a platform containing a distinct statement of policy on the reciprocity question. That platform read in part as follows:

"That, having regard to the prosperity of Canada and the United States as adjoining countries with many mutual interests, it is desirable that there should be the most friendly relations and broad and liberal trade intercourse between them; that the interests alike of the Dominion and of the Empire would be materially advanced by the establishing of such relations; that the period of the old reciprocity treaty was one of marked prosperity to the British North American colonies; that the pretext under which the government appealed to the country in 1891, respecting negotiations for a treaty with the United States, was misleading and dishonest and intended to deceive the electorate; that no sincere effort has been made to obtain a treaty, but that on the contrary, it is manifest that the present government, controlled as they are by monopolies and combines, are not desirous of securing such a treaty * * * that a fair and liberal reciprocity treaty would develop the great natural resources of Canada."

There were, however, a good many reasons why reciprocity with Canada could not be obtained. It is a very safe statement that the ill success of the negotiations of 1891 was not entirely due to what the liberal platform just quoted chose to call the "misleading and dishonest pretext" under which the Canadian government had gone before the electorate. The real difficulty, as already hinted, was that which has always been encountered, namely, to find some "basis" for the negotiations to proceed upon. It was more then ever difficult in 1891 to find a list of goods in which reciprocity could be arranged for, but which, at the same time, would include no articles whose free admission would injure protected interests.

Canada was not alone, however, in her appreciation of the value of friendly commercial relations with the United States. The general feeling on our own side of the border in favor of reciprocity, which had gained considerable strength just before 1890, contemplated better commercial relations with Canada as well as with other countries. An incident in the reciprocity movement, was the bill (H. R. 678) introduced by Representative Butterworth, December 18, 1889, and providing for

full reciprocity with Canada. This bill was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means, but came to nothing.51

So, also, the House resolution introduced by Representative Hitt, December 18, 1889, providing for commercial union with Canada, was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. It, however, was stricken out, and a substitute returned on May 2, 1890. In the substitute, the President was authorized, whenever he might become convinced that the Dominion desired to enter into a commercial union, to appoint three commissioners who should meet similar commissioners from Canada and carry on negotiations.52

In line with the two legislative efforts just described was also the action of Senator Sherman. On September 1, 1890, Mr. Sherman introduced an amendment to the McKinley bill in which he sought to establish reciprocity with Canada in coal. He also provided for the appointment of commissioners to investigate and report the best method of extending trade with British North America.53 This attempt, like its predecessors, was abortive.

The amendment to the McKinley bill, introduced by Senator Hale on September 2, 1890, opened our ports to all the countries of the Western Hemisphere in return for reciprocal advantages; but the amendment, when returned by the Finance Committee, omitted Canada and was ultimately modified so that it became merely the reciprocity provision of the McKinley bill.54

In its earliest form, the Wilson bill contained a reciprocity clause providing for the free entry of Canadian agricultural products, in return for similar concessions to us. While this clause was eliminated, a clause was retained providing for reciprocal concessions in regard to agricultural implements.55

61 Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st session, p. 249.

62 Ibid., pp. 232 and 4172.

58 Ibid., pp. 9454; also 9543-4.

54 Ibid., p. 9510.

55 See discussion of Wilson bill in Chap. VIII. of the present volume.

Among the most interesting efforts to promote better commercial relations with Canada has been the work of the socalled "Joint High Commission," which is still nominally in existence. This was a body appointed by the governments of Canada and of the United States to settle all points in dispute between the two countries. These included reciprocity, the Alaskan boundary, the fishery question, and others. It seemed possible to reach an agreement upon some terms on most points except that of the Alaskan boundary. After the reciprocity problem had been discussed, the boundary question was taken up, the Canadians desiring a port on the North Pacific. This we were unwilling to grant and consequently the deliberations were terminated.

Various efforts to secure Canadian reciprocity were subsequently made and the subject is now frequently taken up by commercial organizations. Nothing, it needs hardly be said, has been accomplished.5

56 One curious episode in the history of our trade relations with Canada is found in the legislation of July 26, 1892 (U. S. Statutes at Large, Vol. 27, p. 267.) This law was entitled "An Act to Enforce Reciprocal Commercial Relations Between the United States and Canada and for other purposes." It authorized the President to suspend free passage through the St. Mary's Falls Canals whenever unjust charges are made by Canadian authorities to American vessels navigating in the St. Lawrence, the Welland Canal and other waterways. (See Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 2d session, p. 5274.) It will be remembered that even during the life of the original reciprocity treaty, dissatisfaction had been felt with the treatment accorded American vessels passing through Canadian canals. It was this same dissatisfaction which culminated in the Act of July 26, 1892. Immediately following the passage of this act (Aug. 18, 1892) President Harrison issued a proclamation. In this document certain tolls were imposed on merchandise passing through the St. Mary's Falls Canals and bound for Canadian ports (U. S. Statutes at Large, Vol. 27, p. 1032.) The imposition of these charges induced Canada to reduce the toll imposed on American vessels passing through Canadian canals and February 21, 1893, the President consequently revoked the proclamation of Aug. 18, preceding. (Ibid., p. 1065-6.)

CHAPTER III

RECIPROCITY WITH HAWAII.-1876-1900.

THE second experiment made by the United States with reciprocity as a policy was undertaken in 1876. This was reciprocity with Hawaii which went into effect in that year and continued without intermission until 1900, when we finally annexed the archipelago to this country.

At the outset, it should be understood that reciprocity with a productive area like the Hawaiian Islands, differing in climate and in the nature of their industry from the United States, must necessarily be very different in character from any agreement of the kind previously attempted. Contrasting the general idea of such a reciprocity treaty with that involved in the treaty with Canada, it appears at once that the principles at stake in the two cases have no similarity. The treaty negotiated with Canada has provided for the reciprocal free admission by both countries of commodities produced under substantially similar conditions in each, and was primarily designed to serve the well-being of the consumer. It led to no foreign complications nor was there any reason why the jealousy of other countries should have been excited by so manifestly reasonable and natural an arrangement. But when the idea of reciprocity with the Hawaiian Islands was suggested it became evident that certain entirely new considerations must be taken into account. In the first place, there were political problems of a very important character to be considered. If we did not offer some concessions to the archipelago it might happen that other nations would step in and get the advantage of us by nego

tiating a treaty of the kind that we had refused. On the other hand, moreover, there were exceedingly difficult economic considerations to be borne in mind. The principal products of the Islands were sugar, rice, and a few other articles which were either produced not at all, or in very limited quantities, within the United States. Moreover, it did not appear that the supply of these articles coming from the Hawaiian Islands was sufficient to meet the whole of the demand afforded by the American market. That being so, trade concessions to the Islands could mean, so far as Hawaii was concerned, merely the opportunity to secure an unlimited market for the output of the local planters, and a guaranteed profit on the sales, inasmuch as the price of such articles would necessarily be fixed by the cost of producing the most expensive portion of the supply. If, therefore, some other country-for example, Cuba-was engaged in turning out goods of the same kind, and if these were needed and must be imported into the United States, Hawaiian producers would evidently be able-supposing that they could produce as cheaply as the Cubans-to profit to the full extent of the difference in tariff rates. It must have been clear, therefore, that concessions to Hawaii could not possibly result in lower prices to our consumers, and that they must necessarily mean an absolute loss to the government in the shape of duties remitted by lowering the tariff. It might be good policy to offer these concessions, provided we could get satisfactory reductions in return for them, but, in any event, whatever was obtained must be directly paid for by American purchasers of Hawaiian goods. Evidently the Islands were not likely to take from us any large quantity of agricultural products, and the plain inference must have been that the advantages gained by them from us could be compensated only by giving us an opening for our manufactures, or by according us political advantages which, whatever their value might be, were actually desired at Washington. The situation was