he is the reputed owner* thereof; provided

wholesale dealer, on sale or return, to a retail customer, who afterwards becomes bankrupt, unless such retail customer has retained them so long in his possession as to show that he had decided to keep them. A mere demand of possession made on the bankrupt by the true owner previous to an act of bankruptcy, will be sufficient to prevent the operation of the statute, even although the demand does not reach the bankrupt until after he has committed an act of bankruptcy (ex parte, Cohen v. Sparke, 40 L.J. Bank, 14). But a mere intention on the part of the true owner to take possession of the goods, or even the happening of the event entitling him to take possession, will not prevent goods being in the regular ownership of a bankrupt with the consent, &c. (Sparkman v. Miller, 12 C. B. N.S. 659). Finally-and this point is one of extreme importance-goods included in a bill of sale, but remaining in the possession of the bankrupt down to the committing of an act of bankruptcy, are now within the operation of this clause. It was provided by clause 20 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, "that chattels comprised in a bill of sale which has been, and continues to be duly registered under this act, shall not be deemed to be in the possession, order, or disposition of the grantor of the bill of sale within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869." But this clause was expressly repealed by clause 15 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1882 (45 and 46 Vict. c. 43). Goods in the possession, &c., of the bankrupt in his trade or business, &c., will now, therefore, although included in a valid bill of sale, pass to the trustee in exactly the same manner, and under the same circumstances and conditions as if they were not the subject of such a security.

"The doctrine of reputed ownership does not require any investigation into the actual state of knowledge or belief either of all creditors or of particular creditors; and still less of the outside world, who are no creditors at all, as to the possession of particular goods. It is enough for the doctrine if those goods are in such a situation as to convey to the minds of those who know their situation, the reputation of ownership, that reputation arising by the legitimate exercise of reason and judgment on the knowledge of those facts which are capable of being generally known to those who choose to make inquiry on the subject. It is not at all necessary to examine into the degree of actual knowledge which is possessed, but the court must judge from the situation of the goods what inference as to the ownership

that things in action other than debts due or growing due to the bankrupt in the course of his trade or business,* shall not be deemed goods within the meaning of this section.

Effect of Bankruptcy on antecedent Transactions.

45. Restriction of Rights of Creditor under Execution or Attachment.—(1.) Where a creditor has issued exe

might be legitimately drawn by those who knew the facts. I do not mean the facts that are only known to the parties dealing with the goods, but such facts as are capable of being, and naturally would be, the subject of general knowledge to those who take any means to inform themselves on the subject. So, on the other hand, it is not at all necessary, in order to exclude the doctrine of reputed ownership, to show that every creditor, or any particular creditor, or the outside world who are not creditors, know anything about particular goods one way or the other. It is quite enough, in my judgment, if the situation of the goods was such as to exclude all legitimate ground from which those who knew anything about that situation could infer the ownership to be in the person having actual possession." Per Lord Selborne in ex parte Watkins re Couston, L. R. 8 Ch. App. p. 528.

*This includes all certain trade debts, whether presently payable or not, but not contingent claims. As to what are trade debts so due to a person, as to have been in his order or disposition, see Cook v. Hemming, L.R. 3 C.P. 334. In that case a person contracted to supply meat to an asylum, but assigned the contract to a butcher, who actually fulfilled it, but in the name of the original contractor. The latter being bankrupt, it was held (Willes, J., dissentiente) that the debt from the asylum was in his order and disposition. A debenture of a joint-stock bank company, by which the company undertake to pay a sum of money with interest, and charge the undertaking, &c., with payment, was held a chose in action for the purposes of the corresponding section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869 (In re Price, ex parte Ramsbury, L.R. 4, Ch.D. 685).

This clause is similar in principle to section 184 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1849 (12 & 13 Vict. c. 100).

cution against the goods or lands of a debtor, or has attached any debt due to him, he shall not be entitled to retain the benefit of the execution or attachment against the trustee in bankruptcy of the debtor, unless he has completed the execution or attachment before the date of the receiving order, and before notice of the presentation of any bankruptcy petition by or against the debtor, or of the commission of any available act of bankruptcy by the debtor.

(2.) For the purposes of this Act, an execution against goods is completed by seizure and sale; an attachment of a debt is completed by receipt of the debt; and an execution against land is completed by scizure, or, in the case of an equitable interest, by the. appointment of a receiver.

46. Duties of Sheriff as to Goods taken in Execution. (1.) Where the goods of a debtor are taken in execution, and before the sale thereof notice is served on the sheriff that a receiving order has been made against the debtor, the sheriff shall, on request, deliver the goods to the official receiver or trustee under the order, but the costs of the execution shall be a charge on the goods so delivered, and the official receiver or trustee may sell the goods or an adequate part thereof for the purpose of satisfying the charge.

(2.)* Where the goods of a debtor are sold under an

* Particular attention must be paid to this second sub-section, which extends to all debtors a somewhat similar enactment, which, in the act of 1869 (see clause 87), was confined to traders. The effect of the whole clause appears to be to defeat all executions for amounts exceeding £20, as against creditors, if a petition in bankruptcy is presented before, or within fourteen days after, the sale of the goods, and due notice thereof is given to the sheriff. That is to say, if the sheriff has notice of a receiving order before sale, he will have to give up the

execution in respect of a judgment for a sum exceeding twenty pounds, the sheriff shall deduct the costs of the execution from the proceeds of sale, and retain the balance for fourteen days, and if within that time notice is served on him of a bankruptcy petition having been presented against or by the debtor, and the debtor is adjudged bankrupt thereon or on any other petition of which the sheriff has notice, the sheriff shall pay the balance to the trustee in the bankruptcy,* who shall be entitled to retain the same as against the execution creditor, but otherwise he shall deal with it as if no notice of the presentation of a bankruptcy petition had been served on him.

(3.) An execution levied by seizure and sale on the goods of a debtor is not invalid by reason only of its being an act of bankruptcy, and a person who purchases the goods in good faith under a sale by the sheriff shall in all cases acquire a good title to them against the trustee in bankruptcy.

47. Avoidance of Voluntary Settlements.†—(1.) Any

goods to the official receiver; and if notice is not received by the sheriff until after sale, the creditors will be entitled to the proceeds, but in the latter case the execution and sale will stand good, as, indeed, is expressly provided by the third sub-section. It will be seen clause 145 provides for the publicity of all sales under an execution for a sum exceeding £20. By clause 146 the writ of elegit is not in future to extend to goods.

* Or under a composition or arrangement, "so far as the nature of the case and the terms of the composition or arrangement admit." See ante clause 18 (13).

The corresponding clause (91) of the act of 1869, was confined to traders. The operation of the present clause is general, and embraces all debtors. The provision at the end of the first sub-section "and that the interest of the settlor in such property had passed to the trustee of such settlement on the execution thereof" is also new, the

settlement of property not being a settlement made before and in consideration of marriage, or made in favour of a purchaser or incumbrancer in good faith and for valuable consideration, or a settlement made on or for the wife or children of the settlor of property which has accrued to the settlor after marriage in right Act of 1869 not having contained anything to that effect. It is scarcely necessary to point out the object of the new provision, or dwell upon its obvious tendency to check or invalidate settlements of an essentially illusory character. It will be seen that this section does not apply to ante-nuptial settlements (except in so far as they contain contracts or covenants for future settlement), or to settlements made in favour of "a purchaser or incumbrancer in good faith, and for a valuable consideration." The word "purchaser" must be construed strictly. It means here a "buyer" in the ordinary commercial sense; and the same substantial construction must also be given to the words "incumbrancer," "good faith," and "valuable consideration." We cannot here discuss the cases on the subject, but it may be said broadly that they amount to this, that settlements of the kind we are now discussing will not be liable to invalidation if they are in substance and fact commercial transactions in which a true equivalent was given for the property passing under the settlement. It must be observed that by clause 11 of the Married Woman's Property Act, 1882, a post nuptial settlement of a policy of assurance made by a man, whether trader or not, upon his own wife or children, or upon his wife and children, will not fall within the provisions of this clause. It is expressly provided by the section of the Married Woman's Property Act, to which we have referred, that any such policy shall not, so long as the object of the trust remains unperformed, form part of the estate of the assured, or be liable to his debts. But if it be proved that the policy was effected, and the premiums paid with intent to defraud the creditors of the assured, they will be entitled to receive out of the monies payable under the policy a sum equal to the premiums so paid. Voluntary settlements though made outside the periods of two or ten years, mentioned in the sub-section under consideration, may, in many cases, be impeached as fraudulent under the 13 Eliz. c. 5, by showing that its effect was to defeat and delay the creditors existing at the time of its cxccution.