last thing under such circumstances which the Islanders would desire, would be annexation and the deprivation of all their advantages." 9914 Mr. Morrison further stated the relation of the treaty to American interests: "There is no protection in this treaty, for there are no American interests to be protected. There is no free trade in it, for there is but little trade of any kind, and that is to be made exclusive for one side. There is no reciprocity in it, for much is given and nothing received." 15 In spite of the opposition thus manifested, the bill finally passed the House, went quickly through the Senate, was approved by the President and became law. Thus the modifications of duties provided in the treaty went into effect. It is, of course, a matter of some difficulty to establish just how far the graver charges made against those who were engaged in promoting the Hawaiian treaty are actually founded upon fact. To what precise extent the Hawaiian sugar lands had been bought by outsiders, who then set themselves vigorously to push a reciprocity treaty through our Congress, can, of course, not be stated. It will be seen in a later chapter how identical charges were made with reference to Cuba, when reciprocity with that Island was under debate, during the session of 1901-1902. As regards Hawaii, no authoritative contemporaneous evidence appears to be available. Yet sufficient has been said at a later date to establish practically a moral conviction that the charges concerning the private interests at work in 1875-1876 contained a large element of truth. We have seen that, prior to 1876, there was little direct ⚫ investment of American capital in sugar raising in Hawaii. This was due to the depressed condition of the industry. It would be harder to say how extensively Americans acquired titles to land. The missionaries and their descendants, as well as other foreigners, had settled in the archipelago and had either obtained tracts of ground by intermarriage with the natives, or by purchase, or had leased them from the government. That the investment of American capital charged by certain Congressmen had, at all events, not been general, was boldly claimed by the Hawaiian Patriotic League in a statement made many years later.16 That statement ran, in part, as follows: "It is an undeniable fact that outside of Mr. Claus Spreckels, of California, no American has ever brought into this country any capital worth mentioning, but many have sent away fortunes made here; most of our present American capitalists outside of sons of missionaries, came here as sailors, or school teachers, some few as clerks, others as mechanics. * * The local Croesus, American by birth, the banker, C. R. Bishop, came here poor and started his fortune by marrying the wealthiest native princess, whose lands and income allowed him to duplicate it by banking on Hawaiian capital." It appears clear, however, that these Americans who had thus by accident, or force of circumstances, come into possession of sugar lands prior to 1876 had steadily for some years been possessed by the idea that their fortunes would be made by a reciprocity treaty. Their power in the government of the Islands was constantly increasing; and, as has already been suggested, it had become paramount before the final negotiation of the treaty. After the agreement had been put through, land, of course, rose in value and a speculative era ensued. As one man afterward expressed it : "The first effect of the reciprocity treaty was to cause a 'boom' in sugar, which turned the heads of some of our shrewdest men and nearly caused a financial crash." " Heavy buying of lands resulted. Mr. Claus Spreckels, a man largely interested in sugar refining on the Pacific Coast, purchased a large interest in the lands of Haiku, Maui and other regions, during the years 1878-1880. In 1879 Mr. 16 Foreign Relations of the U. S., 1894. App. II., p. 921. 17 Statement of W. D. Alexander, Surveyor General, before Mr. Blount, Special Commissioner from the United States, July 18, 1893. Foreign Relations of the United States, App. II., p. 647. Spreckels visited the Islands and outlined an immense irrigation plan. 18 Other planters also sprang into prominence, acquiring titles to land from the original patentees-mainly the government and the chiefs. 19 This whole process was clearly described at a later date by engineer, as follows: Albert B. Loebenstein, an Q. "Well, now-the pooling of these lands-who owns them?” Q. "For sugar culture?" A. "Yes, and for grazing." Q. "Did the natives sell it?" A. "They sold it, and they raised money on it by mortgage, and in some instances lost it by foreclosure." 20 From the adoption of the treaty, onward, the lands slipped more and more out of the hands of natives into those of foreigners, who were chiefly Americans. The crown lands were, for the most part, not sold, but leased on thirty years' time and the disposition of the domain thus rented by the government to the planters now forms (since the annexation of the Islands by the United States) an important problem in Hawaiian administration. Moreover, an increasing number of orientals were imported into the archipelago, in order to satisfy the demand for labor. The Hawaiians themselves were either too indolent or too well off to be willing to work steadily for wages, and it resulted that field labor was chiefly performed by coolies. The conditions thus produced were highly satisfactory to the planters, and could they have continued under a perpetual reciprocity treaty, with no disturbance from the natives, it is not likely that annexation would ever have been advocated from the Hawaiian side. As 18 "It is now mooted," said the Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1879, (Thos. G. Thrum, Publisher, Honolulu), p. 28, "that the magnitude of Haiku's ditching and extensive plantation is to pale into insignificance before the much grander scheme of Mr. Claus Spreckels, whereby waters brought to irrigate the extensive plains of Central Maui expects to produce alone 40,000 tons of sugar per annu:n to supply his San Francisco refineries" 19 Foreign Relations of United States, 1894, p. 688. 20 Ibid., p. 872. are to be whereon he will be mentioned at a later point, however, matters assumed a different aspect on account of the growing antipathy to the Americans in the Islands. In any event it cannot be doubted that the Hawaiian planter was placed in an exceptionally profitable position by the reciprocity treaty. It is easier to ascertain how much went into the pockets of Hawaiian planters, as an aggregate, as a direct result of reciprocity, than to compute their profits in percentages. This gross differential advantage was the amount of the tariff duties lost by the United States. That is to say, supposing that there had been no reciprocity treaty, and that the same amount of sugar had actually been shipped to this country as was sent under reciprocity conditions, the government would have realized, and the planters would have lost, the amount of the duties on that quantity of sugar. This amount of loss or of gain, according to the standpoint from which it is regarded, was as stated on following page. This estimate, of course, proceeds upon several assumptions. The same amount of sugar might not have been sent into the United States, for the cost of producing it may have been so great that some part of the differential advantage was required in meeting the cost of production. On the other hand, reciprocity might have been secured by Hawaii with some other country. These facts have never been generally recognized in Congress. From time to time the old objections to the treaty have been raised in one connection or another, and it has always been maintained that our tariff reduction to the Islands was the precise equivalent of a gift of that amount to the planters. Thus, for instance, in 1890, during the tariff debates in the House of Representatives, Mr. Gear, of Iowa,21 expressed the following opinion: "It is well understood that the sugar plantations of the Sandwich Islands are either owned or controlled, in a large degree, by Americans; it is, therefore, clear to my mind that the people of the United 21 Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st session, p. 4390. QUANTITIES AND VALUES OF SUGAR AND MOLASSES IMPORTED INTO THE UNITED STATES FROM HAWAIIAN ISLANDS AND ESTIMATED DUTY ending June 30 Molasses. Above No. 7 and not Above No. 10 and not Above No. 13 and not Above No. 16 and above No. 13. above No. 16. Dollars. Pounds. Dollars. Pounds. ... 113,574 14,712 9,314 169,157,107 Total value Estimated not above No. 20. Pounds. Dollars. Pounds. Dollars. Dollars. Dollars. 2,108,473 2,274,430 2,131,982 986,475.30 2,811,193 989,602.02 2,826,129 1,266,554.77 4,135,487 4,155,322 1,881,563.44 4,927,021 4,962,058 2,427,777.57 3,026,298 4,027,380 292,595 106,181,858 | 6,918,084 6,943,340 3,314,938.90 52,865 169,652,783| 8,198,144 8,207,198 3,937,947-32 2,713,232 159,571 34,873 191,733,175 228,540,513 10,260,048|| 10,266,465 5,007,200.92 (a) Estimate based on sugar not above No. 13 2.12 cents per pound, since 1883. |