A Honolulu report of March 13th averred that the queen's adherents had reverted to the proposal of a year before, that she should resign her claims to the throne in consideration of an annuity of $20,000 from the United States. The statement was practically confirmed by the Washington correspondents, who wrote on March 31st that information to that effect had been in the possession of the state department for some days. Steps had then been taken by the executive council for a convention at the capital in May to select delegates to a constitutional convention, to meet next autumn and form a permanent government. On the 21st of March Edmund Norrie, editor of the Holomua, at Honolulu, the queen's personal organ, was arrested by the government for the seditious utterances of his paper, and the determination was expressed by Attorney-General Smith to press the trial.

Minister Willis' Transactions.-The first interview of the new United States minister with Liliuokalani occured on the 13th of November, when President Cleveland's message was delivered, and she was asked to pledge amnesty to the provisional leaders and supporters in the event of her restoration. The queen declined on the plea of illegality; but, on the remonstrance of the Royalist press and many of her leading supporters, she subsequently, in interviews on December 15 and 18, gave written pledges of the fullest amnesty to the Revolutionists, and that she would abide by the liberal constitution of 1887, and also assume all obligations incurred by the provisional government. Meanwhile the minister had declined to confer with a quartet of the queen's most trusted counselors named to him by her, on the ground of the bad character of two of them and the certainty that in the event of restoration there would be a concerted movement for the overthrow of the constitution of 1887, which he said "would mean the overthrow of constitutional and united government and the absolute domination of the queen.' Ex-Marshal Wilson also had audience of the minister on December 5 and 6, when the plans of the queen and her advisers for her restoration were disclosed. They provided that the United States officials should proceed to force the provisional government to surrender unconditionally," but "possibly with a recommendation to mercy; that United States marines should be quartered on the island until the monarchy was firmly re-established; and that martial law

should be declared and all the Revolutionists arrested. Minister Willis returned the paper outlining the plan to Mr. Wilson, saying, "I would not have taken it had I known its contents." Reporting the transaction to his government, Mr. Willis adds:

"An analysis of the list of the queen's special advisers, whether native or foreign, is not encouraging to the friends of good government or of American interests. The Americans, who for over half a century held a commanding place in the councils of state, are ig nored. and other nationalities, English especially, are placed in charge."

On the 19th of December, the day after the final preliminary interview with the queen, Mr. Willis in person presented a copy of her pledge of amnesty, with his statement of the theory of the American administration in regard to the former interference of United States officials in the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy, to President Dole and his associates in the government. He then said:

"It becomes my further duty to advise you, sir, the executive of the provisional government, and your ministers, of the president's determination of the question which your action and that of the queen devolved upon him, and that you are expected to promptly relinquish to her her constitutional authority. And now, Mr. President, and gentlemen of the provisional government, with a deep and solemn sense of the gravity of the situation and with the earnest hope that your answer will be inspired by that high patriotis:n which forgets all self-interest, in the name and by the authority of the United States of America, I submit to you the question, Are you willing to abide by the decision of the president?"

To this President Dole replied:

"The government will take this matter under consideration, and answer you as soon as they are ready."

Four days later his reply at length in writing was transmitted. It regrets the rejection of proposals for annexation, but expresses the hope of final realization, denies the right of the interference of the president of the United States in the domestic affairs of Hawaii, and adds:

"If your contention that President Cleveland believes that this government and the ex-queen have submitted their respective claims to the sovereignty of this country to the adjudication of the United States is correct, then may I ask, when and where has the president held this court of arbitration?

No man can correctly say that the queen owed her downfall to the interference of American forces. The revolution was carried through by the representatives, now largely reinforced, of the same public sentiment which forced the monarchy to its knees in 1887, which suppressed the insurrection of 1889, and which for twenty

years has been battling for r presentative government in this country. If the American forces had been absent the revolution would have taken place, for the sufficient causes, for it had nothing to do with their presence. Though the provisional government is far from being a great power, and could not long resist the forces of the United States in a hostile attack, we deem our position to be im pregnable under all legal precedents, under the principles of diplomatic intercourse, and in the forum of conscience. We have done your government no wrong; no charge of discourtesy is or can be brought against us.

I am instructed to inform you, Mr. Minister, that the provisional government of the Hawaiian Islands respectfully and unhesitatingly declines to accept the proposition of the president of the United States that it should surrender its authority to the ex-queen."

In connection with his official report of these proceedings to his government, Minister Willis gave the following reason for the profound secrecy he had found it necessary to maintain in regard to these negotiations:

"Repeatedly since I reached the islands I have been advised by those in the confidence of the native Hawaiians that it was very difficult to further restrain them. They were looking with confidence to the United States for an amicable settlement of their grievances, and this has exercised a wholesome influence upon their conduct. Any sudden announcement of an adverse result or any attempt upon the dignity or life of the queen might, in their judgment, precipitate the most serious consequences."

Per contra, in the same confidential dispatch of the minister to Secretary Gresham, of date December 20, he expressed his good opinion of the provisional government and its following in these evidently sincere terms:

"The president and the ministers of the provisional government and a large percentage of those who support them are men of high character and of large material interests in the islands. These men have been inclined to a conservative course toward the Hawaiians. They had placed in the police and fire departments and also in many other more important offices native Hawaiians, thus endeavoring to conciliate the friendship and support of the 40,000 natives of the country."

The reply of President Dole, and the dispatch of Minister Willis transmitting it to Washington, were naturally considered among the most important state papers in the controversy; and it is worth while to note the great precautions taken to secure secrecy on both Hawaiian and American shores. The United States war vessel Corwin, which had arrived at Honolulu a few days before, was to bring to this country the precious documents, and for that purpose was detained five days beyond its appointed time for sailing. Every officer of the ship was put upon his honor to return to the writer every letter entrusted to him, thus defeating the persistent efforts of the newspaper cor

respondents to get their communications carried by the Corwin. Special care was to be taken in landing at San Francisco to prevent the leak of Hawaiian news from the officers or crew of the ship. At midnight of the 23d the reply of the provisional government was delivered in duplicate to Minister Willis; and the Corwin, which was lying with steam up and anchor hove short, got under way at 4 o'clock the next morning for the United States, with President Cleveland's copy and the minister's letter of transmittal. Naval discipline sternly prevailed on the approach to the Golden Gate; and the vigilant reporters, and through them the country, were profoundly mystified for days by the close secrecy of all on board concerning their errand on the return.

By this time it was developed that the minister had no power under his instructions, which had been published in the United States, to execute his implied threat of the use of our naval forces in coercing submission if the recommendations of President Cleveland to the provisional government should be unheeded. For more than a week the fear was general in Honolulu, of bloody conflicts between the United States marines and the soldiers of the government; and after the exposure it was as generally felt that the minister had been cruel as well as deceitful in his implications of menace to the peace of the capital. Soon after the sailing of the Corwin President Dole called the attention of Mr. Willis to his still threatening attitude, and inquired whether some assurance that would quiet the injurious local fears could not be given. The minister made an evasive reply, in effect that the presidential inquiry did not seem sufficiently specific; but happily on the 29th the arrival of President Cleveland's message referring the whole matter to the arbitrament of congress enabled the Hawaiian president to advise the minister that the public mind was relieved and that persistence in the inquiry was unnecessary.

During the previous correspondence relating to the public alarm, Mr. Willis had represented to Mr. Dole that certain statements in his letter requesting pacific assurances reflected upon the president of the United States and his diplomatic agent in Hawaii, and that they should "be set forth with more particularity and certainty." He therefore asked that the specific facts supporting such statements be communicated to him. To his note of December 29th Mr. Dole added the inquiry whether the

specifications were still desired. After two or three brief and evasive letters had followed, Minister Willis definitely renewed his request for specifications. President Dole took ten days to prepare a comprehensive reply, and on the 11th of January transmitted to Mr. Willis an elaborate document covering twenty-eight detailed statements of grievances suffered by the Hawaiian government and the people of Honolulu at the hands of President Cleveland and his diplomatic representatives at the islands, Commissioner Blount and Minister Willis. The first and principal injury alleged was the withdrawal by the American president, immediately upon his re-entering the executive office, of the treaty of annexation then pending in the senate. Other specifications alleged mainly the secret appointment and service (so far as official notice to the provisional government was concerned) of Commissioner Blount and the unfavorable and unfriendly incidents of Minister Willis' brief residence at the Hawaiian capital, including the declination of the minister and his family to accept any of the social courtesies usually extended to persons in their official relations. A passage which was much complimented for its pith and point as well as eloquence of diction, is the following, expressing the most cordial friendship for the government of the United States:

"In conclusion I beg to refer to the statement in your communication wherein you state that it is a source of sincere and profound regret' that my letter brings for the first time the official informa tion that the warlike preparations described by you were caused by and intended for the diplomatic and military representatives of the United States.' In reply I would say that such regret on your part at receiving such information cannot exceed the sincerity and profoundness of my own regret that such a condition should exist. Such regret, on my part, is only equalled by my inability to understand how it has come about that a government and community which is to-day more closely connected with the United States by ties of commerce, friendship, and blood than any other lying beyond its borders, which values your friendship above that of all other nations, which fully admits and appreciates the many and deep obligations which it is under to your government and people, which has done you and your country no wrong, has been forced into a position where in defense of their very right to exist they have been obliged to take up arms to meet the possible hostility of that country whose flag they revere and whose principles of liberty they love. I cannot but believe that it has arisen through a misunderstanding of facts on the part of your government and mutual misapprehension of motives and intentions which may, I sincerely hope, at an early day be cleared away."

President Dole generously disclaimed any credit for