"of members to serve in Parliament in the manner "therein mentioned; and for substituting other pro"visions for the like purposes," so far as those powers enable the Speaker to nominate and appoint other persons, being members of the House of Commons, to issue warrants for the making out of new writs during the vacancy of the office of Speaker or during his absence out of the realm, shall extend to enable him to make the like nomination and appointment for issuing warrants, under the like circumstances. and conditions, for the election of a member in the room of any member whose seat becomes vacant under this Act.

34. Vacating of Municipal and other Offices.—If a person is adjudged bankrupt whilst holding the office of mayor, alderman, councillor, guardian, overseer, or member of a sanitary authority, school board, highway board, burial board, or select vestry, his office shall thereupon become vacant.

35. Power for Court to annul Adjudication in certain Cases.* (1.) Where in the opinion of the Court a

*This clause does not re-enact the provisions of the Act of 1869 with respect to the annulment of bankruptcy in cases of composition. But this is immaterial, seeing that similar powers had already been conferred by clause 23 (see ante, p. 94), which empowers the court to annul a bankruptcy if the creditors after adjudication agree to a composition or scheme of arrangement, and this is affirmed by the court. On the other hand, the first sub-section of the present clause gives in express terms that power to annul a bankruptcy on what may be described as equitable grounds, which Bacon, C.J. (ex parte Ashworth v. Brown, L. R. 18 Eq. 735) held that the court possessed, even in the absence of any specific enactment. The second sub-section of the clause substantially re-enacts sect. 81 of the Bankruptcy Act of

debtor ought not to have been adjudged bankrupt, or where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the debts of the bankrupt are paid in full, the Court may, on the application of any person interested, by order, annul the adjudication.

(2.) Where an adjudication is annulled under this section all sales and dispositions of property and payments duly made, and all acts theretofore done by the official receiver, trustee, or other person acting under their authority, or by the Court, shall be valid, but the property of the debtor who was adjudged bankrupt shall vest in such person as the Court may appoint, or in default of any such appointment revert to the debtor for all his estate or interest therein on such terms and subject to such conditions, if any, as the Court may declare by order.

(3.) Notice of the order annulling an adjudication shall be forthwith gazetted and published in a local paper.

36. Meaning of Payment of Debts in Full.*-For the purposes of this Part of this Act, any debt disputed by a debtor shall be considered as paid in full, if the debtor enters into a bond, in such sum and with such sureties as the Court approves, to pay the amount to 1869. It will be observed that the provisions of the second sub-section only apply to an annulment of bankruptcy under the first sub-section of the present clause. It will not, therefore, apply to an annulment under sect. 23. This is not, however, material, inasmuch as that section contains a similar provision in slightly different terms.

*It will be observed that the operation of this clause (which corresponds, though with some modifications, to the proviso at the end of clause 120 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1869) is limited "to the purposes of this part of the act," that is to say, it has no effect beyond preventing disqualification occurring whenever the debtor complies with its provisions.

be recovered in any proceeding for the recovery of or concerning the debt, with costs, and any debt due to a creditor who cannot be found or cannot be identified shall be considered as paid in full if paid into Court.

PART III.*

ADMINISTRATION OF PROPERTY.

Proof of Debts.

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37. Description of Debts provable in Bankruptcy.(1.) Demands in the nature of unliquidated damages arising otherwise than by reason of a contract, promise, or breach of trust, shall not be provable in bankruptcy.+

* By clause 18, sub-section 13, it is provided that Part III. of this act shall, so far as the nature of the case and the terms of the composition or scheme admit, be applicable thereto, the same interpretation being given to the words "trustee in bankruptcy," "bankruptcy," "bankrupt," and "order of adjudication," as "in the last sub-section." The "last" sub-section, is, of course, sub-section 12 of the same clause, which provides that “if under, or in pursuance of a composition or scheme, a trustee is appointed to administer the debtor's property, or manage his business (Part V. of this act) shall apply to the trustee as if he were a trustee in bankruptcy, and as if the terms “bankruptcy,” “bankrupt,” and “order of adjudication,” included "respectively" a composition, or scheme of arrangement, a compounding or arranging debtor, and order approving the composition or scheme.

This clause re-enacts clause 31 of the Bankruptcy Act, with one noticeable modification, which is, however, rather apparent than real. It enacts by implication that unliquidated demands arising out of breach of trust shall be provable in bankruptcy. That is to say, it expressly includes these demands in the exceptions to the general rule that

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(2.) A person having notice of any act of bankruptcy available against the debtor shall not prove under the order for any debt or liability contracted by the debtor subsequently to the date of his so having notice.*

(3.) Save as aforesaid, all debts and liabilities, present or future, certain or contingent, to which the

unliquidated damages are not provable in bankruptcy. The Act of 1869 did not expressly do this; but the omission was immaterial, inasmuch as breaches of trust (whether the trust was express or implied) have always been held to create debts in equity, which are provable in bankruptcy. Under the first subsection of the present clause, no claim to unliquidated damages in respect of mere torts is provable in bankruptcy. For instance, no claim can be made matter of proof in respect to damages for an assault, trespass, libel, false imprisonment, or other like injuries, which are wholly independent of any contract between the parties. But when the "tort" or wrong consists in the breach of some contract, or of an obligation or duty arising out of contract-as, for instance, the non-delivery of goods by a carrier, or the non-return of goods, which have been lent, on the determination of the bailment -proof may be made in respect of unliquidated damages. In these cases a plaintiff may proceed either on the contract, or in respect of the tort. If he proceed on the contract he may prove for unliquidated damages; if he bases his claim on the tort, he cannot. Of course proof can in all cases be made in respect of damages which have become liquidated by final judgment (not merely by verdict), or by a compromise before the date of the adjudication in bankruptcy. With the exception of damages arising out of mere torts, and still remaining unliquidated, the general effect of this clause, as it was of the corresponding clause of 1869, is to render provable not merely all debts of ascertained (or liquidated) amount payable either presently or in future, but all demands arising out of breach of contract, promise, or trust, however contingent or uncertain in amount, and this whether the breach did or did not occur before the close of the bankruptcy.

* That is to say, a creditor cannot prove under a receiving order in respect of any debt contracted after he knew that the debtor had committed an act of bankruptcy, which was then available as a ground for that particular order.

debtor is subject at the date of the receiving order, or to which he may become subject before his discharge by reason of any obligation incurred before the date. of the receiving order, shall be deemed to be debts provable in bankruptcy.*

(4.) An estimate shall be made by the trustee of the value of any debt or liability provable as aforesaid, which by reason of its being subject to any contingency or contingencies, or for any other reason, does not bear a certain value.†

*This is subject to the qualification that certain debts are not provable by the general policy of the law. No proof is allowed, as no action can be brought, in respect of debts founded on fraud, or on an illegal consideration; or in respect of debts barred by the Statute of Limitation. In the latter case, time did not under the former law run against a debt after the order of adjudication. It is submitted that under the present act time will cease to run after a receiving order has issued. No proof will be allowed on an unstamped bill or note. When a demand arises out of an act of felony committed by the bankrupt, the right of proof in respect to it is, as a general rule, suspended until the creditor has taken proceedings for the prosecution of the bankrupt. But the rule does not apply when the prosecution has been rendered impossible in consequence of the criminal having died or absconded (unless the failure of justice were due to the default of the creditor); nor does it extend to a case in which the criminal has been already brought to justice by parties other than the creditor seeking to prove. Debts contracted by an infant during his minority (except debts for necessaries and liquidated damages for torts) cannot be proved against his estate if he becomes bankrupt after attaining his majority, even although he may have ratified such debts after becoming of age (37 & 38 Vict. č. 62). But it was held (In re King, ex parte The County Joint Stock Bank, 3 De G. and J., 63), that when an infant had obtained a loan on a representation which he knew to be false that he was of age, a proof was properly admitted in bankruptcy.

Thus it has been held that the value of an annuity for life may be estimated, and that the annitant may prove for this value; and this although the payment of the annuity is contingent on some act done