction of tariffs, or of revising the old tariff schedules in the immediate future. After a tariff conference at Oyster Bay during the

late summer of 1902, at which certain Senators and some others were present, the President strongly expressed in a public speech a desire for the appointment of a permanent tariff commission to recommend to Congress changes in schedules. This, of course, was at once regarded by the Democrats as an attempt to juggle with the question. It did not satisfy the reformers and it annoyed and worried the partisan Republicans. For a moment it seemed as if the President hesitated to pursue the idea further, but it was not very long before definite announcements from the White House showed that the tariff commission idea was to be pushed as an administration measure. Moreover, hints were thrown out from time to time that a revision of the tariff schedules by Congress would be recommended by the President, and that he might call an extra session of Congress for that purpose in March, 1903. It was noteworthy, however, that these suggestions were made chiefly in those parts of the country where the revision sentiment was strong.

The opinion of the country had been changing on the subject of reciprocity. Throughout our whole history during the past twenty years there has been a rhythmic swing of public opinion from tariff revision to reciprocity as a means of getting relief from the burdens and injustice of existing schedules. Reciprocity has been a failure so far as tariff reform through that means is concerned. This, more than anything else, has again driven public opinion to the side of tariff revision. At the opening of the Congressional session in 1902-1903 there are, therefore, several important questions facing the country. Does it in the first place, want reciprocity? If so, can reciprocity be had? And, finally, is reciprocity to be considered a substitute for tariff revision or not? These questions are important. It is for their settlement that the information contained in the present volume has been gathered. Yet they are questions which can be settled only by the public and upon which no obiter dictum will suffice. It is worth while in a

general way to review the main considerations which suggest themselves upon this topic, in order to indicate the lines upon which the discussion of these questions must proceed.

In considering the question whether or not we really want reciprocity, we may make a distinction at the outset between Cuban reciprocity and reciprocity in general. Dealing first with Cuba, it should be observed that the country has pronounced itself in favor of a grant of reciprocity to the Island. It should be noted, however, that this grant is to be twenty per cent. and no more. The verdict of the last election could hardly be construed as a mandate to give more than that amount, and it seems likely that the opposition will concentrate its powers in an effort to limit the concession to that figure. This naturally raises the question whether Cuba will want reciprocity at that rate, and if not, whether it is wise that we should make a larger offer.

Without attempting here to go into the cost of production of sugar in Cuba, there are certain manifest considerations which suggest themselves in connection with Cuban reciprocity. In the first place, it should be understood that the moral issue at stake in the Cuban problem is either nil or so small that it may be neglected. It is possible that we have already done for Cuba as much as that country has any right to ask. The pledge given to Cuba, if made at all, was made only on the personal faith of President McKinley, without authority from Congress. It seems, moreover, to be permissible to look at the reciprocity question in regard to Cuba, as in regard to other countries, from a strictly economic point of view. Our moral obligation to the Island scarcely implies more than that we should put her on a basis of fair competition with all other countries in our markets. If we are to go farther than this, if we are to admit Cuban sugar to our markets on more favorable conditions than that of other countries, it is fair for us from the tariff standpoint to inquire whether the advantages we shall receive are equal to those we shall give,

This state

ment is not based upon free trade philosophy, for if guided by that philosophy we should do well to reduce our duties on sugar to the revenue point, without question as to the policy of foreign countries. Speaking, therefore, from the protectionist's standpoint, first of all, we have to inquire whether or not our moral duty to Cuba has been fulfilled by placing her sugar in our markets upon an equality with that of foreign countries.

It will be remembered that the McKinley Act had admitted raw sugar free and that the Wilson bill had imposed a countervailing duty on bounty-fed sugar. We have seen, too, that this countervailing duty was brought to perfection under the Dingley Act which imposed a countervailing duty equal in amount to any bounty bestowed by any foreign country on any article including sugar. Under the act of 1890, therefore, the product of sugar in Cuba stood on precisely the same basis. as bounty-fed European beet sugar in our market, while our domestic sugar producer had an advantage of two cents per pound over either. At the present time, under the Dingley Act, Cuba, which grants no bounties, can send her sugar to the United States at an advantage of twenty-seven one hundredths of a cent per pound as compared with the beet sugar of Germany, while its disadvantage as compared with domestic sugar due to the tariff is only about 1.7 cents. The difficulty which Cuba has had to encounter in the cultivation of sugar is not due to the "loss of our market," but is due to a general decline in the price of sugar in the world's market. Should we admit Cuban sugar subject to a reduction of twenty per cent., or any other per cent., there is no reason to suppose that the price of sugar at Havana would be better than it now is. As has so often been pointed out in the course of this discussion, sugar prices are determined in the world's market, and not in that of the United States. Why should the American refiner of raw sugar be willing to pay more for Cuban raw sugar than for raw sugar from Europe? Assuming that he would be per